No. 33  Jan/Feb 2000                                                                                    ISSN 1363-9552

Prison Privatisation Report International

Published in London by the Prison Reform Trust

 

 

IN THIS ISSUE

 

Violence related to prison privatisation

Contracting for private facilities

Activation & monitoring of contracted facilities

Assessment of systemic issues within NMDC

The aftermath

 

Crucial lessons from New Mexico

 

 

    In September 1999, the State of New Mexico commissioned an inquiry and asked five consultants  to:

n examine, analyse and recommend solutions to problems regarding aspects of correctional operations in New Mexico, including the cause and management of the riot that occurred at the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility on 31 August 1999;

n review procedural and operational changes made subsequent to the riot to determine if remedial action taken is sufficient to prevent and minimise future occurrences;

n examine and analyse whether disorder management planning and training at correctional institutions in New Mexico meet standards of proper corrections practice; and

nexamine, analyse and recommend solutions to problems regarding security and operations at public and private corrections facilities in New Mexico;

n review a chronology of critical incidents that have occurred in the past three years; and address specific issues of significance to correctional operations.

    As well as the issues summarised below, the consultants reported on the State’s prisoner classification system, security threat groups and facility security.

 

 

31 AUGUST 1999:VIOLENCE AND RIOT

 

Major findings

Violence in Wackenhut’ s prisons in New Mexico had been occurring since December 1998.

On 31 August 1999, events at Guadalupe County Correctional facility led to the murder of a correctional officer, the stabbing of a prisoner, and a riot in a housing unit. The inquiry’s findings included:

n the combination of physical plant deficiencies and lack of staff in the main [GCCF] corridor on 31 August 1999 provided inmates opportunities to convey a homemade knife to the assailant in the [prisoner] Mares stabbing;

n suspended ceilings in the housing units (a correctional design flaw) provided inmates space above the ceiling to hide themselves, weapons, and other contraband that avails to them opportunity and equipment to commit violent acts;

n inmates with violent acts on record were transferred to medium custody inappropriately. GCCF lacked a proper method for detecting and assessing disturbance indicators to predict the potential of a planned insurrection;

n the State Governor’s statement and the notice posted by NMCD officials stating action that would be taken if additional violence occurred in the private facilities increased tension at GCCF in the days preceding the riot;

n the level of political controversy surrounding correctional issues in New Mexico had a destabilizing effect on the corrections environment;

n failure to investigate inmate misconduct and act quickly to remove suspects from the general population contributed to the violence at GCCF on 31 August 1999, and left two inmates suspected of the officer homicide in the general population;

n disparate levels of amenities between the public and private facilities increased tension. GCCF staff mismanaged critical inmate intelligence suggesting Los Carnales (LC) gang violent intent;

n the experience level of staff and the staffing deployment in inmate living units was inadequate;

n the New Mexico State Police were not properly notified of the riot; however, local police and the NMCD were notified in a timely manner;

n the concentration of LC gang members at GCCF, although designed to reduce inter-gang violence, provided gang members with an opportunity to establish a power base and carry out violent acts towards rivals and staff;

n the Secretary of Corrections’ decision to transfer difficult to manage inmates to a close security prison in Virginia may have stabilised the prison situation in the months that followed the riot.

 

Major Recommendations

n The physical plant deficiencies identified require attention and alteration.  A solid wall should be constructed between the caustics room and the gymnasium.  False ceiling panels in the cellblocks should be replaced with solid, tamper-proof material.

n A formal incident reporting system should be devised and implemented at GCCF.  Incident reports received should be immediately evaluated, their intelligence value assessed, and issues requiring attention addressed.  Formal documentation of action taken is required.

n A comprehensive analysis and revision of the search protocol at GCCF is necessary.

n Staffing issues at GCCF should be addressed.  Critical posts should be manned at all times when inmates are moving about, and supervision of housing units requires continual officer presence.

n Public officials must exercise caution when debating correctional issues publicly. Increased sensitivity to potential inmate reaction is required.

n GCCF must develop a protocol to ensure that incidents of inmate misconduct are carefully managed and addressed in a timely manner.  Failure to act can have catastrophic consequences.

n The disparity between the private and public facilities concerning housing amenities should be resolved.  Increased consistency and propriety of amenities according to custody level should be the goal.

n GCCF officials should embark on an aggressive programme of both in-service and pre-service staff training.  Ongoing recruitment of qualified, experienced employees is necessary.

n An emergency alert system should be installed at GCCF to ensure law enforcement officials are notified of disturbances and escapes without delay.

n The Department disturbance protocol should provide local administrators sufficient latitude to respond and resolve a disorder until responding authorities arrive.

