Prison Privatisation Report International
No. 59, December 2003
Published by the Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)
University of Greenwich, London, England.
www.psiru.org/justice
This
publication is supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute.
IN THIS ISSUE
| AUSTRALIA | UNITED KINGDOM |
| ISRAEL | REPUBLIC OF IRELAND |
| UNITED STATES | RECENT PUBLICATIONS |
Western Australia: AIMS prison “no benefit”
“It is clear that this privatisation delivered no benefit to the community,” Western Australia’s justice minister Michelle Roberts told parliament on 30 October 2003. Responding to a question about the department of justice’s second annual report on Acacia Prison, run by AIMS Corporation (owned by Sodexho), the minister also said: “ The model offered by Acacia Prison indicates what happens when a prison is privatised. For members [of parliament] opposite this was not just about building a prison. They believed Acacia would be their benchmark, their flagship, and the market leader in correctional practice. The previous government said at the time that it would provide proof that its privatisation policies would work ...we have seen the result has been a lot different from the rhetoric,”(see PPRI # 57, 55, 52, 48, 37, 36, etc).
On 19 November 2003 the West Australian reported the minister as saying: “Based on this experience, we wouldn’t consider privatising any more prison in Western Australia.”
The prison, commissioned by the former coalition administration, opened on 1 June 2001. Introducing his annual report, which covers the period June 2002 - May 2003, the director general of the department of justice, Alan Piper, said: “Throughout this period there has been a pleasing lack of serious incidents, major disruptions or escapes ... however, the overall performance of Acacia Prison, based on a range of other performance criteria, is disappointing. It under-performed in a number of key areas and delivered services at standards below the department’s expectations. As a result, AIMS was penalised A$356,756 of the total performance-linked fee possible.”
He also said that “the department provides a monitoring team with almost as many senior and experienced staff as it would take to run the prison if it were in public ownership.” The direct departmental costs that can be attributed to contract management during the year were approximately A$1.5 million. This includes the costs associated with the department’s monitors, contract management team and custodial contracts branch. The director general’s findings also included:
* The staff profile indicates that up to 90% of staff have no previous correctional experience (which has some advantages and disadvantages for prison operations).
* On 18 March 2003 Acacia custodial staff took industrial action lasting two days in protest over sick leave payments and a demand for 30 additional custodial staff to be employed. Following the strike AIMS increased custodial staff numbers, changed operational procedures and reallocated staffing levels to different parts of the prison to meet work demands.
* The most significant staffing issue is one of leadership. It is not surprising that the lack of leadership, poor support for inexperienced staff and inadequate prison processes have combined to create under-performance across the system at Acacia.
* The department was particularly concerned about the lack of support from AIMS’ Queensland-based head office during the first six months of the operational year. It was not until the industrial action and the Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services (see PPRI # 55) briefing in March 2003 that AIMS started to provide the necessary support.
* Many of the issues identified in the 2002 review and later in specialist monitors’ reports are still ongoing. They include: the integrity of treatment programme delivery; processes and methods of evaluation; and record keeping.
* The level of drug use at Acacia remains a concern.
* There were four unlawful releases during the year.
* The 2002 report noted that the full integration of Acacia’s security framework and innovative technology with management systems and practices - in line with the concept and philosophy of the prison - had not been fully utilised. This remains the case at the end of the second operational year.
* The level of bullying, stand-over tactics and general violence was low at Acacia during the year but the number of instances reported exposed concerns about whether the prison had adequate systems or strategies to deal with the issue.
* Aboriginal prisoners make up almost 30% of Acacia’s prisoner population. It holds more Aboriginal prisoners than any other prison in the state, including a number of Wongi prisoners. Acacia’s performance in relation to the Wongi prisoners was unacceptable during the year.
* AIMS has not established indigenous health service at Acacia and has yet to achieve the indegenous health services expressed in their initial proposal.
* Investigations conducted internally into food quality and the size of portions provided revealed significant problems involved in food distribution, including stand-over tactics and general wastage.
