Prison Privatisation Report International
No. 62, May/June 2004
Published
by the Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of
Greenwich, London, England.
www.psiru.org/justice
This publication is supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society
Institute.
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IN THIS ISSUE UNITED KINGDOM NEW ZEALAND ISRAEL AUSTRALIA UNITED STATES COSTA RICA ARGENTINA GROUP 4'S DEALS PRISONS 2004 CONFERENCE RECENT PUBLICATIONS |
Contractors to have statutory powers over prisoners
Directors of private prisons in England and Wales are to be given statutory powers over prisoners in line with their public sector counterparts.
The proposed transfer of powers brings to a close one of the central arguments used for privatising prisons: that a government appointed controller is on site to monitor the contract and carry out statutory duties in overseeing fair and lawful treatment of prisoners.
Much of the controllers’ responsibilities - and some controllers too - are being swept away in a Correctional Services Bill to be considered by parliament later this year.
PPRI has seen an internal prison service document drafted by the assistant director, office for contracted prisons in the prison service, Trevor Williams. It is addressed to the prisons minister, Paul Goggins, and the chief executive of the National Offender Management Service, Martin Narey. Subsequent correspondence dated 17 May 2004 adds further detail. Neither document makes reference to any planned public consultation. The prisons minister has given “outline approval” to most of the prison service’s original proposals.
As planned, the Correctional Services Bill will transfer powers to:
In addition, legal advice is being sought on the transfer of powers to directors to:
Plans to transfer the power to restore additional days awarded to prisoners are not being pursued “on the grounds that to do so may prejudice the progress of the Bill.” And following comments from the prisons minister a proposal to transfer powers relating to RIPA will also not be pursued. This would have allowed directors to handle “covert human intelligence sources” ie, “covert intelligence gathering and handling informants.” This, the document states, was likely to cause “concerns raised by civil liberties groups (such as LIBERTY).”
It is also admitted that “allowing directors to authorise segregation and the use of force are potentially controversial” but the document states that: “whilst the proposed changes might be seen as contentious on their own, within the context of a wider Correctional Services Bill they are likely to be lessened in impact as a result of their specialised nature. It is unlikely that there will be widespread public opposition to these measures.”
However, “interest is likely from the same sources that opposed the creation of private prisons when the 1991 Criminal Justice Act was introduced (prisoner rights groups such as the Prison Reform Trust and Prison Service Trade Unions)” and “any media or public response should be handled by the office for contracted prisons in conjunction with the wider Bill preparation team...”
According to the document the role of controller was created because “at the time, the provision of custodial services by private providers was controversial and there was a campaign against the creation of private prisons ... as a response to this the role of controller was created to administer the internal prison discipline system of adjudications; to authorise the use of physical force against prisoners and their segregation; and to investigate allegations of inappropriate behaviour by contractors and their staff.”
But “the growing experience and maturity of these providers combined with contracts robustly monitored by the office of contracted prisons and oversight from the independent monitoring boards for each establishment, means that the time is now right to pass these statutory duties to the contractors who carry the operational risks associated with them.”
Now the prison service is also seeking advice on what the remaining role of the controller would be. “Are we correct in thinking that each contracted prison would still need to have a controller to conduct those legacy tasks that we do not transfer, but that there would be no requirement for that controller to only have responsibility for one prison and nor would they have any requirement to be based in the prison they were appointed to.”
Central to the plans is the claim that transferring these responsibilities creates “a more level playing field for contestability by putting directors on a similar footing to prison governors in the public sector. It would therefore be supportive of the general development of the National Offender Management Service [NOMS, see below]. “The proposals would “appropriately clarify the process of risk transfer to private contractors and strengthen the purchaser/provider relationship.”
Cost cutting also comes into it. “There would be a reduction of up to 25% in headcount across controllers teams ... the total savings across the 11 contracted prisons [by 2005] would equate to a figure of approximately £50,000 per establishment. This would be a realistic figure on which to negotiate with contractors in regard to taking over these duties.” Any costs associated with the phase out of these changes and staff training could be borne “from within existing resources” leading to an overall effect that would “deliver modest cost savings across the contracted prison estate.”
