Prison Privatisation Report International
No. 71/72, Dec 05-April 06
Published by the Public Services International
Research Unit (
For all
inquiries about PPRI's contents or to contribute
material, please email Stephen Nathan, PPRI
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This publication is
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IN THIS ISSUE
CANADA ISRAEL COSTA
RICA PERU FRANCE GERMANY BULGARIA
UNITED KINGDOM JAPAN AUSTRALIA SOUTH AFRICA
CANADA
“The Government of Ontario will transfer the operation of the Central North
Correctional Centre in Penetanguishene to the public sector”, the provincial
government’s community safety and correctional services minister Monte Kwinter
announced on 27 April 2006 (see PPRI
#70, 64, 61, 58, 49, 44, 38,. 37).
“After five years, there has been no appreciable benefit from the private
operation of the Central North Correctional Centre,” said Kwinter in a news
release. “We carefully studied its overall performance compared with the
publicly operated Central East Correctional Centre (CECC) in Kawartha Lakes,
and concluded the CECC performed better in key areas such as security, health
care and reducing re- offending rates. As a result, the government will allow
the contract with the private operator to expire.”
Utah-based Managaement & Training Corporation’s (MTC) Canadian
subsidiary, Management and Training Corporation Canada (MTCC), was chosen to
operate the Central North Correctional Centre in May 2001 as part of a
five-year pilot project. During that period, the Central East Correctional Centre
- which is identical in design - opened as a publicly operated facility. The
pilot project was to determine if there was any advantage to private operations
of correctional services in
“We acknowledge that MTCC was in material compliance with the contract,”
said Kwinter, “but the evidence clearly indicates that the public facility
produced better results in key performance areas.”
The contract with MTCC ends on 10 November 2006.
An Ontario Government spokesperson told PPRI
that an internal review to compare MTCC-run Central North Correctional Centre
with publicly-run Central East Correctional Centre was carried out and the
methodology reviewed by Anthony Doob of
the University of Toronto. The government also commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) to evaluate MTCC’s contract performance and to make recommendations for
policy options.
According to Canadian Press the
company has responded to the government’s announcement by claiming that it has
saved taxpayers C$23 million and could save a further C$11 if allowed to
continue for five more years. Scott Marquand, president of MTC Canada, said
that there is no “evidence to support a change that will cost
According to data from the ministry of community safety and correctional
services seen by PPRI, the publicly
run prison rated better on security, classification, programming effectiveness,
continuum of services, recdivism rates,
healthcare and community impact. A comparison of programming quality was
deemed undeterminable.
PricewaterhouseCoopers
PPRI has also obtained a copy of the
executive summary of PwC’s report and a verbatim extract is set out below. The
full report, which incorporates information provided by ministry staff as well
as PwC’s own research and analysis, has not been published due to commercial
confidentiality.
The majority of PwC’s policy decision considerations favoured private
management and/or extending the period of comparison. One telling point in the
summary is a reference to the role played by the local community in
Penetanguishene which has consistently opposed CNCC being privately run. PwC
states: “With respect to community impact, findings indicate that the impact of
CECC appears to be somewhat more positive on the community than that of CNCC.
This difference in impacts is minimised if one does not consider the data from
the ani-privatisation advocacy groups in among the groups that rated both
facilities.”
PwC Summary of Findings
Overall, the data and analysis
in this report indicate that MTCC is operating in material compliance with its
contractual obligations under its Services Agreement with the Ministry, and
that its performance is, on the whole, satisfactory in the context of the
Ministry’s overall system. A comparison of the performance of CNCC versus CECC
(excluding cost) indicates that CECC is rated higher than CNCC.
Extending the Ministry’s
contractual relationship with MTCC for an additional five-year term appears to
be economically advantageous. However, there have been specific performance
concerns that will need to be addressed in negotiations with MTCC, should the
Ministry choose to continue its contractual relationship with MTCC.
MTCC Performance: CECC
Comparison
The Ministry analyses
conclude that on balance, CECC’s performance was
rated higher than that of CNCC, as managed and operated by MTCC according to
the Services Agreement for the identified comparison periods. The Ministry analyses address the comparative performance
(other than cost, which is dealt with separately in this report) of
CNCC, as managed and operated by MTCC, versus CECC. This conclusion is based on
the comparative information available from the Ministry on comparative
non-economic performance, those addressing security, programming, health and community impact for the specific comparison
periods identified within the report.