* Acacia’s performance in relation to the delivery of programmes in accordance with each prisoner’s individual management plan (IMP) requirements remains unsatisfactory, with the performance measure being met in only six of the twelve months.
* The prison’s inability to fulfil the contractual requirements is attributable to a lack of strategic planning and ongoing financial and human resource restraints.
* AIMS’ performance in the delivery of treatment and development programmes has been disappointing again ... with the contract requirements of the performance-linked fee measure met in only six of the 12 months ... is particularly disappointing given that the 2002 Performance Review and the last Annual Report made it clear that this area demanded immediate remedial action so that prisoners were not disadvantaged.
* At the end of the second operational year, the contractor has not delivered the number of programmes required as published in the schedule, nor have all the prisoners undertaken programme intervention as required in their individual management plan.
* A specialist monitor engaged in February 2003 ... found deficiencies in terms of programme evaluation and integrity, programme documentation and processes and 31 recommendations were made to address all the issues identified.
* The delivery of accredited educational and vocational training by the contractor has not met contractual requirements in 2002/2003 and the full performance-linked fee will not be paid. Rehabilitation outcomes were below performance expectations again, with the benchmark average of four hours tuition per week for prisoners achieved in only seven months of the year.
* Acacia has struggled to provide prisoners re-entering the community with the necessary support.
* For the second year, AIMS did not provide the required six hours work per day per prisoner at any point in time.
* The benchmark of 100% of prisoners employed or in programmes or education was also not achieved.
Contract payments and penalties
A total of A$ 23.04 million was payable to AIMS for the year 2002/2003. This was made up of the base contract fee and the payable performance-linked fee. Under the agreement, five per cent of the total possible fee to AIMS is withheld and payment of the full amount is linked to performance. Its level of compliance in the 2002/2003 operational year has seen only 69.5% of the PLF monies returned. This is primarily due to the prison failing to meet its reparation requirements.
* A$146,210 due for the % prisoners employed in programmes - AIMS received nil.
* A$146,210 due for the % contracted work hours provided - AIMS received nil.
* A$70,181 due for the required vocational/education hours provided - paid A$40, 936.
* A$70,181 due for the required offending behaviour programme hours paid - A$35,090.
Acacia Prison Services Agreement Annual
Report 2002/2003, www.parliament.wa.gov.au (and follow the links.) See
also Report of an Announced
Inspection of Acacia Prison, March 2003, Office of the Inspector of Custodial
Services, Western Australia, published October 2003.
www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au
AIMS court security: failures and fines
For the third year running AIMS (Australian Integration Management Services, owned by Sodexho) has failed to meet the contractual requirements of its court security and custodial services contract with the government of Western Australia (see PPRI # 57, 55, 52, etc).
In a statement issued 1 November 2003, Western Australia’s justice minister, Michelle Roberts, said: “While AIMS, for the first time, met budget forecasts of nearly A$18 million, a comprehensive review earlier this year highlighted that the service could be provided for at least A$1.5 million less. Clearly this is unacceptable and that is why other options have been explored to provide the state with better value for money.”
The minister also said that, as a result of under-performing, AIMS would lose A$95,546 of a potential $757,893 in performance-linked fees. “The company also risks losing a further A$100,000 following a coronial inquiry into its first death in custody in May,” she said. A review of future options concerning court security and custodial services is underway and a final decision is expected before the end of the state’s financial year.
Western Australia - courts are next
Despite the state’s experience with Acacia Prison and the court security and custodial contracts (see above) the government of Western Australia is to award a A$127 million contract for new court complex. The private sector’s role will be to finance and construct the buildings and provide accommodation, estate management, soft facilities management, user management and security services, custodial services and court booking.
In a statement 20 October 2003, attorney general Jim McGinty said:“We are looking for the sort of innovation and project management which will deliver a first class justice facility for Western Australians - and represent extremely good value for money.” Two consortia are being considered: Western Liberty Group which includes Multiplex and John Holland with ABN Ambro as the proposed financier; and Amicur, which includes Leighton Contractors, Broad Construction Services and the Macquarie Bank. The consortia also include security specialists, facilities services organisations, engineers and architects.