* One proposal in the original document seems not have been discussed in the subsequent correspondence and has not been included in the transfers to be contained in the Bill. No reason is given for this. The prison service wanted to “allow the flexible use of contractors’ staff to a level equivalent to that which exists in the public sector (specifically in relation to searching and supervision of prisoners by grades other than Prison Custody Officer (PCO).” The justification for this was that “it will resolve the present inconsistency whereby only accredited PCO staff supervise prisoners in a contracted prison due to the wording of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act. Contractors express frustration that public sector prisons can employ operational support grades and civilians to do some of this work when they have to use PCO staff. This has given the public sector a commercial advantage because they can employ cheaper, less highly trained staff to undertake work such as searching of visitors on entry to the prison, supervision of work parties, etc. Removing this requirement will increase contestability when submitting bids to operate prison services and reduce costs incurred by the private sector allowing in turn efficiencies to be passed on to the commissioning authority. The net result of this change will be to offer improved value for money and greater prospect of innovation from providers.”
Progress at Group 4's Medway but...
“Medway Secure Training Centre has made some significant improvements according to an independent annual report ...”
This was the headline in a Youth Justice Board press release of 2 April 2004 announcing publication of a report by the government’s social services inspectorate on this Rebound ECD (Group 4 subsidiary)-run facility for persistent offenders aged 12- 17 (see PPRI #60, 54, 48, 43, 40 & 37). Paragraph four noted, however, that there remains a “full agenda of issues to take forward in order to ensure a sustainable quality service.” The Board stated that “areas for improvement include considering further the policy and practices around bullying and assaults and planning a training and staff development strategy.”
Rebound ECD’s press release of 27 March 2004 - which, at the time of writing, was still on Rebound’s website (www.reboundecd.com) - offered what it calls “edited highlights” of the report. These highlights only include some of the inspectors’ positive comments. Set out below are examples of the inspectors’ concerns which neither the Board - the commissioning authority for the centre - nor the company fully addressed in their press releases.
The inspection was carried out in two phases: June/July 2003 and October 2003. Inspection of Medway Secure Training Centre, Kent, October 2003, published April 2004. Commission for Social Care Inspection, 33 Greycoat Street, London SW1 2QF, England. www.csci.org.uk
Medway - where the money goes
Group 4's secure training centres are run under the Rebound name. Rebound ECD Ltd - ECD stands for education care and discipline - is, however, a dormant company. In 2001 the business and its assets were transferred to Group 4 Falck Global Solutions UK Ltd.
The company that financed, designed, built and operates Medway is ECD (Cookham Wood) Ltd. The original contract was signed on 3 March 1997 and an amendment relating to a 36-bed extension of the facility was signed on 11 January 2002. The most recently filed accounts for ECD (Cookham Wood) Ltd - for the year ended 31 December 2002 - include the following details:
Sources: ECD (Cookham Wood) Ltd Directors’ Report and Financial Statements 31 December 2002 and Group 4 Falck Global Solutions Ltd Annual Report 31 December 2002. (Note: UK companies have ten months from the end of their financial year within which to file their accounts).
Investigation into circumstances of STC boy’s death
An independent inquiry has been launched into the death of 15 year old Gareth Myatt who lost consciousness while being restrained by three members of staff at the Rebound ECD-run Rainsbrook secure training centre. He died in hospital on 19 April 2004. He had been sent to Rainsbrook on 16 April.
The centre in Northamptonshire opened in 1999 and now holds up to 70 persistent offenders aged between12-17. It is the second of Group 4 subsidiary’s financed, designed, built and run secure training centres. As at 31 March 2003 the company had been fined £155,152 for contract failures at Rainsbrook (see PPRI #54).
Rally against privatisation
Probation officers held a rally and lobby of parliament on 11 May 2004 to protest against the government’s plans to restructure the probation and prison services along market lines. The government wants to subject the new service, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), to what it calls contestability. Individual teams, services and prisons will be forced to compete with arbitrarily set government targets. The National Association of Probations Officers (Napo) believes that further privatisation will be the result of that process. For details of the government’s proposals and NAPO’s response see: www.napo.org.uk/napolog
Law preventing privatization due
New Zealand’s Coalition government is confident that measures in the Corrections Bill to prevent future prison privatisation will become law (see PPRI # 54, 51, 46, 38, 34, 32, etc). The move will set an international precedent.
