Prison Privatisation Report
International
No. 53, February 2003
Published by the Public
Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) University of Greenwich, London,
England.
www.psiru.org/justice
This publication is supported
by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute.
IN
THIS ISSUE
Premier’s Ashfield: the
“worst” prison in England and Wales
This issue of PPRI covers a newly
published report on a failing private prison for children and young offenders
in England. Her Majesty’s Prison & Young Offender Institution Ashfield,
financed, designed, built and run by Premier Prisons is described by the chief
inspector of prisons for England and Wales as unsafe, suffering from inadequate
management, staffing and training, a lack of regime provision and poor contract
monitoring (see PPRI #47). Some good practices were noted but the chief
inspector recommended 115 improvements to be implemented. Extracts from the
full inspection report - which runs to
over 150 pages - are set out from page three onwards.
The director general of the prison service, Martin Narey, has referred to Ashfield as the worst prison in England and Wales and is threatening to take it into the public sector if improvements are not made. After initially denying the prison service's concerns about Ashfield, the youth justice board (YJB), which is responsible for all offenders up to the age of 17, is withdrawing 172 sentenced prisoners from the prison, having already withdrawn 91.
At Ashfield, the YJB contracts with the prison service which, in turn contracts with Premier. Speaking on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, 5 February 2003, Mr Narey said that Premier has lost around £2 million in revenues so far.The prison service is now discussing Ashfield's future role with Premier and the YJB.
The prison near
Bristol, south west England, opened in November 1999. It holds remanded and
sentenced young offenders (young people between the ages of 18-21 years) and
juveniles (children and young people between the ages of 15-18 years). Its
operational capacity is 400 with approximately 100 places designated for young
offenders and 300 places available for juveniles. On 2nd July 2002,
when the chief inspector visited, the number of children and young people held
was 289.
It is also noteworthy that, under the terms of Premier's contract - and normal under the private finance initiative (PFI) - the banks that financed the prison's construction decide whether they choose another private operator or allow the public sector to take over.
On 23 May 2002, the
prison service took the unprecedented step of removing the company’s prison
director and installing public sector management. At that time the director general of the prison service said: “I
found that standards of care and control of prisoners were not as high as I
would expect them to be. I considered that the prison was unsafe for both staff
and the young people detained there and that urgent action was required. I
informed Premier Custodial Services of my decision today and I will continue to
monitor the situation at Ashfield very closely. My aim is that the prison
should be made safe and constructive and that in due course we are able to hand
management back to a director appointed by Premier.”
By September 2002,
some improvements had been made and control was returned to Premier but only
after a public sector prison governor was hired by the company to run Ashfield.
The chief inspector
of prisons made an announced inspection of Ashfield in July 2002. The report is dated October 2002. but it was
not published until 5 February 2003. No explanations have been given as to why
publication was delayed.
In a statement
accompanying the report’s publication, the director general of the prison service said: “Ashfield has been struggling for some considerable time to
provide an environment for young people which is safe and constructive. Premier’s failures were so significant that
in May 2002, some time before the Inspectorate’s visit, I considered closing it
and would have done so were it not for the population pressures we were
facing. Instead, I took the
unprecedented step of imposing a public sector governor and he made significant
improvements. As the HMCIP [chief
inspector] report acknowledges, a new, more constructive and safer regime, some
weeks in the design stage, was successfully launched shortly after the HMCIP
visit.
“But these early
improvements were not built upon as I had hoped. Since then I have personally intervened to help Premier recruit,
in Vicky O’Dea, one of the most talented, committed and inspirational governors
in the Prison Service. I have immense
confidence in her and at last I am beginning to see signs of fundamental change
for the better ... if the recent improvements at Ashfield are not built upon I
will have to consider terminating the contract by inviting Premier’s bankers to
appoint another private sector company to run the prison. Failing that, I will have to consider bringing
Ashfield into the public sector. For
the time being, we will only be using half the places at Ashfield and paying
Premier only part of its monthly fee.”
According to Mr Narey
the introduction of the private sector into the running of prisons has brought
immense benefits, but “Ashfield, by some measure, is the worst. Sustained improvement is now vital if I am
to be persuaded to leave the management of Ashfield in Premier’s hands.”