Security flaws in ACM’s Queensland prison
Australasian Correctional Management (ACM) has been served with a non-compliance notice for failing to report a prisoner-on-prisoner assault in the maximum security unit (MSU) of the Arthur Gorrie Remand and Reception Centre at Wacol, Queensland (see PPRI # 56, 55, etc).
The assault occurred on 11 October 2003 but the state was not notified within the specified time frame. Queensland’s prisons minister, Tony McGrady, only learned of the incident through a newspaper. It was the second security breach since July.
On 13 October 2003 Mr McGrady told parliament that he had issued the notice and that he was “incensed that the company failed to notify the department of corrective services or myself immediately of this incident ... Australasian Correctional Management faces the real possibility that it will have its contract terminated if the episode is repeated. Indeed, had it been issued with a prior non-compliance notice, the termination of the contract would have been discussed ... because of the seriousness of this issue. It now has seven days to put in place a strategy to ensure this never occurs again.”
The Brisbane Courier Mail, 20 October 2003, reported that ACM’s parent company in the US, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (now known as The Geo Group), had sent an audit team of three senior executives to investigate procedures at the prison. On 22 October the same newspaper reported that the prison’s general manager, Kevin White, had resigned and four prison officers were suspended with pay. On 28 October the newspaper revealed the contents of an internal investigation report which found that prison doors jammed and staff were unaware for up to 90 seconds that doors were open. The report also noted:
* The doors in the exercise yard tended to bounce away from the magnetic hold and were not constructed specifically for the electronic security system.
* Electronic failure did not contribute to the alleged attack on [the prisoner] and a prison officer had not waited for confirmation a door had closed.
* The closed-circuit television, which monitors prisoners, was obsolete and inadequate for such a high-risk area.
* The practice for prisoners to open doors under intercom direction from staff had led to an undue familiarity.
The report recommended that the four officers in the MSU be disciplined, console operation training be reviewed and the surveillance and electronic security door control be upgraded.
Commenting on the report’s findings, Brian Newman of the Queensland Prison Officers Association said: “It’s an example of human warehousing - locking criminals away and moving them around by remote control rather than having one-on-one interaction with prison officers.”
The Weekend Australian 7 December 2003, reported that a prisoner in the MSU allegedly assaulted three prison officers after they removed his handcuffs after returning the prisoner to his cell following an exercise period.
The Arthur Gorrie Remand and Reception Centre has been run by ACM since1992. It is one of two privately operated prison in Queensland.
Victoria: default notice for Group 4
The state government of Victoria has issued Group 4 with a default notice over failing to deal with repeated security breaches at the company-run Port Phillip Prison. In a statement issued 22 October 2003, corrections minister Andre Haerneyer said Group 4 “would have to immediately address security issues with an acceptable cure plan or face sanctions including the possible loss of their contract,”(see PPRI # 57, 56, 51-49, 45, 42, 37-34 & 28-15).
The company has already lost 10 per cent of its performance-linked fee this year due to health-related breaches of contract. The notice was issued in respect of security breaches including:
* 7 May 2003 - a targeted search by Group 4 revealed: a small handgun loaded with five bullets; a mobile phone; and a significant quantity of drugs.
* 8 May - a search by Group 4 and the state Security and Emergency Services Group discovered contraband, including mobile phones and a digital camera.
Mr Haermeyer said that a subsequent security breach on 15 August 2003, where a prisoner was unable to be located for more than seven hours, constituted a failure to provide the movement control of prisoners as required under the contract.
Speaking on ABC Melbourne’s Drive programme, 22 October 2003, Mr Haermeyer also revealed that an independent team called in by the state’s Correctional Services Commissioner to carry out a comprehensive security audit at Port Phillip “identified 39 areas where it was deficient. We then called on the newly formed corrections inspectorate to have a look ... and it has advised me that they’re still deficient in 24.”