The government’s parliamentary majority will ensure that GEO’s existing contract to manage the Auckland Central Remand Centre will not be renewed in 2005 and no further prison contracts will be awarded. However, the opposition National Party has pledged that “the next National-led government” will invite the private sector to build and run future prisons.
Cornell is third hopeful operator
Cornell Companies Inc. has emerged as the second US private prison operator bidding for the controversial prison contract due to be awarded by the government of Israel (see PPRI # 60, 59, 56, 52, 45, 43 & 34).
Houston-based Cornell is part of a consortium with Israeli construction firm Minrav. This is Cornell’s first bid for a contract outside of the US. Other operators short listed as preferred bidders for the contract are Dominion Correctional Services and French firm GEPSA, both in partnership with Israeli construction firms and banks.
According to Minrav’s managing director, Arik Borstein, Cornell is “one of the leading companies in the world in building and operating prisons.” However, as at 31 March 2004 Cornell operated 64 facilities with a total service capacity of 13,878 providing detention, schooling and rehabilitation services for adults and young people in 15 US states and the District of Columbia. It also had six facilities under development, construction or renovation with an aggregate service capacity of 2,766 upon completion.
Since 2002 Cornell has been under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in relation to the company’s restatement of its 2000 and 2001 accounts. This followed a review of the sale and leaseback of 11 facilities and what the company describes as a ‘synthetic lease transaction’ from 2000. According to Cornell’s 10K annual report for the year ended 31 December 2003, “the company has cooperated and intends to fully cooperate with the SEC’s investigation ... the SEC has not given the company any indication as to the outcome of its investigation. If the SEC makes a determination adverse to the company, the company ands its officers and directors may face penalties, including, but not limited to, monetary fines and injunctive relief ... in addition federal and/or state agencies may be reluctant to enter into or prohibited from entering into contracts for the company’s services. Any such reaction from the company’s customer base could have a material effect on its business.”
Prison doubts ignored
In passing the legislation enabling the private prison to go ahead the government ignored calls to incorporate amendments that would provide more protection for prisoners and the public. It also ignored doubts raised about the need for a new prison at all.
The prison service has maintained that it needs 600 new prison beds for low risk offenders. But in a document dated 24 February 2004 the ministry of public security’s chief legal advisor, Hanna Keller, stated: “It is categorically clear from the facts given by the prison service that there is no target population to populate the private prison. I have to stress that this factor puts a question mark over the wisdom of promoting the whole process.”
Critics are also concerned that, according to the tender specifications, the government will pay the contractor for 800 prison places regardless of whether the prison is full. According to the ministry of finance, approximately $762,000 (£431,000) has been spent on advisors for the prison privatisation process.
MSU systems at Arthur Gorrie “limited if not virtually non-existent”
Fundamental operational deficiencies at the maximum security unit (MSU) at GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd-run Arthur Gorrie Remand and Reception Centre have been exposed by an independent audit commissioned by the government of Queensland (see PPRI # 61, 59, 56, 55, 46-43 & 41). GEO was formerly known as Australasian Correctional Management (ACM).
A death at a publicly run maximum secure unit (MSU) in October 2003 and security breaches at the Arthur Gorrie facility led the government to commission an independent audit of both units.
The auditors found systemic faults and made over 50 consolidated recommendations for improvements to policy and practice at both the public and private units. The report is “abridged because of the security risks and potential prejudice to pending criminal proceedings that may otherwise result from full release.” The term ‘NOT RELEASED’ appears some 60 times in the main body of the report.