 

 

VIOLENCE RELATED TO PRIVATISATION

 

The Company and the State

     During the inquiry, Wackenhut executives George Zoley and Wayne Calabrese gave their point of view about issues and difficulties in the private prisons they operate in New Mexico. These issues included:

n increased costs were incurred during construction and siting, primarily related to politics and bureaucracy;

n New Mexico delayed and down scaled the project, apparently due to State financing problems;

n numerous logistical problems occurred;

n the State pressured Wackenhut to accelerate activation which affected the ability to ensure a smooth transition;

n the New Mexico inmate classification instrument had placed maximum-custody inmates in their medium security units inappropriately, and NMCD officials rejected their remedial plan, apparently because it required the State to pay a higher per diem; and there were no protocols provided for addressing known New Mexico gang problems.

    From the State of New Mexico’s point of view, operational problems in the Wackenhut facilities contributed to the violence.  These problems included:

n incidents of excessive force and harsh management approaches at Lea County Correctional Facility (LCCF) may have exacerbated  their difficulties with inmates;

n inattentive inmate management and inadequate supervision existed;

n Wackenhut did not study the characteristics of the incoming inmate population and prepare for them with efficient inmate management and problem solving approaches. The relationship between the parties became strained when violence began to occur at LCCF, the first Wackenhut facility which became operational in 1998.  After the riot and the officer’s death in 1999, the relationship between the parties worsened. 

 

Major Findings

n Insufficient communication and mutual problem solving impeded a working relationship between New Mexico and Wackenhut from the beginning of the contract period.

nPlanning prison operations was apparently secondary to higher priorities such as rapid siting and activating of new prison beds, resolving the Duran case, and addressing political concerns.

nThe Wackenhut facility and staffing complement were not capable of managing inmates who were being classified to medium custody by New Mexico.

n Since there appears to be no system in place to flag and track inmates who are gang members/leaders so that they are placed appropriately, Wackenhut was not in a position to exclude them from the received population.

 

Major Recommendations

n Develop a special process for reviewing and discussing the profile of inmates to be transferred to any new facility, and especially a private facility.  Establish an automated tracking and alert system for disruptive and dangerous inmates.

n Engage in numerous team-building discussions to include problem-solving strategies between contractor and State to avoid dichotomies during the course of the contract.

nAssure that correctional terms mean the same for both parties to avoid misunderstandings and disagreements during the contract period, and to protect the safety and security of the facility.

n Establish a system for inmate management that must be used system-wide, to include contractors.

n Monitor, be aware, and respond promptly to the contractor’s or State monitor’s reported problems.

 

 

CONTRACTING FOR PRIVATE FACILITIES

 

Well short of industry standards

    The Guadalupe and Lea County privatisation projects may be unparalleled in their complexity.  Each project involves two contracts (one between the County and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation and one between the County and the New Mexico Corrections Department), a binding letter agreement, and the incorporation by reference of New Mexico Corrections Department policies, Duran v. Johnson decrees, American Correctional Association Standards, state law and federal law.

    To understand the contractual situation, it is necessary to go back to 1995 when the legislature authorised contracts for two prisons to be privately constructed and operated in certain specified counties.  In response, the Corrections Department released two requests for proposals (RFP) in 1996.  Ultimately, Wackenhut was selected for both projects, but because of opposition to Wackenhut’s financing method for construction of these facilities, both projects were ultimately abandoned. 

    However, those who expected to gain from these projects were not anxious to give up on them: the Corrections Department was in need of the prison beds; the counties wanted the jobs and revenue the correctional facilities would bring; and Wackenhut, which had expended considerable time and money on the 1996 projects, was anxious to recoup its investment and take advantage of its favourable marketing position in New Mexico. 