1. With respect to security, CECC scored higher
than CNCC on static security, video monitoring, staffing levels, supervision
levels, and search compliance. CNCC scored higher than CECC on preventative
maintenance (of security-related equipment) and training compliance. Overall,
CECC scored higher than CNCC on security.
2. With respect to programming:
● On
classification, and on use of this classification for client/risk
need practices, CECC rated higher than CNCC with the exception of the
educational area in which CNCC’s use of the Canadian
Academic Achievement test was noted;
● On
variety and volume of programming, CNCC rated higher than CECC,
particularly in the educational area;
● On
programming quality and effectiveness, CECC’s
closer alignment with the “what works” literature resulted in a higher rating
than CNCC. Organizational culture was another factor in which CECC rated
higher, although “both institutions struggle to effect cultural change to one
that supports rehabilitation of offenders”;
● On the continuum of
services to offenders, CECC’s well-established
inter-agency links, discharge planning and staffing levels were factors
contributing to its higher rating versus CNCC; and
● On
recidivism, analyses were performed using data from the Offender
Tracking Information System as of September 2005. For this analysis, “due to
the short follow-up period, recidivism is defined as any re-entry into the
provincial system, including offenders who re-entered the system due to parole
violations or remand warrants”. The analysis compared inmates at CNCC for the
period of April 2002 to July 2003, and inmates at CECC for the period of March
2004 to June 2005. These analyses concluded that the recidivism rate of inmates
released from CNCC was higher than those released from CECC by a statistically
significant amount, allowing for differences in offender populations.
3. With respect to health, CECC rated higher
than CNCC overall in areas of infections, time to respond to requests, time to
receive treatment or medication (by a small margin), issues of concern and
health-related ombudsman complaints by inmates. CNCC rated higher on health
care assessments. Overall, CECC rated significantly higher than CNCC on health.
The Ministry authors note that “substantially more audits were performed at
CNCC than CECC; this may have resulted in a greater number of critical
incidents at CNCC than at CECC.” A direct comparison between CNCC and CECC on
health care is complicated. Although both institutions provide health care,
CNCC operates a 24-hour infirmary, while at CECC, the facilities required to
deliver comparable services are not available due to construction issues. The
Ministry authors note that “this may have some impact on the inmates that may
be transferred to this facility.”
4. With respect to community impact, “findings
indicate that the impact of CECC appears to be somewhat more positive on the
community than that of CNCC. This difference in impacts is minimized if one
does not consider the data from the anti-privatization advocacy groups” in
among the groups that rated both facilities.
MTCC Performance: Services
Agreement Expectations
The research and analysis
conducted by PwC addressing matters of performance
versus contractual expectations (other than cost) indicate that MTCC has been
in material compliance with its contractual obligations. It is also fulfilling the expectations of
stakeholders interviewed by PwC for this analysis
related to these obligations and the Ministry’s intent in entering into the
contractual relationship with MTCC.
1. With respect to performance, data and
interview results indicate that MTCC is operating in material compliance with
its contractual obligations. There have been, over the course of the Initial
Term, issues that have arisen related to these contractual obligations,
notably in areas of health care and food services. In these cases, quantitative
data and interview findings indicate that MTCC’s
performance trend has been favourable and that MTCC is currently operating in
material compliance with its contractual obligations.
2. With respect to stakeholder satisfaction,
interview results indicate that stakeholders–Ministry and community–are
satisfied with MTCC’s performance against
expectations. Internally to the Ministry, interviewees indicated that CNCC
under MTCC management is operating as expected within the Ministry’s
corrections management structure. Relations with Adult Community Corrections
have been strained at times, although interviewees indicate that this is a
Ministry-wide challenge not unique to CNCC. Community stakeholders indicated
that issues which arose from the opening of CNCC – the impact of CNCC on the
local waste treatment system, and clear delineation of responsibility (between
MTCC and the Ministry) for communication and action–have been resolved and that
MTCC is operating according to expectations.