But it revealed that, in respect of the non-compliance notice issued to ACM on 13 October 2003, “observations by a contract monitor assigned to AG [Arthur Gorrie] at that time reported that monitoring and reporting systems with respect to the operations of the MSU were extremely limited, if not virtually non-existent. As a direct result of this non compliance notification, AG was directed to implement a ‘cure plan’ to rectify a number of shortcomings ... this was done ... prior to these developments, however, it would appear that the custodial staff at the AG MSU also lacked direct supervision, clear procedural guidelines and reporting relationships, and ongoing management support.”
The auditors recommended that “the normal staffing complement for the day shift at the MSU at AG be increased by one officer to five, to comprise one correctional manager, one control room operator and three escort and search officers,” and that “the appropriateness of a separate systemic overview and monitoring of the operations of the MSU must be further considered by the department in consultation with ACM.”
Public Release Version Report of an Audit of the Management, Staffing and Operations of the Maximum Security Units at the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre and the Sir David Longland Correctional Centre. January 2004. Tabled in Parliament 7 April 2004. www.dcs.qld.gov.au
**Queensland’s current and future strategies for prison privatisation were to: “continue development of effective contract monitoring and performance; share in innovation; ensure cost efficiency.” The government’s performance measuring and analysis unit’s primary role was to: “collect, analyse and interpret data on performance information for the contract management unit (CMU) whose role was, in turn to develop key performance indicators and standards, develop contracts, negotiate with service providers and assess contract performance.” ‘Striving Towards Financial Best Practice Correctional Facilities Management’, Helen Ringrose, director general Queensland department of corrective services, International Quality & Productivity Centre 6-7 March 2002, Sydney.
Death at MTC-run prison
A 33 year old prisoner, Troy Crossman, was found hanged in his cell at the Borallon Correctional centre near Brisbane on 17 March 2004. Borallon has been managed by Management & Training Corporation of Utah (MTC) since 2000 and is the company’s only Australian prison contract (see PPRI #61, 48, 46 & 38-36).
PPP for New South Wales
The New South Wales departments of health and corrective services have called for expressions of interest from the private sector for a contract to finance, design, redevelop and maintain (facilities management) the Long Bay forensic and prison hospitals. Ancillary services at the new 135 bed forensic hospital will be contracted out. Custodial services at the new 85 bed prison hospital, to be located within the publicly run Long Bay Correctional Centre, will be provided by the government.
‘Independent’ research on CCA’s website
Governments considering prison privatisation as a policy option are being steered towards research that claims to be independent and ‘proves’ that private sector provision is cheaper, more efficient and more innovative than the public sector. Often this research is provided to government officials by corrections companies and their lobbyists or consultants hired by governments to advise on possible policy options.
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest private prison operator in the US, no longer operates in the international market. So research listed on the company’s website is aimed at persuading US authorities to privatise corrections. However, this research is also finding its way into the international arena as ‘proof’ that prison privatisation works. However, leaving aside arguments over methodology, the material cited by CCA as “a series of evaluation studies” cannot be considered objective as the work is funded and commissioned by the prison industry or through a network of free market, pro-privatisation think tanks and foundations. For example:
This study by Vanderbilt University researchers was commissioned and paid for by Corrections Corporation of America and the prison industry’s trade and lobbying group, the Association of Private Correctional & Treatment Organisations (APCTO, see PPRI # 54, 50, 46-44, 40 & 37).
This was published by the Rio Grande Foundation an organisation that refers to itself as “New Mexico’s free market think tank.”
Published by the Michigan-based Mackinac Center for Public Policy, an affiliate of the Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation (see below). Mackinac was described by the Lansing Bureau, 2 May 2004, as “ a Midland based think tank that supports privatisation.”
The Wisconsin Policy Research Institute Inc published this work in Wisconsin Interest, described as “a journal of ideas and reform.”
A Washington Policy Center publication. The Center refers to itself as “Washington State’s premier public policy center providing high quality analysis on issues related to the free market and government regulation.”
This report was published by the Iowa-based Public Interest Institute.
This now infamous piece of work appeared in the May 2002 issue of the Harvard Law Review (HLR). Although the author was a Harvard graduate student his affiliation with the Reason Public Policy Institute, a division of the libertarian and pro-privatisation Reason Foundation, was not mentioned (see PPRI #50).