    To satisfy these various needs without new legislation, a New Mexico law was found which permitted counties to contract for the operation of jails without adhering to the requirements of the State’s procurement code.  While this was method was expedient, it created significant problems for the State and the Corrections Department. 

    Using this statute, Guadalupe and Lea Counties entered into contracts whereby Wackenhut would operate County jails which would also house inmates under a contract between the County and the Corrections Department.  The decision to contract for County ‘jails’ was a necessary manoeuvre because the procurement code exemption only applied to contracts for the operation of jails, not prisons.  Ultimately, however, neither facility ended up housing County inmates.

    The attempt to maintain the artifice that these were county facilities created County  responsibilities which often go unaddressed.

    For example, although contractually required, Lea County did not approve the facility administrator; neither County approved facility staffing patterns; and neither reviews Wackenhut’s job applicants to determine whether they should be denied employment for ‘security reasons’.

    The circumvention of the procurement code was the most damaging aspect of the approach taken with these two facilities.  Had the contracts been awarded through a competitive RFP, the facilities’ missions would have been more clearly  defined.  In particular, the type of inmates to be sent and the programmes to be provided would have been determined before the facility was constructed.

But, once the facilities were constructed, the Corrections Department had little choice but to enter into contracts given the political pressure which would have been brought to bear had Department officials said that the locations, price, programmes or operator were not to their liking.  To negotiate in this non-competitive environment for the best combination of programmes and price was impossible.

    The management contracts should have been executed well before facility construction began.  But, rather than a business-like and security-minded approach, the facilities were built and inmates were rushed into them under emergency contracts before final management contracts were even executed.

    At the same time, pressure on the Corrections Department to complete the contracts came from all sides.  The two Counties, apparently fearful that their economic development projects might fall apart, put pressure on the State to get the contracts signed.  Families with relatives incarcerated out of state pushed to have them returned to New Mexico; and Wackenhut pressured the State directly and through its allies for completed contracts.

    The contract legislation required that the Attorney General’s Office and the Department of Finance and Administration to review the contracts in detail, including review of provisions which should have been left to the good judgment of Corrections Department professionals.       The result was a review process so cumbersome that today it cannot be determined who is responsible for many of the inappropriate, confusing, incomplete and costly provisions of the contracts. 

    In the end, the complex contractual arrangements, the unclear facility missions, the need for prison beds, and the involvement of too many agencies and individuals in negotiations, resulted in contracts which fall well short of industry standards and create significant security, programmatic and fiscal implications for the State. 

 

Recommendations to the Legislature

n The present statutes addressing correctional service contracts contain some workable provisions, some conflicting provisions (e.g., county need not use procurement code process; state required to use procurement code), some gaps in what ought to be addressed (notably in the area of ‘speculative’ ventures), and some directions better left to the discretion of corrections professionals. 

    Therefore, it is recommended that the legislature enact new legislation addressing all aspects of contracting for jail and prison bed space in New Mexico.  Although not within the scope of this study, it is clear that other private facilities are being operated in New Mexico without sufficient oversight.  This should be addressed as well.

n It is recommended that legislation authorising construction of correctional facilities not specify particular counties, unless recommended by the Corrections Department. 

    Facilities should be located not on the basis of a county’s economic need, but on proximity to inmate families, availability of support services and transportation, an adequate labour pool, and other factors best identified and evaluated by the Corrections Department.

n  The Attorney General’s Office and the Local Government Division of the Department of Finance and Administration are given broad authority to review county privatisation contracts pursuant to NMSA 1978 Section 33_3_27 (1984). 

    Most of the problems identified in this document slipped by these agencies without notice.  At the same time, others took a more casual approach to their review of the contracts because they felt the Attorney General and Local Government Division would catch any problems.       Given the specialised nature of corrections privatisation, legislation should provide for primary review of the contracts by the Corrections Department or its consultants and not by these two agencies.

 

Recommendations to the Corrections Department

n The present Lea and Guadalupe contracts are in dire need of re-negotiation, if at all possible. Prior to re-negotiation, strategies should be developed to provide the Department with some negotiating strength.

n In re-negotiating the present contracts or in negotiating future contracts, the Department should allow the private contractor as much flexibility in operating the facility as possible. 