3. With respect to the impact on the
4. With respect to the impact on the community,
the positive economic benefit of CNCC has proved, according to interviewees, to
be greater than anticipated in part because of MTCC’s
policy of buying locally where possible. According to interviewees MTCC has
also earned a reputation of being a good corporate citizen through its program
of charitable giving. The opening of CNCC has placed a strain on the Huronia and
Cost and Affordability
The data and analysis in
this report indicate that the Ministry has enjoyed a cost advantage at CNCC
versus CECC over the life of the current contract with MTCC. Further, based on MTCC’s
initial pricing proposal for a contract extension, continuing the MTCC contract
is economically advantageous.
1. With respect to historical cost efficiency,
CNCC and the CECC are the two most efficient adult correctional institutions
when using per diem costs to evaluate the cost efficiency of correctional
institutions in
2. With respect to future affordability,
projected costs for CNCC are lower than for CECC at all utilization levels
considered for contract renewal based on the initial proposal from MTCC.
For the prospective Renewal
Term period, MTCC’s initial proposal indicates
savings of approximately $8.4 to $10.3 million ($9.6 to $11.4 million including
Cookchill savings) versus comparable costs at CECC.
Decision Considerations
The Ministry’s preferred course
of action with respect to the Services Agreement will depend in large part on
the definitive economic terms available in negotiation with MTCC and the cost
indications of terminating a relationship with MTCC.
1. One additional decision factor that the Ministry
may consider is that a decision to transition of the operation and management
of CNCC to the Ministry would be difficult to revisit (that is, to re-introduce
private corrections management) at a later date due to, for example, labour
relations reasons. A decision to continue external management of CNCC is easily
reversed, as the Ministry is afforded a decision point (at a minimum) at every
contract expiry; and
2. Another decision factor that the Ministry may wish
to consider is that, due to delays in commencing operations at CECC, the
comparative study of CNCC and CECC is based on one year of real time experience
for financials and a variety of different calendar periods for each facility in
other areas. Completion of this analysis has been delayed. The Ministry may
wish to make its decision on the long-term management of CNCC based on a
greater experience base and real time comparison with the public sector over
that time.
Scenario 1: Economic
Advantage for Continuation of MTCC Relationship
Initial pricing from MTCC
indicates an economic advantage of continuing the Services Agreement with MTCC, although the advantage may not be as great as is was
for the Initial Term. Overall, performance of CNCC under MTCC management was
satisfactory in the context of the Services Agreement. Based on this, the
Ministry’s preferred course of action may be to negotiate with MTCC with a view
to achieve modified contractual performance obligations that reflect the
Ministry’s concerns regarding the performance issues highlighted in this
report, as well as the best possible economic terms. Other issues for
consideration include:
1.
The Ministry’s evolving priorities for the overall management of the
2.
The Ministry may need to exercise its option to extend for all or part of one
year in order to provide the time necessary to achieve its negotiating
objectives (or to determine that they cannot be achieved);
3.
Alternatively, the Ministry may determine, for policy reasons outside the scope
of this report, that managing CNCC should be internal to the Ministry, notwithstanding
an economic advantage to continue the contract with MTCC;
4.
Finally, the Ministry may choose to re-tender if it determines, in the course
of negotiations with MTCC, that improved terms may be available in the market
and that these improved terms would offset the investment (financial and in
operational disruption) involved in re-tendering.
Scenario 2: Economic
Advantage for Internal Provision
If, in the course of the
negotiations described above, the definitive pricing from MTCC indicates an
economic advantage for internal provision by the Ministry (using CECC as the benchmark), or that the Ministry’s
performance objectives cannot be met, then the Ministry’s preferred cause of
action may be to:
1. Prepare for expiry of the MTCC
contract and commencement of the internal provision;
2. Re-tender the CNCC contract to
achieve better terms from another provider; or
3. Retain MTCC as a service
provider as part of the overall Ministry portfolio at this time for policy
reasons.
Scenario
3: No Apparent Economic Advantage for MTCC or Internal Provision
If the Ministry determines
that there is neither a clear advantage to either internal provision nor to a
continued contractual relationship with MTCC, then the Ministry’s preferred
course of action will be determined by policy considerations. Examples of such policy considerations include:
The desire to extend the
comparative analysis of CNCC versus CECC as described above;
1. The desire to have an external “benchmark” as part
of the Ministry corrections portfolio to achieve competitive tension and a
window on practices in other jurisdictions. This action would indicate to
continue having the private sector be involved; or
2. A policy decision that
Central
North Correctional Centre Review and Comparison With
Central East Correctional Centre, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Federal crackdown
: more private prisons?