Ashfield’s
performance and the prison service’s handling of the situation have been
criticised by prison reform organisations and trade unions. Juliet Lyon,
director of the Prison Reform Trust said “the utterly damning report raises the
question of why it was ever considered acceptable to place our most vulnerable
and challenging children in the care of a private company with such a dismal
international track record in work with young offenders. Why has it taken three
years to blow the whistle on a place which has been frightening and damaging
children and harming staff?” Meanwhile,
Brian Caton of the Prison Officers Association called for Ashfield to be taken
immediately into public ownership as Ashfield provided evidence of the
“immorality of running private prisons with the emphasis on making profit
rather than running a good service on behalf of society.”
The Guardian, 5 February 2003,
referred to the youth justice board’s decision to withdraw 170 prisoners as
“the biggest blow to Britain’s private prisons sector in its ten year history.”
In response to the
chief inspector’s findings and the director general’s threat, Premier’s
managing director, Kevin Lewis, told the Daily Telegraph, 5 February
2003, that “it might be easier to walk away but I am not going to allow that to
happen. We will put in the extra resources
and will expect to make some money in the long term but our reputation
comes first.” Ashfield’s director told BBC radio that improvements such as new
terms and conditions to encourage staff recruitment have been implemented since
the inspection was carried out.
n Pucklechurch
Custodial Services Ltd (part of Premier Custodial Group - the company’s major
activity is the design, construction, management and finance of HMP & YOI
Ashfield) made a pre-tax profit of
£1.23 million for the financial year ended 31 December 2001(£1.37 million in
2000). Turnover was £11.7 million (£12.4 million in 2000) which included
finance charges of £4.13 million (£4.41 million in 2000). In their report the
directors stated that they were “confident that 2002 will be another successful
year.” Until May 2002, Premier was owned jointly by Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation and Serco. With Group 4's acquisition of The Wackenhut Corporation,
Premier is now owned by Group 4 and Serco (see PPRI # 51-49 & 47).
THE CHIEF INSPECTOR’S REPORT
INTRODUCTION
Ashfield was the first juvenile Prison Service
establishment to be run by the private sector, in this case Premier Prison
Services. It operates under contract
from the Prison Service, which in its turn undertakes to deliver the regimes
and environment required by the Youth Justice Board. Because of these dual and treble arrangements, Ashfield is the
most invigilated establishment in the entire prison system. Local management is overseen by the company
itself, a Prison Service Controller, the Prison Service’s Juvenile Operations
Manager and the Youth Justice Board’s monitor.
It also had a committed Board of Visitors.
Yet this report is
probably the most depressing I have issued during my time as Chief
Inspector. It describes an establishment
that was failing, by some margin, to provide a safe and decent environment for
children, or to equip the young people in it with the education, training and
resettlement opportunities that are supposed to be at the core of their
sentences. This is in spite of the fact
that it was dealing with a particularly vulnerable and needy population, and
one for which the Prison Service and Youth Justice Board are specifically
committed to providing regimes and an environment that meets those needs and
vulnerabilities.
At the time of our
inspection, a temporary Prison Service Governor and team were in charge. As a
result of these moves, we were aware that Ashfield ... was a safer place than
it had been. It was also poised for significant
changes to attempt to ensure a better regime for the young people there, which
were due to take effect the week after our announced inspection.
However, the scale of
the problems uncovered in this report will not make it easy to transform
Ashfield into a safe and positive juvenile establishment. Since the Prison Service had taken over
direct management, some of the most serious and obvious manifestations of
unsafety had been tackled: assaults and the use of force had both declined from
previously very high levels and the wings no longer felt physically unsafe or
chronically unstable.
Nevertheless, at the
time of this inspection, we found that underlying systems and processes were
insufficient to provide the minimum requirements of a safe environment for the
young people there.
First night and
induction processes, critical to ensuring safety in the early days of custody,
were not properly carried out and vulnerability assessments were meaningless or
inaccurate. In some areas, many staff were
so unsure of their proper role that they relied upon young prisoners themselves
to carry out key tasks. Bullying was
not addressed and it appeared to us that many children were afraid to leave
their cells. Effective child protection
procedures and links were not in place or properly understood, staff were not
subject to enhanced criminal records checks, and some staff had strip-searched
children on their own.
The Prison Service is
committed to the principles of the Children Act, which requires that children
should be protected from the risk of significant harm. We did not believe that Ashfield, at the
time of our inspection, could confidently claim to do so.