    One of the purposes of privatisation is so the State might learn whether there are better ways of doing things than their own way.  This is not possible when the contractor is required to adhere to all of the State’s policies.

    While it is difficult to know exactly which policies ought to be adhered to by the private company, it is better to err on the side of too few than too many. 

    The contract can provide that additional policies will be added whenever the Department deems appropriate. 

n Prior to the issuance of any future request for proposals, the Department should do a thorough job of addressing the numerous policy decisions which must be made to ensure an RFP which puts vendors on notice as to what the Department expects, while at the same time requiring sufficient information from the vendors so that the Department can distinguish a good proposal from a poor one.

nThe Department should ensure that any future activation of a new contract facility be well organised and gradual, with feasible start-up schedules, on-site monitoring and a willingness to alter plans to adapt to the realities of the situation.

n The Department should not enter into future contracts without a complete analysis of the contractor’s proposed budget.  This analysis may reveal that the contractor has underbid the project and will be unable to provide the services at the price it has proposed. On the other hand, there may be budget categories which warrant reductions in the contractor’s price.

n The Department should work with the legislature to pass all encompassing privatisation legislation. The Department should seek repeal of the requirement that the Corrections Department train private contractor employees.

    First, if a private contractor is not capable of providing adequate training, it should not be selected for the project in the first place.  Second, much of the training provided by the Department is specific to State employees (e.g., benefits).  Third, as discussed above, the training of the private sector’s employees eviscerates the State’s liability protections.  Fourth, this training is not provided when inmates are sent out of State, putting the Department at odds with the law.

 

 

ACTIVATION & MONITORING OF

CONTRACTED FACILITIES

 

'Corrections light' monitoring

 

    Unfortunately, the ACA [American Correctional Association] standards which consumed all of the Department’s monitoring resources could for the most part be described as ‘corrections light’. 

    These standards addressed such things as linen issue and exchange, telephone access, availability of religious programmes and a qualified chaplain, library services, and postage for indigent inmates.  A few could be said to have addressed more substantive issues _ i.e., classification, inmate discipline, fire safety and inmate activities - and the remainder addressed construction issues -  cell size, exercise space, etc.  However, the primary operational functions of the institution - maintaining security and control, use of force, control of contraband, perimeter security, staff experience, staff turnover, and operation of the inmate grievance system - are largely ignored. 

    The Department defends not having done more extensive monitoring on the basis of not having the necessary funding.  It reports that during the 1998 and 1999 legislative sessions the Department included budget requests for funding to monitor the new prisons, but that these requests were denied.  The compliance monitoring that has been done utilised two positions taken from the Department’s central compliance staff in Santa Fe.  On the other hand, the Legislative Fiscal Office takes the position that the Department has adequate resources available to staff monitoring positions if it desires to do so.

    According to staff members of the Legislative Finance Committee, the Department had vacant positions for Correctional Administrator  (a position compatible with the contract monitoring duties) in 1997 and 1998.  These were cut from the 1999 budget for non-usage.  The Fiscal Office points out that the Department has approximately 250 vacant positions, any one of which could be reclassified to provide the Department with the necessary positions to retain contract monitors.

    The Department agrees that the positions are available, but argues that it has no funds for them because of having to pay excessive overtime due to an inability to hire correctional staff at New Mexico’s starting salary.

    The successful activation of a facility depends on a number of variables, some of which can be controlled while others cannot. The private prisons in Lea and Guadalupe experienced the significant variables including:

n overcrowding in the system prompting an early and rapid flow of inmates into the facilities;

n unusual final construction decisions;

n difficulties in recruitment of staff;

n receipt of a diverse inmate population which posed management difficulties.

    States have a responsibility to monitor a private prison operator’s performance to assure that the inmates and the public are receiving the quality and quantity of services specified in the contract.

    While the State would not think of entering into a $10m construction project without hiring a person or firm to oversee that contract, monitoring of the Guadalupe and Lea County Correctional facilities has not been given the same attention. 

    The New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) has considerable experience with monitoring because of its long involvement in the Duran litigation; therefore, with proper technical assistance and staffing, the NMCD should be able to do a good job of monitoring the Guadalupe and Lea County contracts.