The Reason Public Policy Institute published this work in 2002 and provides many references for the HLR article mentioned above.
Financial backing for these centres - if not specifically prison privatisation work - comes from a relatively small group of trusts and foundations. For example, The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Inc has funded the Macinac Center and Wisconsin Policy Research Institute Inc. The JM Foundation has funded the Macinac Center, the Rio Grande Foundation and The Reason Foundation. The Earhart Foundation has funded the Mackinac Center, Public Interest Institute and Reason.
The Heritage Foundation, which refers to itself as “a think tank whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values and a strong national defense - was launched in 1973 by Paul Weyrich with funding from Joseph Coors of the Coors beer company and Richard Mellon-Scaife, heir of the Carnegie-Mellon fortune. Richard M. Scaife and Holland Coors are Heritage Foundation trustees. The Sarah Scaife Foundation has supported the Mackinac Center and the Reason Foundation. Amongst other businesses, individuals and foundations, Heritage has received financial support from the Olin and Bradley foundations. Frank Shakespeare, another Heritage trustee is also a trustee of the Wisconsin-based Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
Paul Weyrich also set up the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) which, amongst other campaigns across the US, promotes model legislation for prison privatisation (see PPRI #38).
Sources: www.correctionscorp.com www.elitewatch.911review.org www.watch.pair.com www.mediatransparency.org
Geo’s gratitude - how it’s shown
“Later on at this conference, we’re going to have a break-out session on client relations. At the heart of that session is the concept of gratitude and how we show it to our clients - by contributing generously to the campaigns of elected officials who support our industry and our company; by regularly visiting the public officials who grant and renew our contracts, not just when we need something, but most especially when we don’t need anything at all; by joining community civic groups and contributing our time back into the communities that have contributed so much to our success; and in countless other small and large ways. GEO employees are grateful.” Extract from GEO Group Inc. president Wayne Calabrese’s address to the company’s 2004 leadership conference, April 2004, reported in GEO World, Volume X Number 2, second quarter 2004.
CSC faces $10 million lawsuit
A former social worker employed by Youth Services International (YSI) at the troubled Charles H. Hickey Juvenile School in Maryland has filed a lawsuit claiming $10 million in compensatory damages. The former employee alleges that she was raped by a student and the company tried to cover up the incident by blaming her. The lawsuit, filed in Baltimore County Circuit Court, also alleges that YSI and its parent company, Correctional Services Corporation (CSC), allowed the rape to happen through lack of supervision (see PPRI #61, 58, 55, 45-42, 36, 30, 26, 24, etc).
In May 2003 a state audit found that instances of child abuse or neglect were taking place at the facility on average once a week. YSI’s contract to run the facility expired in March 2004 and was not renewed. Maryland’s juvenile justice department is currently withholding some $1.8 million from the company. According to the Baltimore Sun, 27 May 2004, when the state took over the facility from YSI on 1 April 2004 “it found an out- of-control wreck of a juvenile detention centre.”
CSC is currently appealing against having pay a court imposed $35 million in compensation to the family of Bryan Alexander who died after allegedly been denied adequate medical care while a prisoner in CSC-run Tarrant County Community Correctional Facility, a Texas boot camp. In 2003 CSC was fined a record $300,000 by New York’s state lobbying commission for failing to report that it provided free transportation and other gifts to state lawmakers. Between 1992 and 2000 CSC received $25.4 million in contracts to provide halfway house services to the New York prison system. In March 2004 New York state assemblyman Roger Green was sentenced to three years probation and ordered to pay $3,000 restitution and a $2,000 fine in connection with hid relationship with CSC. He denied any wrongdoing and argued that the company gained nothing in return from this relationship.
Despite these problems CSC continues to win new contracts. Through its YSI subsidiary it claims to be the leading private provider of juvenile programmes in the US for adjudicated youths with 20 facilities and 2,300 juveniles in its care. CSC also operates 14 adult correctional facilities with some 5,400 beds. Overall, including aftercare services, it has 7,700 beds in 12 states.
Cornell’s strategy
“...it [the company] has taken steps primarily in the area of legislative and governmental monitoring and lobbying, in an effort to minimise these sorts of adverse developments in the future.”