The problem was not
simply the absence of proper processes.
Ashfield had recently become an establishment for juveniles only. Fundamentally, the majority of staff lacked
the experience, confidence or skills to manage this difficult and demanding
population rather than simply reacting to it, containing it or hoping that it
would manage itself. Those staff who
did have the understanding and experience stood out, both on the wings and in
projects like the reorientation unit and the family liaison work. But they were rare beacons in an otherwise
dismal landscape. Nor did management
systems within Premier appear to provide the support and guidance that
inexperienced staff might need: indeed, staff seemed reluctant to discuss
problems and difficulties.
Similarly, education
and training suffered from inexperienced and frequently changing staff, poorly
managed and struggling to provide a good quality service. Their work was further undermined by the
fact that many children never got to education at all, or on time. A spot check during the inspection revealed
that nearly half of the young people were in their cells during the core day,
and less than a quarter were in education.
We welcomed the fact that changes to the regime, to greatly improve the
quantity of education and training, were about to be implemented. But OFSTED [the government’s education
‘watchdog’] were unconvinced that staffing and management were adequate to meet
the demands of these increased hours, or provide quality training.
Finally, there was no
effective resettlement strategy, or proper liaison with Youth Offending Teams
or the wider community. Training plans,
which should drive the sentence, were not properly completed, linked into
education and residential experience, or effectively monitored. There was no written drug strategy, or drug
strategy group.
These are not
problems that can be sorted out overnight, or by a change of management or
regime. They raise two questions: how
the establishment reached such a state and what needs to be done to recover
it. Much of this is outside our direct
remit, but needs tackling if Ashfield is to be turned round and similar
problems avoided in the future.
There can be no doubt
that one of the main underlying issues has been the problem of staff
recruitment and retention. This links
to the level of staff salaries, and the extent to which salary scales can
reward experience and continuity. Too
many staff were new, young and with no custodial or youth experience. They lacked confidence in enforcing
appropriate behaviour in a calm and proactive way. At management level, too, in the period prior to the arrival of
Prison Service personnel, there was insufficient experience of working with
children and young people in order to support young and inexperienced staff;
and no sense of a supportive management culture that allowed problems to be
positively dealt with. These
difficulties were compounded by the size of the establishment and its units.
What was also evident
was the absence of the basic building blocks of a safe and positive
environment: such as suicide and self-harm, child protection, vulnerability
assessment, training planning and regime delivery: These are not ground-breaking or cutting edge procedures, but
ones which are now expected and accepted in the rest of the juvenile custodial
system, even if they are not always fully delivered. At Ashfield, they were barely grappled with. It was like an island, isolated from
developments and expectations in the rest of the system. And it was an island whose contours appeared
to be the precise terms of the contract negotiated with the Prison Service,
rather than any wider understanding of the needs of children or, necessarily,
the increasingly demanding requirements of the Youth Justice Board.
The extent to which
that contract, as renegotiated, allowed or required Premier to fulfil Youth
Justice Board requirements is not a matter for this Inspectorate. What is, however, apparent is that Ashfield
was not doing so and had not been for some time. All the bodies responsible for monitoring - the Prison Service
Controller, Juvenile Operations Manager and Youth Justice Board - agreed with
this analysis and said that they had been raising significant concerns for some
time. Indeed, the Area Manager’s
extreme concern over some time (and that of the Inspectorate on a previous visit)
had prompted the Director-General’s direct intervention. Yet none of these monitors had been able to
act decisively to prevent a drift becoming a crisis. The Board of Visitors, too, was frustrated that its repeated
concerns had not been acted on earlier.
In our view, the
division of responsibility among Premier and its parent company, the Prison
Service’s contract monitors, its juvenile operations manager and the Youth
Justice Board was a significant factor in this. The monitoring bodies had the power to penalise, but not directly
prevent. Their different criteria and
perceptions sent messages which were sometimes mixed, or even
contradictory. Premier itself was
unable, or unwilling, to look beyond the terms of the contract it had itself
renegotiated with the Prison Service after the Youth Justice Board
reforms. There were insufficient
mechanisms for collective, coherent and proactive management in the interests
of the children and young people at Ashfield.