 

Major Findings

n The State decision to exclude electrical power from inmate cells created significant management issues, since inmates viewed the inaccessibility and use of electrical appliances in their cells at the new prison as a setback in comparison to cell amenities in State operated prisons.

n The inmate fill rate at the Lea County Correctional Facility was too high in the initial 60 days of activation.  The new and inexperienced staff were not able to adjust to the high rates of influx.

n Numbers initially received were from out of state and many had histories of discipline and management problems. Several inmates’ classifications were questionable, and Security Threat Group (STG) information clearly had not been reviewed.

nThe Guadalupe Facility experienced normal fill  rates at activation; however, within 90 days the facility was affected when inmates with strong STG affiliation and several with questionable custody levels arrived due to the closing of a major State operated facility.

n Monitoring of private prison providers has not occurred because of an emphasis on meeting Duran requirements and because of a lack of positions to provide the necessary monitoring.

n A conflict between the Legislative Fiscal Office and the Department has seriously impacted on the monitoring of the two private prison contracts.

 

Major Recommendations to the Legislature

n The Legislature ought to immediately fund a minimum of two positions for contract compliance auditing, together with funds for technical assistance in the training of the monitors and development of audit instruments.

n The budget issues raised by both the Legislative Fiscal Office and the Department should be addressed. However, funding of the compliance monitoring positions is too important to be used as the catalyst for resolving these long standing and complex problems. Contracting for the private management of prisons brings with it the duty to oversee those contracts for the protection of both the inmates and the public. 

    The cost of this necessary oversight is part of the cost of privatisation and should be considered as such in determining whether privatisation is less expensive than public operation of prisons in New Mexico.

n Achieve legislation and funding required to establish a private provider contract monitoring unit in the Department whose responsibilities would include compliance audits and oversight of the classification of all inmates (especially if out-of-state inmates are to be housed at private facilities).

    Include in the legislation a requirement that private contractors be assessed a fee to finance the monitoring project.

 

Recommendations to the Corrections Department

n The Department should fill its compliance officer positions with neutral fact finders as soon as it is able.

n The Department should train its monitors in auditing as well as in negotiations given the many conflicts inherent in the present contracts.

n The Department should prioritise its monitoring needs according to what it believes is most important, rather than immediately turning attention to Duran matters simply because they are Duran matters.

n The Department should use in-house specialists to monitor the medical and mental health portions of the contracts.

n Contracts such as those with Wackenhut are so inclusive that it is not possible to monitor every aspect of the contract, nor is it necessary. 

    Therefore, contract areas should be prioritised and those which are key trouble indicators and/or most likely to result in litigation should be given the most attention in the monitoring process.  In every case, there must be physical observation/testing for compliance monitoring to be legitimate.

n To be meaningful, monitoring needs to compare what is going on at public facilities with the private prisons.  For example, if a private prison has three escapes in a year this could mean totally different things when compared to a similar state facility. 

    If the state facility had no escapes, the private prison number would take on one meaning, but if the state facility had eight escapes the private prison number would take on an entirely different meaning.

    If the state does not have comparable facilities against which to measure the private contractor then comparable out-of-state facilities should be identified and used for this purpose.

n Require that planning of private facilities for the NMCD includes their input from beginning to end to ensure that construction and cell accoutrements are consistent with those of state operated prisons.

n Install electrical outlets in appropriate cells at the GCCF and LCCF.

n Link the monitoring unit function with the Central Classification Bureau to ensure proper classification assignments in the private prisons.

n Establish monitoring standards for private prison providers that empower the NMDC to require private prisons to operate consistent with state prison policies and procedures.

n Contract monitoring at GCCF needs strengthening and monitoring should go beyond compliance issues with the Duran requirements.

 

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF

SYSTEMIC ISSUES WITHIN NMDC

 

Buy Wackenhut facilities?

    The New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) has grown dramatically in recent years, consistent with national trends in corrections.

    Thousands of pages of documents were reviewed and numerous individuals were interviewed from September to December 1999. 

    Although the main focus of the inquiry was related to the riot and privatisation issues, numerous systemic concerns were identified. 