Anthony Doob of the
The
government of Israel has been allowed an extension on its deadline for
responding to a supreme court order requesting a definition of the
constitutional limits of the powers to be contracted out to the private sector
(see PPRI #70, 69-67, 64, etc). The
government’s response had been due by the end of January but the court granted
an extension. The final court hearing is now scheduled for June 2006.
In
a recent decision signifying the importance of the case, the court issued a
ruling that seven judges rather than three should hear the arguments.
Even
though the government has now signed a contract with a consortium to finance,
design, build and run a prison the petitioners are challenging the government’s
constitutional authority to privatise prison operations. They claim that
granting a prison operator clear governing authority, including the use of
force, restricting freedom and restricting the privacy of both prisoners and
visitors contravenes
The
government, on the other hand, argues that the privatisation of a prison is a
statutory privatisation that does not harm fundamental constitutional rights.
Constitutional issues in
the
Two
eminent
He
concludes: “…based on my expertise, experience and analysis of relevant court
decisions, is that the operation and management of prisons is one of he
exclusive and essential function s of the modern state: therefore, the act of
privatising prisons, if properly brought before a competent court, would be
declared unconstitutional. Another clear conclusion is the experience with
private incarceration has proved to be futile, dangerous and gravely harmful to
human rights, especially to inmates’ rights and dignity. If a state delegates
one of its essential functions (operating and managing of prisons)it might find itself in an irreversible process, ultimately
abdicating itself of its sovereignty.”
In
a paper Private prisons - Colony beyond
the scope of democracy and outside the realm of Law and Justice - prisoners as
raw material, Professor Michael Waltzer of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton,
argues that “the problem of prison privatisation is that it illegitimately
exposes the prisoners from the protection of the law … all the internal rule
and regulations of their imprisonment, the system of discipline and reward, the
hundreds of small decisions that shape their daily lives, are open now to a
single unanswerable question: is this punishment or economic calculation, the
law or the market?”
Furthermore
he argues that: “In this case the state gives up on what it cannot give up
legitimately, which is its prerogative to punish, or use coercive force against
violators of the law. Since incarceration is part of the process of criminal
justice and stems directly from decisions of the court, private prisons may put
in question the legitimacy of the court decisions as well.”
“Imprisonment
is a state action, and so is every decision made, whoever makes it, about the
course and character of imprisonment. All such decisions are subject to
constitutional norms, and the courts will do what they can to enforce those
norms. The enforcement will probably be more roundabout, and will take longer
and be harder to monitor, in private than in public prisons. Although the
constitutional monitoring of administrative decisions in the field of
imprisonment leave room for desired improvement, it still offers the hope of
legal protection.”
This,
he says, “is probably the chief economic advantage of prison privatisation-that
it shuts down this hope, that it offers a (temporary) escape from the
enforcement of constitutional norms…. we should not be contracting out, as if
these were not our prisoners; we
should be bringing new ideas into the orbit of public service.”
MTC’s battle for compensation
Management
& Training Corporation (MTC) are due to receive $4 million compensation
from the government of Costa Rica after the ministry of justice cancelled a
contract to finance, design, build and run a prison at Pococi
(see PPRI #68, 62, 52, 51, 49-46
& 42).
The
company had been seeking $20 million in compensation. However, the agreement
has not yet been ratified and it is not clear whether the outcome of elections
on
While
these negotiations have been going on the ministry of justice has built 2,600
places at a cost of $10 million. MTC’s project would
have cost $73 million for a 1,200 bed prison.
Two private prisons on the
way
Two privately financed,
designed, built and operated prisons are to be commissioned in
In 2002 US firm Carter Goble
Associates was commissioned to advise on how to expand capacity and they
suggested that to increase capacity it was necessary to restructure existing
facilities and build new prisons.
Comision multisectorial encargada
de proponer medidas para viabilizar la construcción de establecimientos penitenciarios mediante inversion
privada así como el ordenamiento jurídico necesario para su implementación
D.S.No 014-2005-JUS Informe
Final Lima, 10 December 2006, available from PPRI.