In response to the government’s action, Group 4 issued a media statement on 22 October 2003 “acknowledging the seriousness of the two incidents” and saying that the company had “taken, and continues to take, commensurate and appropriate actions to ensure security is enhanced and tightened further.”
Group 4 was awarded the contract in 1997 to finance, design, build and operate Port Phillip. The contract expires in 2017.
Prisoner found dead
A 71 year old remand prisoner was found dead in his cell at Port Phillip Prison on 14 October 2003. Richard Barry Turner had with wrist wounds. Razor blades were found near his body A spokesperson for Corrections Victoria said that early investigations did not indicate that Mr Turner was suicidal or that he had been held in protective custody.
Complaints to the Ombudsman
According to Victoria’s Ombudsman “Port Philip Prison, the prison with the largest prisoner movement in the state, does not forward any property details, other than the number of boxes, when transferring a prisoner. This practice creates a breach in the transparency of the property chain, with the subsequent need for unnecessary enquiries.” The Ombudsman dealt with 106 complaints from prisoners at Port Phillip during 2002-03, the main concerns being property and medical issues. Thirtieth Annual Report of the Ombudsman - for the year ended 30 June 2003, tabled October 2003. www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au
Escape from ACM’s “university of life”
A prisoner who escaped from Australasian Correctional Management (ACM)-run Fulham Correctional Centre in Victoria on 27 October 2003 was caught by police after they intercepted a vehicle in the early hours of 28 October, according to the Latrobe Valley Express, 30 October 2003 (see PPRI # 57, 51-48, 32, etc). At the time, the police were unaware that a prisoner had escaped. Earlier in the month the Melbourne Herald Sun, 17 October 2003, reported that a prisoner on cleaning duties found a bullet in an area of the prison where punching bags are made. The find prompted a police investigation. The same newspaper reported on 9 October 2003 that police were interviewing three prisoners about an alleged racket to smuggle drugs into Fulham.
According to a new ACM promotional brochure for Fulham Correctional Centre, “Security is never compromised. Inmates are contained by highly efficient custodial technology and skilled staff members that allows for more open space and flexibility than most prisons. It’s a university of life.”
South Australia Courts
South Australia’s Labor government is tendering for contracts worth A$30 million to finance, design, construct, maintain and operate police stations and court buildings at Victor Harbor, Mount Barker, Gawler, Berri, Port Lincoln and Port Pirie. The government will run the policing and court processes, (see PPRI # 55, 50, 48, 43, 41, 10 & 7).
Meanwhile, consultancy fees on the proposed public private partnership women’s prison have already reached $119,909, according to figures given to South Australia’s parliament in October. A financial analysis of a police station development has cost taxpayers A$68,683 and an analysis and final business case for a proposed youth detention centre has cost A$100,217. The consultants were engaged by the state’s public private partnership unit. In opposition Labor pledged to cut the use of consultants by developing in-house capabilities.
Enabling legislation next
Israel’s cabinet has approved plans to commission an 800-bed private prison at Beer Sheva (see PPRI #56, 52, 45, 43 & 34). Legislation enabling the contracting out of prison management is due to be presented to the Knesset (parliament). The prison is expected to be operational in 2007.
Federal bail out for private prison industry continues
While states suffer from revenue shortfalls and some revise their corrections strategies away from incarceration (see FAMM report, page 14), private prison operators who need incarceration rates to grow can continue to seek solace from the federal government, (see PPRI # 58 & 38).
In September attorney general John Ashcroft ordered prosecutors to seek the most serious possible charges for almost all federal cases. More recently, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it wants additional prison bed space to hold up to 8,000 suspected illegal immigrants per day. The current detainee population is around 22,000 and security officials want to catch 400,000 of the supposed 8 million -11 million illegal immigrants in the US. The government aims to apprehend and deport all of them within five years.