 

Major Findings

n Planning mechanism and process to strengthen the State’s ability to address correctional policy issues is either not in place or ineffective.

n The inmate classification process has demonstrated poor performance in evaluating inmate risk and threat potential.

n A budget process that ensures sufficient funds is not available to address the needs of correctional facilities properly, especially with regard to physical plant maintenance.

n The influence of gangs on the operation of correctional facilities in New Mexico is unacceptable and must be addressed.

n There is not a formal process for siting new prisons.

n The State has no capacity to monitor inmates held in New Mexico private facilities that house inmates from other states unless the facility also houses New Mexico inmates.

n Correctional officer vacancies in the public and private facilities are not filled and compensation levels may not be competitive with the job market.

n The inmate disciplinary policy is highly technical, outdated and cumbersome.

n The State has no contract protection to maintain private prison capacity on a long-term basis if it is essential to house the population.

 

Major Recommendations

n The parties should consider the development of a Correctional Policy and Research Council.  The NMCD should strengthen its research capacity to support planning efforts.

n The inmate classification instrument must be evaluated and improved.

n Annual budgeting should ensure that sufficient funds are available for physical plant repairs and asset protection purposes.

n A gang management programme designed to reduce gang influence on the NMCD operations must be established.

n The parties should retain population management classification experts and planners to determine the necessary number of secure maximum-security beds needed and funding for renovation and/or construction. A reconfiguration or addition to the Penitentiary of New Mexico (PNM) North or South is an option.

n A coordinated plan should be developed to add bed space with the NMCD consistent with the characteristics and security needs of inmates.  This is of particular importance with regard to high custody cases.

n Reactivate the South Unit at the PNM and utilise for additional administrative segregation housing.

n A formal process to improve the process of siting new prisons should be established.  The process must take into account criteria consistent with correctional needs.

n State officials should develop a method to monitor private correctional facilities in the State, including those that do not house NMCD inmates. 

n The establishment of a set of minimum standards is recommended, along with an enforcement mechanism.

n Correction officer compensation levels should be studied further to determine competitiveness in the employment marketplace. Furthermore, a staffing study is recommended to ensure adequacy of overall staffing, especially in inmate living areas.

n The inmate disciplinary policy should be revised, updated and streamlined.  The Secretary of Corrections should commission an internal task  force to address this issue.

n The State should consider purchase of the Wackenhut facilities or enter into a long-term lease arrangement to protect their interests.

 

THE AFTERMATH

 

Are Wackenhut’s contracts legal?

    Wackenhut Corrections Corporation’s contracts to hold State inmates in its prisons might be illegal, according to Stuart Bluestone, New Mexico’s Deputy Attorney General.

    The company also could face civil penalties for by-passing State procurement rules.

    If so, Mr Bluestone believes that this could give the state leverage in renegotiating the Wackenhut contracts. This, in turn, could result in lower costs, better security and more legal protections for the State.     

    “The state can negotiate from a position of strength rather than a position of weakness,” he said.

    But the company’s view is that the contracts were reviewed by the former Attorney General’s Office, and approved by all required state and county officials. It denies any allegations of misrepresentation.

    The Attorney General’s Office is investigating the contracts as a result of issues raised by the independent inquiry.

    Wackenhut has contracts worth about $25m annually to hold about 1,500 state prisoners at its two prisons. The State pays $53 per prisoner per day, including medical costs.

    The Attorney General has also said that all state contracts with private prisons will be reviewed. She has also raised the  question of whether Governor Gary  Johnson was allegedly influenced by “substantial campaign contributions” from Wackenhut Corrections Corporation. Governor Johnson has so far vetoed all legislative attempts designed to impose State regulations on private prison operators.

    The Attorney General issued a statement saying that “We should all look at the question of private prisons  with an open mind rather than with the preconceived notion that private prisons must be made to work here”.

 

AFSCME and ACLU say “stop”

     “When you hold these private vendors to regulations, they can’t turn a profit. The way they turn a profit is by cutting corners,” said Joshua Miller, an economist with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

    Miller was addressing a joint meeting of New Mexico’s House Appropriations and Finance Committee and the Senate Finance Committee on 24 January 2000.

    Urging New Mexico to stop privatisation, he also said that other states, including Pennsylvania and New York, had halted contracts with private prison operators and that Illinois has a moratorium on private prisons.