These underlying
issues will need to be addressed in order for Ashfield to function effectively
and safely. Normally, our reports
contain a number of main recommendations, that the establishment needs to
address as a matter of priority. In the
case of Ashfield, given recent events, we do not believe that the establishment
alone can do so. It requires concerted
and planned urgent action by all three of the players - Premier, the Prison
Service and the Youth Justice Board.
The Prison Service,
Youth Justice Board and Premier should together agree a targeted and time
tabled urgent action plan to remedy the severe deficits uncovered in this
report, including a revision of the contract, if it does not allow Premier to
meet the requirements of PSO4950 and the YJB standards. The action plan should include:
n an overall
vulnerability strategy, covering child protection, anti-bullying, substance
use, mental health, and reception and induction procedures;
n provision of
effective training plans, including suitable accommodation, administrative
support, consistency and training of staff, involvement of residential and
educational staff, and the setting and monitoring of detailed and specific
targets;
n a comprehensive
resettlement strategy managed by a multi-disciplinary resettlement policy
committee;
n better links with
outside agencies, including Youth Offending Teams and local statutory and
voluntary organisations;
n agreed and clearly
understood systems, accountabilities and responsibilities for implementing,
monitoring and reporting on the Action Plan.
The entire management
and staffing of the prison should be reviewed. This should include ensuring
that there is:
n a strong senior
management team, which includes managers with experience of working with
juveniles;
n management systems in place that can deliver
the requirements of the action plan and support staff in doing so;
n salary levels and
promotion opportunities that assist staff recruitment and retention;
n training for staff
who lack experience of working with juveniles;
n ensuring that all
staff with direct contact with children are subject to enhanced Criminal
Records Bureau checks;
n an effective
personal officer scheme.
EXTRACTS FROM THE MAIN REPORT
SAFETY AND RESPECT
n At the time of the
inspection, in our view, Ashfield was a safer place than it had been for some
time. However, the fundamental
structures upon which the safety of an establishment holding juveniles depends
were not in place.
n Systems and
strategies such as anti-bullying, an effective rewards and sanctions scheme,
rigorous management of self-harm and robust child protection procedures provide
a framework within which competent, suitably-trained and well-managed staff are
able to protect children from harm effectively. Although we acknowledged future
plans and the commitment and enthusiasm of many staff, neither the
necessary systems nor sufficient staff with the required level of knowledge and
expertise were in place at Ashfield.
n Dynamic security is
based upon positive and proper relationships between staff and prisoners. This did not exist at Ashfield. Staff in general were inexperienced and
appeared to have expected little support from Premier managers; indeed, there
seemed to be a reluctance to report problems or difficulties. Although overall staff numbers had been
increased by secondments from other areas of Premier Prison Services, it was
not untypical for the longest-serving member of staff on a wing to have been at
Ashfield less than six months; others were recently trained or from settings
such as escort work where they had little experience of working with young
people.
n Staff lacked
confidence in many areas of their work and we saw instances where this had
resulted in collusive
and potentially dangerous relationships with young people. Inspectors saw examples of young people taking
on inappropriate roles of responsibility without proper supervision or clear
boundaries. Staff spoke of getting most
of their information regarding the regime changes from the young people and
described the situation as being ‘all in it together’.
n It was unacceptable that, after three years, no policy and no effective
child protection procedures were in place at Ashfield. There was very low staff awareness,
inconsistent practice, and no liaison with the Area Child Protection Committee. These deficiencies had serious implications
for the safety of children and young people at Ashfield.
n The induction programme was barely operating.
n There was no anti-bullying strategy: identified bullying behaviour was
not being addressed at all and there was no real support for victims.
n Overall,
the training, experience and skills of staff were inadequate to deal properly
with the young people at Ashfield. This
had consequences for respect as well as safety.
PURPOSEFUL
ACTIVITY
n Inspectors found that both the level and quality of purposeful activity
fell seriously short of the standards specified by both the Youth Justice Board
and the Prison Service itself in Prison Service Order 4950 and we were unable
to draw attention to any noteworthy areas of good practice.
n At mid-morning and mid-afternoon points of the working day, at least
50% of the population was to be found on the living units and thus not engaged
in any purposeful activity. Of the 50%
of the population we found in the living units, the only young people not
locked in their cells at the mid-afternoon and mid-morning points were full-time
cleaners and orderlies, whose work did not form part of an accredited training
course. Children and young people
should not be employed in this way unless it is part of a recognised training
activity.
n There were significant problems of teacher recruitment, retention and
remuneration. Teachers were inadequately managed and supported. Initial assessments were neither
co-ordinated nor effective, and the curriculum did not meet the needs of
individual learners.