According to the Houston Chronicle, 7 December 2003, Garrison Courtney of the Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement said: “If we don’t have a place to keep them, they’re going to disappear and we will have to go look for them again.”
Wackenhut becomes Geo Group
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC) is now known as The Geo Group Inc. The new name became effective on 25 November 2003. According to the company the name has nothing to do with the fact that the founder was George Wackenhut or the current chairman and chief executive is George Zoley. “The Geo Group will continue to strive for high quality, efficiency and innovation in the delivery of outsourced government services around the world in the same way that we have done under the name Wackenhut Corrections Corporation for almost twenty years.” said George Zoley in a media statement on 18 November 2003.
Giving to the governator
California’s new governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, refused donations from the state’s prison guards union, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association, but he did not turn down $53,000 from The Geo Group. According to the Los Angeles Times, 28 November 2003, “the money came as the state prepared to close a 224-bed Wackenhut Corrections Corp. facility December 31 in the Central Valley town of McFarland.” Geo has four of the nine private prisons in California housing state prisoners. Geo’s president, Wayne Calabrese, told the newspaper: “We have a large investment in California ... we want to do everything we can to preserve our business base ... we thought we should support a candidate and governor who has articulated support for public-private partnerships.”
Low staffing, missed opportunities at Group 4 prison
Group 4-run Rye Hill prison is “in many ways an example to most public sector prisons. However, as we have reported in relation to other private sector prisons this open and relaxed approach can carry risks, ”according to Anne Owers, the chief inspector of prisons for England and Wales.
In her recent report she also pointed out that “as in other privately-managed prisons there was a generous amount of time out of cell. However, too much of the work that was provided was low-skilled and, where skills were acquired, they were rarely accredited. Private sector contracts have tended to focus on the quantity rather than the quality of provision and this needs to be addressed.”
The chief inspector made 83 recommendations for improvements and also noted nine examples of good practice.
Rye Hill is a privately financed, designed, built and managed 600 bed category B training prison for male prisoners serving sentences of four years or more. The prison, in Warwickshire, central England, opened in January 2001. It was Group 4's fourth prison contract in the UK. When the chief inspector visited in June 2003 the prisoner population was 659. The report did not mention that the company was fined £60,000 in June 2002 for allowing a prisoner to escape.
Overall, the inspector found that prisoners were held in a reasonably safe environment. But there was a need “for managers and staff to remain alert to issues of safety ... partly because of the low staffing levels on residential units and the relative inexperience of many prison custody officers. Rye Hill’s prisoner population was long term, experienced and sometimes sophisticated, which added another dimension to the dynamics of the relationships between staff and prisoners. Many prisoners were frustrated because staff failed to resolve some basic and immediate issues. It was important that steps were taken to address this problem. Although prison custody officers were in control in the prison, there remained a need for staff to set clear boundaries in their relationships with prisoners. For many, this required an increased sense of confidence and authority in their daily interactions with prisoners.”
Other issues included:
* There was very little specifically in place for prisoners spending their first night at Rye Hill, and there was “a need for the prison to reflect on the potential stresses that new prisoners experienced on entering the very different environment provided at this establishment. Risk assessments for cell sharing were completed, but the information contained in them was not always taken properly into account when deciding where to locate prisoners.”
* Fifty nine per cent of prisoners surveyed said that they had problems when they first arrived yet only 26% felt that they had been helped to sort out these problems at reception.
* Induction for vulnerable prisoners “could be inconsistent”.
* The profile of anti-bullying was “not high” and there was no programme that challenged bullies, although steps were being taken to correct this. There had also been “no prison-wide analysis of bullying information reports that could have identified ongoing trends. There was no safer custody committee. We could not accept that in a long term training prison only three of over 650 prisoners were involved in bullying in five months.”
* There was no work or education available for prisoners in the segregation unit.
* Although respect was at the centre of all relationships between staff and prisoners “unfortunately, some of the systems in place did not reflect this. This was particularly so for race relations and for the management of applications and complaints.”