    Denise Clegg, acting executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of New Mexico, urged the committees to fund oversight of private prisons and to support a moratorium on further privatisation.

n Ralph Robles, a correctional officer at the State prison in Las Cruces, told the committees that New Mexico needs to raise public sector salaries.  He said that New Mexico was being used as “a breeding ground” to train correctional officers who then move on to higher-paying jobs in other states.

 

Wackenhut’s new lobbyist

    Michael Olguin, former State House majority leader, has quit his role as vice chairman of the Democratic Party in New Mexico to become a paid lobbyist for Wackenhut Corrections Corporation.

    On 14 January 2000, he announced that he would receive  $10,000 from the company that he had previously criticised.

    Following the incidents on 31 August at Wackenhut’s prison, he signed a letter from the Democratic Party to  the media accusing the company of “systematic deception.”  “It's time for the governor and his Republican colleagues to fess up: privatisation is a dismal failure,” said the letter. “New Mexicans were deceived by Wackenhut, by Governor Johnson and by the Republican Party...”

    His job now is to lobby for the company during New Mexico’s 30_day legislative session, which began on 18 January 2000.

     “I do have concerns about privatisation, but privatisation is here to stay and we need to do what we can to make this work now that it’s here,” he told the Albuquerque Journal.

    He also said that “it’s not about the money. It’s not even a lot of  money ...  I just think we have to get a better handle on corrections in New Mexico and if I can help to move this along in the best interest of the state, I want to do it.”

    Accepting Mr Olguin’s resignation, state Democratic Party Chairwoman Diane Denish said that “the Democratic Party of New Mexico remains opposed to privatisation and the prison management policies of the Johnson administration.”

n Senate President Pro Tem Manny Aragon, a leading Democrat politician in New Mexico, resigned his post as a consultant for Wackenhut Corrections Corporation in September 1999, after conflict of interest allegations were made (see PPRI # 32).

 

‘Super-max’ but no oversight

    Governor Gary Johnson’s administration wants to establish a ‘super-max’ prison in New Mexico in order to transfer around 490 higher classification prisoners from other facilities.

    Such a facility would cost between $4m to $5m to build if existing buildings at the Penitentiary of New Mexico near Santa Fe are reconfigured, and another $8m to $9m a year to operate.

    At least two members of the independent inquiry  board support the idea of a new 500 bed ‘super-max’ to hold gang members and other violent prisoners.

    But some legislators are sceptical of the idea since the Governor promised three years ago that privatisation would solve the prison system’s problems.

Meanwhile, Corrections Secretary Rob Perry had said that the administration would  be open-minded about a legislative oversight Bill this year. “I have no problem with independent oversight as long as it’s oversight within reason,” he said on 24  January.

But within days of this statement, the Republicans rejected an attempt by the Democrats to overturn the Governor’s veto of a Bill that would have been a first step towards some state oversight of private prisons. At the same legislative session, a Bill was introduced calling for an extra $6.6m for a ‘super-max’ prison to be allocated to next financial year’s budget.

 

Another lawsuit for Wackenhut

    Mentally ill prisoners at Wackenhut Corrections Corporation’s Guadalupe and Lea County facilities have allegedly been gassed, beaten and, in one instance, paraded naked down public hallways, according to a class-action lawsuit filed on 20 January 2000.

“Inmates with serious mental health needs are being subjected to solitary confinement, excessive force by correctional staff and dangerous conditions of confinement,” alleged Santa Fe lawyer Mark Donatelli.

    The lawsuit, filed in the US District Court in Santa Fe, cites Wackenhut Corrections Corporation  and eight other defendants. It is alleged that more than 250 prisoners with mental and developmental disabilities have received inadequate care in violation of their civil rights at the two Wackenhut facilities.

    “We are ready to defend the staffing and operations at both our facilities in New Mexico,” said a Wackenhut Corrections Corporation spokesman. “Both are in keeping with the general requirements of our contracts with the State of New Mexico,” he told the Albuquerque Journal.

 

Take your pick

    “The [inquiry’s] report is a devastating indictment of the current state of affairs in the prison system.” Mark Donatelli, prisoners’ lawyer.

    The document “may be one of the best things to happen to corrections for a long time.”  Rob Perry, New Mexico Corrections Secretary. Both quoted in the Santa Fe New Mexican 18 January 2000.