RESETTLEMENT
n In the three years since the establishment opened, no resettlement
strategy based on the needs of children and young people at Ashfield had been
developed. We were both surprised and
concerned to find that such a requirement was not explicitly part of the
contract between the Prison Service and Premier Prison Services. Indeed, there
was a lack of understanding in how to develop this essential work.
n Complaints from children and young people, staff, parents and youth
offending team members showed that there was a serious lack of casework
continuity in the establishment. We
were told of some situations where young people had changed caseworkers as many
as eight times.
n We were concerned that, although the establishment had the expertise to
do so, it had never developed and delivered offending behaviour
programmes. This was a serious omission
...
n At the time of our inspection, the establishment had no written drug
strategy and no drug strategy group.
RECEPTION
n On the day we inspected, the reception team comprised a manager and
three members of staff brought from other Premier Prison Services operations
elsewhere in the country. None of these officers had been trained either for
reception duties or working with young people and they were further
disadvantaged by being unfamiliar with the establishment.
n Overall, children and young people left reception having had basic
procedures completed but at such a speed that their individual needs were not
able to be addressed. There was an
expectation that their individual needs would be catered for as soon as they
arrived on the induction wing.
Unfortunately, we found that this was not usually the case.
n We were concerned that first night procedures were insufficiently
resourced, were not understood by staff, were not monitored or co-ordinated by
managers and were not given adequate priority to ensure the safety and
protection of children and young people spending their first night in custody
at Ashfield. Children and young people were not being adequately inducted.
DUTY OF
CARE
n The research showed that the level of bullying was disturbingly high
... despite 27 incident reports identifying 20 bullies and 18 victims being
submitted during May, no action had been taken other than to speak to the
victims to acknowledge the reporting of the incidents. The bullies had not been
spoken to. This was unacceptable.
CHILD
PROTECTION
n A keen, enthusiastic and competent child protection co-ordinator had
recently been appointed and it was encouraging to note the efforts that she had
already made to address a situation that should never have been allowed to
develop. However, there was little
evidence that the current guidance, procedures and practice were of a
sufficiently high professional level to ensure that children at Ashfield were
actually being properly protected. This
situation was unacceptable.
SELF HARM
AND SUICIDE PREVENTION
n The culture of the establishment, which had a clear emphasis on
regaining control, was not conducive to enabling staff to listen to children
and young people in order to share their problems and distress. The regime did not offer children and young
people the opportunity to sustain good mental health and develop self-esteem.
n We were not convinced that the existing procedures on suicide and
self-harm were sufficient to enable the establishment to identify and seek to
prevent young people who might harm themselves.
RACE
RELATIONS
n At the time of this inspection, there were around 40 young people from
ethnic minority groups at Ashfield.
This amounted to 10.5% of the population.
n The profile of race relations within Ashfield had been heightened in the
weeks prior to this inspection by the actions of the Governor temporarily
appointed by the Prison Service regarding two members of staff who had
allegedly been involved in a racist incident.
It was through such action and the involvement of the most senior
managers that staff were sent clear messages about attitudes that would not be
tolerated. Several members of staff we
spoke to had welcomed the action of the Governor.
n The race relations liaison officer was doing some good work but more
time needed to be devoted to race relations.
There needed to be greater support from senior management
SUBSTANCE
USE
n No recent needs assessment of drug use among the population had taken
place. Until recently, the education
department had been running a drug and alcohol awareness module. This had stopped due to staff shortages,
which meant that many of the children and young people would have no
opportunity to examine issues related to the use of substances, including the
potentially negative consequences, and would be less able to make informed
choices.
n The links between problematic drug use and offending have been well
evidenced and many of the children and young people at Ashfield were clearly at
risk of developing chronic dependency problems. However, the potential to provide treatment and support to this
group while in custody was not being fully exploited. In particular, there was a failure to ensure that links with
community-based services were established to provide children and young people
with support once discharged.
HEALTH
CARE
n A health needs assessment, action plan and a primary care review were
completed in 2001 and recommendations made.
However, along with other areas of the prison, there had been ongoing
recruitment and retention staffing problems.