Contract awarded
Eiffage, the Paris-based
construction and concessions multinational, has been awarded a 20 year contract
to finance, design, build and maintain four prisons with a combined capacity of
2,800 beds. The contract is worth some €350 million (see PPRI #69, 67, 52, 44, 25 & 11). The facilities will be built at
The
unsuccessful bidders included Bouygues, Spie Batignolles and two Vinci
subsidiaries, Sogea and GTM. The contract tendering
process for a second group of prisons is underway.
Semi-private prisons more
expensive
The
direct running costs of
Cour des Comptes, Rapport public
thématique, Garde et réinsertion, La gestion des prisons, January 2006, full coverage in the
next PPRI.
■ See also Dedans Dehors No. 53, Jan-Feb. 2006 and No.54, March-April 2006, Observatoire international des prisons Section française,
www.oip.org
■
A conference to promote public private partnerships in
Another semi-private prison
The
state of
Debate on private prisons?
A public debate on private
prisons is due to take place this year. In an interview with Bulgaria National
Radio (BNR) in March, deputy justice minister Dimitar
Bongalov announced that his ministry was open to the
idea.
“Institutional meanness” at Serco’s
“
The
chief inspector carried out an announced inspection in November 2005 of this
local prison for males. The capacity is 1,120 although at the time of the
inspection the prison held 1,105.
The
chief inspector’s other findings included:
●
“…respect was again seriously undermined by the physical conditions in which
many prisoners lived, which in some cases were squalid. Many prisoners lacked
pillows, adequate mattresses, toilet seats, working televisions, notice-boards
and places to store belongings. Some cells, especially on the younger
prisoners’ wing, were dirty and festooned with graffiti. These were examples of
institutional meanness which was also reflected in the practice of making
prisoners pay to change the PIN phone numbers they needed to contact relatives,
and in the fact that no unemployment pay was provided to those prisoners for
whom no work was available.”
●
“Suicide prevention continued to be well managed, with innovative work, though
prisoner ‘buddies’ needed more support. However, this good work was undermined,
in the important early days of custody, by inadequate procedures and
environment. The alleged first night centre was a wing of poorly maintained,
often dirty cells where no support was available for newly-received prisoners,
and where some prisoners were at risk from others. Combined with inadequate and
unsafe detoxification procedures, these deficits presented significant risks to
prisoners’ safety. Bullying was also insufficiently addressed, even though
links to self-harm were evident.”
●
“Lengthy periods of time out of cell, with little activity and low staff
levels, raised concerns about safety. Equally importantly, the young men had
little chance of participating in anything that might reduce their chances of reoffending.”
●
“Race relations were well managed, but younger black and minority ethnic
prisoners said they were significantly disadvantaged in their treatment … there
was no clear management of young prisoners, who comprised a third of the
population, and they described their experience much more negatively than did
adult prisoners.””
●
“Our main concern was not only that managers had failed to tackle the problems
we pointed out at the last inspection, but also that the prison had
deteriorated in some important respects. It is noticeable that the deficits we
found are all in areas not specifically mandated by the contract under which
the prison is run. There remains a concern that, focusing on meeting their
contractual obligations prison managers had allowed important areas to slip
below what was safe and decent; and indeed may have sought savings in precisely
those areas.”
Despite
this the chief inspector also stated that: “
Following
the report’s publication, the Guardian,
Report on an announced
inspection of HMP & YOI
■
The Doncaster prison management contract provides Serco
with £19 million per year in income, according to a company presentation at the
Merrill Lynch Seminar on Defence & Home Affairs in November 2005 (www.serco.com).
UKDS-run Forest Bank : early promise not maintained
“In 2002 we described the
new, privately managed Forest Bank as a very good local prison. However, this
unannounced short follow-up inspection found that this early promise had not
been sustained. In particular, there had been a significant deterioration in
safety - so that urgent management attention and remedial action was required
to rebuild staff confidence and properly regain control of the prison.”
UK Detention Services Ltd opened Forest Bank in
● “There had been
over 2,500 adjudications in the first half of 2005 and in the most recent month
positive mandatory drug test results had reached 40%. Prisoner assaults on
other prisoners were consistently running at 25 a month. There was a continuing
series of assaults against staff, including one unsavoury incident when a
bucket of excrement was thrown into an office and over two staff who were in
there, while we were at the prison. This was by no means the first such
“potting” incident in the prison’s recent history. The establishment was attempting to respond
to these issues but there was a lack of coherence and balance in their
approach.”