* “It was not possible for prisoners to open their cell windows and cells became unreasonably hot, particularly for those prisoners in double occupancy cells.”
* The inspectors “received various complaints from prisoners about the opening of legal correspondence.”
* When prisoner resorted to the formal complaints procedure they did not always receive answers that were courteous or that fully addressed the point.” There was no effective system that ensured adequate responses to prisoners’ complaints. There were no statistics on how long it took for prisoners to receive replies, if they were fortunate enough to do so at all. “These deficiencies combined to make the complaints system a major cause of frustration for prisoners and there was a need to review and improve the systems in place.”
* Despite approximately 35% of prisoners being from black or ethnic minority groups “race and
diversity were not areas on which the prison had focused. The prison operated an outdated policy and it was clear that some of the assistant race relations liaison officers (RRLOs) on the wings did not fully understand the nature of the work they were required to do. There was also a need for training in complaints handling for all RRLOs and managers. Ethnic monitoring was undertaken and range setting was in place, but the data being scrutinised was not always reliable. There was no evidence of a commitment to the promotion of diversity throughout the prison and prisoners reported to us that they believed some staff displayed racial bias.”
* There were also over 100 foreign nationals in the prison but “their specific needs were largely neglected. They had no co-ordinator, and there was no understanding of what working with this group might amount to.”
* For prisoners who had work, employment opportunities were “varied” and there was “a lack of quality in much of the work available.” Around150 prisoners were unemployed each day.
* There was
“very little accreditation of training throughout the prison and this led to
many missed opportunities. Co-ordination of training throughout the prison was
not good either and there was very little sharing of some of the good practice
found in individual areas.” Overall, “quality assurance of both education and
training was poor.”
* Curriculum management within education was “inadequate.”
* There had been no formal monitoring of the quality of teaching and learning for over a year. A detailed survey of [prisoners feedback] had not been carried out for 14 months.
* There were insufficient numbers of trained staff to be able to offer accredited vocational training courses.
* All prisoners could go to physical education, but “the work undertaken there was essentially recreational. There was no effective training or systematic delivery of service to prisoners requiring remedial help.”
* There was “a need for the prison to take a wider view of resettlement rather than focusing simply on matters of risk reduction. Its resettlement strategy was out of date and had a narrow focus. Although a resettlement policy committee met bi-monthly, it was not monitoring or driving resettlement work effectively throughout the establishment.”
* Public protection measures were “not always effective.”
* In general “we found many custody officers experiencing difficulties in effectively managing the considerable demands made on them by prisoners.”
* As personal officers, prison custody officers generally “did not have a detailed knowledge of the prisoners for whom they were responsible … prison custody officers were not properly trained for their work as personal officers and … they did not properly fulfil the role.”
* The staffing complement for visits was one supervisor and eight prison custody officers (PCOs) although “there were only five PCOs when we inspected … it was clearly very difficult to provide proper supervision with less than the full complement of staff. Staff were also hampered because several of their personal radios were broken or on ‘receive only’ mode. In addition, the closed-circuit television room was not always staffed. The closed visits area was unsatisfactory.”
* The inexperience of some staff meant that they lacked either the knowledge or confidence to respond to questions raised by often very sophisticated and adept prisoners.
* At the time of the inspection nearly all health care staff vacancies were filled for the first time since the prison opened.
* Prisoners enjoyed considerable time out of cell each day and at weekends. The only complaint received on this subject was that “some prisoners felt they were unlocked for too long.”
* 22.6% of prisoners were unemployed. Pay differentials were significant and there was “little incentive for prisoner to opt for education.”
* Force was used “as a last resort.” But the documentation on the use of force was poorly completed. “Sections indicating that the duty manager and the doctor had been informed remained blank. In 10% of the forms sampled there was no certification for the use of force. In one case involving the use of force by four officers, none of them had made statements.”
* None of the prisoners due for release within four weeks of the inspection had been seen by a resettlement officer. “Sixty five per cent said they had no help in finding a job on release; 71% had no help on finding accommodation on release; 73% had no help with their finances in preparation for release; and 62% had no help in claiming benefit on release.”