This strategy was mentioned in Cornell Companies Inc’s recent 10Q report, 31 March 2004, filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission. The adverse developments Cornell is trying to prevent are negotiations with clients that fail to result in increased per diem reimbursement rates, “a key driver of the company’s gross revenue and operating margins” representing 71.2 per cent during the first quarter of 2004. The company states that: “in recent years as budgetary pressures on governmental units have increased, the company has granted a few of its customers relief from formulaic increase provisions in their agreements and some of our customers have not agreed to increase the per diem rates payable to the company. Such increases are often necessary ... to offset operating expense increases.” The company has “mitigated a portion of the impact of these developments “by reducing services or obtaining commitments for increased volume.”
Still no decision
Costa Rica’s constitutional court has still not handed down its decision on a legal challenge to the government of Costa Rica’s plan to award a contract for a private prison (see PPRI 52, 51, 49-46 & 42). Management & Training Corporation were negotiating a contract with the government to operate a 1,200 bed prison to be built at Pococi before the Ombudsman instituted proceedings.
New prison, public operation
The government of Argentina has commenced a tendering process for a $44.5 million contract to design, construct and maintain a prison at Agote, Buenos Aires Province. Operating the prison does not form part of the tender.
New investors in the frame
Group 4 Falck has entered into a definitive agreement to sell 100% of it shares in Global Solutions Ltd (GSL), which runs its international correctional services operations. The firms negotiating to buy are not prison or security companies but private equity firms Englefield Capital and Electra Partners Europe. Group 4 will receive £207.5 million in cash. Completion of the deal is expected to take place on 1 July 2004.
However, the deal is subject to approval from UK and South African competition authorities and the satisfactory conclusion of probity checks in respect of what Group 4 calls “certain Australian contracts.” PPRI understands that Australia’s department of immigration and cultural affairs (DIMA), which awarded Group 4 a contract to run the federal government’s immigration detention centres, has concerns about the deal being a possible breach of contract.
Group 4's disposal of the prisons business was apparently part of “a long term strategic decision to further achieve focus and sharpen the profiles of our two core businesses, namely security and fire and rescue. As this disposal also fulfils our objective to provide an attractive return to our shareholders, we are very satisfied with the transaction. Obviously we have also given due consideration to ensure that GSL now has a solid base for further prosperous development,” said Lars Nørby Johansen, president and ceo of Group 4 Falck on 26 May 2004.
Group 4 Falck’s proposed merger with British firm Securicor has also yet to be completed. The merged company will retain Securicor’s European and US corrections business. In announcing Securicor’s financial results for the half year ended 31 March 2004, chief executive Nick Buckles said that the company currently electronically tags some 3,000 offenders, an increase of 45 per cent over 2003. In the last 18 months with prisons in England and Wales suffering overcrowding, tagging has been extended to juveniles and people on bail. Mr Buckles was hopeful that in the near future taggjng could be extended to asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and become “one of the company’s growth drivers going forward.”
Prisons and Penal Policy: International Perspectives, 24 and 25 July 2004, City University, Islington, London England. A forum for an exchange of ideas relating to the development of prisons and penal policy in different countries. Keynote speakers will include: Prof. Loic Wacquant; Prof. Pat Carlen; Prof. Thomas Mathieson; Prof. Michael Tonry; and Anne Owers, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons.
On 25 July there will be two sessions on prison privatisation. Papers include: ‘Privatising Prisons: Australia, Canada and the US Compared’ by Phillip Wood and Kim Nossal; ‘Globalisation in the Sphere of Penality: Tracing the Expansion of Private Prisons’ by Michael Welch and Fatiniyah Turner; and ‘Comparative Criminal Justice Policy-Making in the UK and USA: The Case of Private Prisons’ by Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones. Registration and other details from: Nick Bolton Nexus Conferences, Hampton, England: Email: nbolton@nexus-conferences.com. Tel: ++ 44 208 941 3133. Information regarding papers and sessions from: Prof. Roger Matthews, Centre for Criminology, Middlesex University. Email:r.matthews@mdx.ac.uk Tel: ++ 44 208 411 6439. Conference website:www.prisons2004.com
Privatisation Update #11, Corrections USA, www.cusa.org
“The information the private prison industry hopes you’ll never see.” The latest of CUSA’s dossiers of mostly US press coverage of the private prison industry’s failings from July to December 2003.