We were pleased to learn that four nurses, including one with a mental
health qualification, were due to start in September.
n In many respects, health care was an oasis for young men as the staff
were sympathetic, motivated and concerned for their welfare, although the
number of nurses was insufficient to provide therapeutic care for
everyone. However, there was
insufficient structured activity available.
ACTIVITIES
n Students were receiving an unsatisfactory level of provision. Although there were some examples of good
practice, the quality of teaching and learning was generally poor. Expectations of teachers, in many cases,
were too low; the emphasis was on keeping students occupied rather than
providing challenging and stimulating lessons.
n The good examples [of individual achievement] however, were relatively
isolated and the general pattern was one of under-achievement or modest
progress at best. The strategic
planning of education and training placed insufficient emphasis on achievement
or standards.
n The quality of teaching and learning ranged from very good to poor
... conditions of service and salary
levels for teachers were poor compared with provision in local schools and
colleges.
THE WIDER
REGIME
n Poor records, the frequent recent changes to the function of some wings
and the large number of temporary staff meant that inspectors had difficulty in
securing definitive information on the numbers or nature of the population on
each wing. It was also very difficult
to establish the training programmes that the young people should have been
attending. However, the impressions
gained by Ofsted of an establishment that was struggling to meet even the
minimum requirements of a purposeful regime were mirrored on the
residential wings.
n Crudely calculated, assuming the pattern did not differ on the two days
when the [survey] sample was taken and that the proportions are similar both
morning and afternoon, at any one time, 136 (46%) of Ashfield’s population were
locked in-cell during core education and training time. This compares to about 60 (22%) who were
attending education and training.
n Inspectors were further concerned about the high number of orderlies,
cleaners and servery workers. Prison
Service Order 4950 and Youth Justice Board standards make it quite clear that
no young people should be allocated to any full-time work that has little or no
education and training worth. Despite
this, the regime and staff at Ashfield appeared to be substantially dependent
on at least 70, possibly more, young people carrying out these functions.
n Inspectors concluded that there were deep-rooted and complex problems
underlying the poverty of the level and quality of purposive activity.
GOOD
ORDER
n It was difficult to envisage how children and young people at Ashfield
would know the basic rules and routines that operated within the establishment
as there were no systems in place to promulgate them
n Some staff showed a lack of confidence that affected their dealings
with the children and young people and their ability to maintain control and
good order in particular.
n Recorded assaults had been rising steadily over the period from
February to May 2002, with 23 assaults committed in February compared to 34
assaults in May. The majority of the
assaults were by young people on other young people, although there was also a
noteworthy number of assaults on staff.
Eleven of the 34 assaults in May were on staff. During June, the month prior to the
inspection, the number of assaults had fallen to 18, including five on
staff. Thirty-three per cent of
respondents to our survey said that they had been hit kicked or assaulted by
other young people.
n Senior managers were optimistic that the reduction in assaults
indicated that recently introduced strategies to bring back good order and
regain control had been successful to some extent. We found it difficult to fully accept this possible explanation in
the light of the number of young people we found who were too frightened to
leave their cells because they believed that their personal safety would not be
protected.
REWARDS
AND SANCTIONS
n It was freely admitted that the operation of the existing rewards and
sanctions scheme had all but collapsed.
There was little general information about the scheme and, due to the
deficiencies in the reception and induction procedures, children and young
people knew little about it. In
reality, officers knew less about the scheme than the young people: those who
were on detached duty were naturally unfamiliar with it while those permanently
located at Ashfield had not received any training.
n We could only welcome the ambitious scope of the changes that were
being proposed and the transparency that this would bring to the scheme. We were, however, concerned as to whether
the establishment yet had the numbers of staff with the necessary training and
skills and a sufficiently embedded culture to realise these aspirations.
DISCIPLINARY
PROCEDURES
n Checks were made to ensure that young people understood the charges and
procedures but we were not satisfied that these checks were anything more than
perfunctory.
n Young people facing serious charges were given time to prepare their
cases and technically were aware that they could receive legal advice. However, hardly any young people took this
up or even asked more about it ... We observed several adjudications. These were overtly fair and sensitively
dealt with following the laid-down procedures.