* ARAMARK provided catering for prisoners, staff and visitors. The quality of the prepared and cooked food was good. “There was inadequate supervision of meals on wing serveries with the result that portion control was not being monitored and prisoners at the end of the queue were given smaller portions than those at the beginning. Menus were uninspiring with few choices for healthy eating and a poor selection of traditional Muslim dishes.”
*ARAMARK also provided the prison shop. A good range of goods was offered but “prices were high.”
Report on a Full Announced Inspection of HM
Prison Rye Hill, 16-20 June 2003, HM Inspector of Prisons, 22 October 2003.
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/justice/prisons/inspprisons/inspection.html
Inquiry into alleged racism at Group 4 detention centre
The government has ordered an urgent independent inquiry into the alleged culture of racism at Group 4-run Yarl’s Wood immigration detention centre in Bedfordshire.
The move is in response to revelations about staff attitudes towards detainees published by the Daily Mirror 8 December 2003 (www.mirror.co.uk). A Mirror reporter provided a false job application, was hired as a security officer by Group 4 and spent seven weeks working under cover at the centre before being found out. The reporter alleges that staff boasted of using violence and intimidation on detainees. In his view “some staff opinions would not have been out of place at a far right rally.”
Yarl’s Wood reopened recently after being burned down during riots last year. Currently it employs 120 staff and holds 60 detainees but is due to take up to 400.
The reporter claims that a psychologist brought in to retrain staff told them that violence was a last resort but that he was “going to train you in how to deal with the really nasty people. Group 4 started treating people humanely, teaching them about duty of care. That’s fine, as far as it goes. If you start treating these people humanely they think it’s a pushover.” Detainees were described as “bastards who will always let you down.” The reporter was allegedly instructed not to treat “scum” with sympathy or believe their harrowing stories.
Immigration minister Beverley Hughes said: “The Mirror’s investigation raises some very serious issues. The government expects those who run centres like Yarl’s Wood on our behalf to treat immigration detainees with decency and respect.”
Two prisons, escort services up for grabs
Justice minister Michael McDowell has obtained government approval for the management of open prisons Loughan House in County Cavan and Shelton Abbey in County Wicklow to be contracted out and the prisoner escort service privatised (see PPRI # 58). Two other prisons could be closed.
Yet on 15 October 2003, the minister told the Dáil (parliament) “I can state categorically that there is no plan in my department to privatise the prison service.” Meanwhile, a prison service study in 2002 concluded that “privatisation of prisoner escorts is not a viable option ... it would not be appropriate to privatise the service at a time when it is not operating efficiently as this would militate negatively against the level of efficiencies and cost savings that could reasonably be expected to be achieved in the normal course.”
The Prison Officers Association has already proposed savings of Euros 30 million. In a statement on 11 November 2003, Rick Lines of the Irish Prison Reform Trust said: “Since August we have argued that the minister is manufacturing a crisis in order to push through an ideologically driven agenda under the guise of a solution. These fears have now been borne out.”
Corrections Corporation of America: A Critical Look At Its First 20 Years, P. Mattera. M. Khan and S. Nathan, Grassroots Leadership, www.grassrootsleadership.org
An analysis of the company’s past and current performance in the US and its international joint venture operations before they were sold. The report argues that legislators should think twice before commissioning the company - which is still $1 billion in debt - and that CCA’s operational record is an example of how the pursuit of profit stands in the way of carrying out a core public function such as corrections.
The Journal of Offender Monitoring, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2003. Celebrating Twenty Years of Electronic Monitoring: 1983-2003. Special Supplement to Community Corrections Report on Law and Corrections Practice. www.civicresearchinstitute.com
According to The Journal’s founder, Marc Renzema, “after 20 years of electronic monitoring, what do we know about its effects on offender behaviour? Clearly, not as much as we should ... all that I can see clearly at present is that although EM may be justified on economic and humanitarian grounds, when one apples it in isolation from other services, it has no detectable impact on recidivism.” Also includes articles such as Electronic Monitoring in Europe: Momentum and Caution, by J. Robert Lilly, Dick Whitfield and René Lévy.