Private Juvenile Prisons: A Compendium of Media Reports August 1998 -December 2003, Corrections USA, www.cusa.org
“What the private prison industry doesn’t want you to know.” A 44 page state-by-state dossier of press coverage. CUSA will also soon be publishing Private Jails, MTC Compendium and Private Medical Compendium.
The Death of Tallulah Prison by Xochitl Bervera, Colorlines, Summer 2004 issue, www.colorlines.com
The article describes the worst excesses of profiteering and human right abuses at this Louisiana prison. It also documents the emergence and campaign of Families and Friends of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children (FFLIC), a statewide juvenile justice movement.
Prescription for Disaster: Commercializing Prison Health Care in South Carolina, by Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Grassroots Leadership www.grassrootsleadership.org & South Carolina Fair Share www.scfairchare.org, April 2004
This report documents “the many problems - from seriously deficient services provided to prisoners to cost overruns and unpredictable, unstable contracting - associated with privatised health services in South Carolina and the nation at large.”
Consensus, May 2004, Citizens Alliance of Prisons & Public Spending, www.capp-mi.org
This issue of the Michigan-based CAPPS newsletter includes a critical cost analysis of the privately run Michigan Youth Correctional Facility, dubbed ‘the punk prison’. CAPPS argues that taxpayers are paying for a maximum security prison while two thirds of the prisoners are much lower risk.
Pan-African Conference on Penal and Prison Reform in Africa, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 18-20 September 2002, Penal Reform International, www.penalrefrom.org
Deatials the proceedings including the Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action, workshop reports, debates on prison privatisation and the establishment of an all-Africa association for prisons and correctional services.
Report of an Announced Inspection of Non-Metropolitan Court Custody Centres, July 2003, Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services, Western Australia, January 2004. Published March 2004, www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au
The third inspection report into aspects of Western Australia’s court security and custodial services contract operated by AIMS Corporation (Sodexho). Covering the regional court custody centres the inspection found “the same pattern of inadequate partnering” as in the two earlier reports on other parts of the system. Recommendations for improvements were directed at both the department of justice and the company.
Prisons in Victoria: Accountability mechanisms in the part-privatised prison service, by Valarie Sands, Alternative Law Journal, Vol. 29 No.1, February 2004. www.altlj.org
This article reviews “a number of historical and contemporary developments and issues in the public sector as well as the simultaneous evolution and application of these concepts to the Victorian prison system ... a number of questions about the independence and accountability consequences of the new corrections inspections and regulatory framework have been exposed.”
Private Capitol Punishment: The Florida Model, by Ken Kopczynski, 1st Books Press, 1663 Liberty Drive, Suite 200, Bloomington, Indiana, 47403, www.1stbooks.com
Review by Michele Y. Deitch, attorney, Center for Criminal Justice Alternatives, Texas.
The book is subtitled: “A true story of corruption, politics, and the for-profit private prison industry.” The work is essentially a heavily documented exposé, but one with significant policy implications. Kopczynski is an expert on private prisons and he serves as the legislative liaison for the Florida Police Benevolent Association. This book tells the tale of how he developed his expertise and anti-privatization convictions through his investigation of the private prison industry in Florida, and his subsequent exposure of a scandal that had reverberations throughout the industry.
By now, it is well known that the academic ‘guru’ on prison privatisation, Charles Thomas, has been discredited. The details of the story are less well-known, as is the companion tale of the resignation of the executive director of the state agency that oversees private prisons in Florida. But with the publication of Kopczynski’s book, those sordid details are laid bare for all to see. This privatization story makes you feel dirty and angry.