What we saw was properly written out and recorded. There was no evidence to suggest that
children and young people were intimidated before or subject to repercussions
after adjudication hearings.
n It was clear, however, that the adjudication process suffered as a result of the staff attendance systems. On one day of the inspection, the vast majority of the 15 scheduled adjudications had to be adjourned because young people pleaded not guilty and reporting officers were not on duty.
n Indeed, all custody officers from the previous day had
been replaced due to the two days on/two days off working pattern of most
residential staff.
n The most common charges were assaults, fighting, disobeying orders,
damaging property, and threatening and abusive language. A large amount of data about adjudications
was available but we were not satisfied that this was being sufficiently
analysed. It appeared that assaults
attracted the most interest because this information related directly to the
contract and penalty points.
USE OF
FORCE
n The use of control and restraint (C and R) at Ashfield had increased
over the 12 months prior to the inspection, culminating in a doubling of the
incidents between May 2001 and May 2002.
Figures peaked in January 2002 when there were 43 incidents of young
people being restrained by staff.
TREATMENT
OF VULNERABLE YOUNG PEOPLE
n The ‘coping with custody’ module was not sufficiently comprehensive to
support a young person who had sought own protection and, in any event, the
induction programme was not being delivered with any degree of
consistency.
n There was no anti-bullying work being undertaken and we have already
described the situation of children and young people who were afraid to come
out of their cells on the induction unit for fear of being bullied. Subsequently, they were being penalised
through the rewards and sanctions scheme for failing to attend education. In our judgement the induction unit was a
dangerous place to relocate children and young people on own protection.
TRAINING
PLANNING
n At the time of this inspection, the equivalent of six full-time staff
were available for this work. A number
of the team, to their considerable frustration, were being instructed to work
relief shifts to assist in maintaining staffing levels on the residential
units. The pressures of work, with an
average of 12 conferences a day, were therefore high and the morale in the
staff group correspondingly low.
n The conferences that inspectors observed were not of an acceptable
standard. The physical conditions in which meetings had to take place were
totally unacceptable.
n During the inspection, we surveyed a sample of 25 training plans ...
none of those we saw complied with the guidance that they should be specific,
measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bounded. Above all, we saw none that were being used as a way of either
motivating or dealing with the underlying problems of young people.
OFFENDING
BEHAVIOUR WORK
n While the establishment had some of the resources and expertise to
deliver a broad range of programmes, we were concerned that nothing had been
developed to meet the criminogenic needs of young people.
n The lack of any resettlement strategy or any offending behaviour
programmes was a serious flaw in the operation of resettlement issues within
this establishment and contrary to standards laid down by the Youth Justice
Board.
PERSONAL
OFFICERS
n We were very concerned to find that no personal officer scheme was in
place in Ashfield. We observed staff on
wings who were determined in their approach to control young people. However, this was done through orders and
sanctions rather than through good communication skills. This approach was not
conducive to either positive relationships or a safe environment.
n We found that most staff working on the residential units had been
given very little training beyond the six-week generic custody officers’
course. While on paper a new personal
officer scheme was being implemented, we were less confident that it would work
in any meaningful way until staff knew what was expected of them. Many staff appeared not to have either the
skills or the understanding of the importance of this work to be able to bring
stability to the establishment or to set values and realistic expectations for
young people.
n We were disturbed to find staff reluctant to engage with young people,
relying instead on locking children away in their cells for control.
n There were very few staff with any depth of experience, which was a
consequence of the establishment’s inability to retain staff; this was unlikely
to change without a fundamental re-evaluation of the role and management of
staff.
n We were concerned to find that many of the staff working on the
residential units had come on detached duty from non-prisoner contact
positions, such as drivers, and were now expected to work with difficult
children without preparation or training.
We observed young people who were orderlies on the wings taking
advantage of this by running their own control systems. It was akin to a school ‘prefect’ system
that had developed with the collusion of staff but without proper checks and
balances.
Report of
a Full Announced Inspection of HMP & YOI Ashfield, 1- 5 July 2002, by HM
Chief Inspector of Prisons, published 5 February 2003.
The full report is available on the internet at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmipris/hmipris.htm
ENDS
Prison
Privatisation Report International
Public
Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)
School of
Computing and Mathematical Sciences
University
of Greenwich
30 Park
Row, London SE10 9LS, England
Internet:www.psiru.org/justice
Email:
Stephen Nathan,
stephennathan@compuserve.com