Smart on Crime: Positive Trends in State level Sentencing and Corrections Policy, J. Greene, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, December 2003. www.famm.org
Twenty five states have abolished mandatory minimum sentencing laws, accelerated parole, increased time off for good behaviour, diverted prisoners into treatment programmes or otherwise cut the use of incarceration. It is not only the financial crisis faced by states that is driving this trend. Correctional practices are being re-evaluated with policymakers taking account of research that has questioned the effectiveness of incarceration.
The Late Modern Prison and the Question of Values, Alison Liebling, Cambridge University. Plenary Paper presented at the Australia and New Zealand Criminology Conference, 1-3 October 2003, Sydney. Author’s email: al115@cam.ac.uk
The paper explores “the arrival and the impact of the concept of performance and the links apparently forged between managerialism and moral values.” It includes a brief discussion of a comparative study in the UK that highlighted, amongst other things, that the line between ‘permissive’ and ‘without condescension’ is very narrow. “This was illustrated dramatically in the case of [Premier-run] Doncaster prison, one of the best in our study, but which shortly after our research went on to experience two escapes. These were linked, in the [prison service] director general’s view (and in the light of other research on private prisons), to levels of trust that may have exceeded our moral framework, or at least to other important security values being too low (at the time of our research).” Doncaster was “out of balance in its ‘harmony orientation’: cooperative and democratic relations mattered to the detriment of rule enforcement.”
An Inspection of Harmondsworth Immigration
Removal Centre, September 2002, HM Inspectorate of Prisons, August 2003. This
report and others relating to privately run immigration facilities in the UK
can be found at:
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/justice/prisons/inspprisons/inspectionim.html
Following the inspection of this UK Detention Services Ltd (owned by Sodexho)- run facility the inspector noted: “specific aspects ... that caused us particular concern. The centre as a whole was not well-equipped to ensure detainees’ protection. Staffing levels were low, there was no means of locking down the centre in the event of concerted indiscipline, and no health and safety assessments of the risks to detainees had been carried out... Harmondsworth ... did not meet three of our four tests for a healthy custodial environment.”
Paying for Private Profit, A Review of the Public Private Partnership Model in the Provision of Community Infrastructure and Services, Strategic Economics, August 2003. Available (cost A$10) from the Community & Public Sector Union -SPSF Group (Federal Office). Email: fedsec@spsf.asn.au
“The PPP model is often inappropriate, poorly understood and relatively expensive compared to other techniques, and over the life of the project full of significant risks to government, the community and workers.”
Forty Ninth Report: The Operational Performance of PFI Prisons (HC 904),
Committee of Public Accounts, 2 December 2003.
www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/committee_of/pac021203_pn49.cf
“There is a strong case for greater
co-operation and learning between publicly and privately managed prisons, and
the prison service should take a tough approach with failing prisons whoever
manages them.” This parliamentary committee’s formal acceptance of the National
Audit Office report The Operational Performance of PFI Prisons (see PPRI # 57).
Leftovers and Scraps, library and information resources and access in
Australia’s immigration detention centres, Dr Alan Bundy. Appendix: relevant
reports, standards, guidelines and case law by Gayle Davies.
www.alia.org.au/advocacy/submissions/leftovers.and.scraps.html
A review of services provided to
detainees in ACM-run detention centres in mainland Australia. Findings
included: “ … the service provider appears to have no contractual obligation or
corporate policy for the provision of library and information resources and
access ... it has no knowledge of library operations and appears not to have
sought professional advice.”
ENDS
Prison Privatisation Report International
Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)
School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences
University of Greenwich
30 Park Row, London SE10 9LS, England
Internet:www.psiru.org/justice
Email: Stephen Nathan, stephennathan@compuserve.com