In a nutshell, Dr. Charles Thomas, a University of Florida professor and director of an academic research center on private corrections, had been a longtime darling of the private prison industry for his favorable research findings on the benefits of privatization. Thomas also consulted for the Correctional Privatization Commission, the state agency charged with independent oversight of private prisons in Florida, and was conducting a cost-benefit analysis for the state on privatization. Kopczynski was curious about Thomas’ work and began asking questions about the funding of his research center. After some significant investigative work, he uncovered evidence that the leading private prison vendors were subsidizing Thomas’ research and that Thomas had collected almost $400,000 from them over the previous eight years. In addition, Thomas had recently been named to the Board of Directors of the Correctional Corporation of America (CCA)’s Realty Trust, where he was paid and had an option to purchase shares of the Trust, and he owned a significant number of shares in a variety of private prison companies (later found to be worth $600,000).
Kopczynski’s findings led him to file an ethics complaint against Thomas, a state employee, with the Florida’s Ethics Commission. While the ethics investigation was pending, amazingly, Thomas performed consulting services for CCA and collected a fee of $3 million! Ultimately, the largest fine for an ethics violation in Florida’s history was lodged against Thomas, and under pressure, he resigned from his tenured position at the University.
Kopczynski’s impressive investigation revealed some other financial irregularities. For example, Thomas and the director of the state oversight commission, Mark Hodges, did consulting work together on privatization-related projects; Hodges abused his position and used state resources to undertake conflicting consulting work; Hodges had hired the chair of the state oversight commission - his boss - as a subcontractor on an in-state project; Hodges had accepted honoraria and a trip to Hawaii paid for by a private vendor; and Hodges had falsified records to cover his activities. Perhaps the most audacious act uncovered by the investigation was that Hodges had been paid $15,000 for essentially selling the Florida manual for contract monitoring of private facilities to the city of Youngstown, Ohio! Hodges too fell from grace, lost his job, and was subjected to ethics fines.
If this book were only about individuals whose greed led them to fall afoul of ethics rules and who were hoisted on their own petard, it would be interesting but not nearly as important as it is. What makes this a cautionary tale that deserves to be better-known is that Kopczynski reveals patterns in the way that for-profit prison vendors do business. For example, we see the private sector ‘investing’ in experts who serve their needs by providing a supposedly objective voice in favor of privatization. Kopcyznski even suspects that private vendors approach communities or agencies needing a jail or prison and persuade them to bring in one of these ‘unbiased’ experts as a consultant or to testify as to why the community or agency should privatize. The indirect arrangement benefits the experts who get paid (and later are referred for other jobs), and, of course, the vendors. And we also see the extent to which those charged with protecting the state’s interests are presented with constant temptations and subtle pressures to step in line with industry wishes and to promote privatization. The amount of money at stake with privatization of prisons is enormous, and one suspects that the misdeeds revealed in this book are only the tip of the iceberg.
There is an obvious lesson here: those hearing testimony in support of privatisation need to have a healthy level of skepticism about possible conflicts of interest on the part of these advocates (and, of course, on the part of advocates for the other side as well). But beyond this, the book raises significant doubts about the effectiveness of the Florida model for overseeing private prisons. The Correctional Privatization Commission was roundly criticized by Florida Corrections Commission and the Auditor General for its lack of meaningful oversight of private prisons and for its inadequate management controls. Moreover, Governor Jeb Bush and the Department of Management Services each recommended abolishing the agency, but the industry blocked any legislative effort to do so.
Kopczynski argues persuasively that it simply does not work for an agency outside the department of corrections to manage private prison contracting and monitoring. What appears on the surface to be independence is little more than an unfettered opportunity for co-option and corruption. States like Texas, which last legislative session actively debated a shift to this “Florida model” of private prison oversight, should take heed.
This is an edited version of Ms Deitch’s review and is reprinted with permission from Correctional Law Reporter, Vol. 15, No. 6 (April/May 2004), pp. 88, 92. Copyright ©© 2004 by Civic Research Institute.
ENDS
Prison
Privatisation Report International
Public Services International
Research Unit (PSIRU)
Business School,
University of Greenwich
Park Row, London
SE10 9LS, England
Internet: www.psiru.org/justice
Email: ppri@dsl.pipex.com