● “We were
concerned that a culture of tolerance of, and acquiescence with,
inappropriate
behaviour was becoming established at Forest Bank and this put both
prisoners
and staff at risk. Local managers were not surprised by what we had found
and
were keen to see matters improve. High levels of staff turnover did not help to
create
an atmosphere of certainty and consistency in dealing with some challenging
behaviour
and a local culture steeped in serious drug abuse.”
● “A survey carried
out by the quality improvement group (QIG) asked respondents to comment on what
they thought of the induction programme; 38.5% of respondents thought it was
“useless”.
● “There had been
an undoubted increase in the number of work and training
opportunities
in the establishment and many work places provided accredited learning
opportunities.
Local employers who might be able to offer prisoners employment on release had
been approached and the establishment was prepared to facilitate this through
the use of resettlement release on temporary licence. If every activity place
had been used, every prisoner at Forest Bank could have at least part-time work
or education and, for many, there would be full-time work. However, we found
that over half the prisoners in residential units were locked in their cells
for lengthy periods. It was not clear why senior managers were not fully
exploiting the potential in this area.”
● “The reception
area was busy with an average of 110-130 new receptions and 150 discharges to
court each week, in addition to various other movements. The area was largely
staffed by senior custody officers and basic grade staff who had either never
worked in reception or had been working elsewhere for a considerable period of
time and who were unfamiliar with reception policies and procedures. A change
of shift pattern in the month before our inspection had resulted in a dedicated
team of eight reception staff increasing to a team of 25 to cover both visits
and reception areas. Reception was bare and institutional in design. Prisoners’
first experience of Forest Bank was being greeted by staff, standing behind a
high desk, and being told to stand behind the yellow line. Overall, however,
reception staff treated prisoners respectfully and interactions were friendly.”
The chief inspector recommended 59
improvements, some of which were repeated from the previous inspection, and
highlighted one example of good practice.
Report on an unannounced
short follow-up inspection of HMP Forest Bank, 22-24 August 2005 by HM Chief
Inspector of prisons, December 2005,
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/
First report on women’s
prison
HMP
Bronzefield, in Ashford, Middlesex, is the
In
June 2005 the prison was inspected by the chief inspector of prisons. In her
report the chief inspector made 152 main recommendations for improvements,
noted 25 points for improved housekeeping and highlighted three examples of
good practice.
The chief
inspector stated that: “some of the newly recruited staff had not been prepared
for this level of need; and nor had some of the initial systems, in particular
detoxification and healthcare. It was to the credit of managers that they had
to some extent stabilised the staff group, and that lessons had been learnt
from the early false starts in detoxification and healthcare, which were
beginning to be remedied by the time of the inspection. The high dependency
unit was caring well for some very ill women. We remained, however, concerned
by the paucity of primary mental healthcare for the majority of women, and the
length of time taken to transfer acutely mentally ill women to appropriate NHS
facilities.”
“Suicide
and self-harm management was good; but anti-bullying strategies needed
improvement.
Nevertheless, prisoners were less likely to say that they had been victimised
by other prisoners than the benchmark for women’s prisons.”
The chief
inspector said that both the physical environment and the relationships between
staff and prisoners at Bronzefield were good. “Staff were approachable and knowledgeable about individual
prisoners. However, their inexperience sometimes meant that they were unable to
sort out prisoners’ detailed queries; and the applications and complaints
system was not effective.”
“The
prison had made a good start in tackling race relations, but had not yet got to
grips with the needs of the 40% of its population who were foreign nationals,
some of whom had language needs that were not being met.”
She also
noted that “the provision of activity was better than in most prisons we have
inspected. Not only were prisoners out of their cells for lengthy periods, they
were also able to participate in activities that were linked into resettlement
needs, and workshops that delivered employment skills. Unlike many local
prisons, Bronzefield did not rely primarily on
domestic cleaning jobs in order to provide out of cell activity for its
prisoners. This approach is greatly to be commended.”
However,
the prison “lacked a needs analysis of its population, or the ability to track
and ensure progress on the resettlement plans that were developed for each
prisoner. Most importantly, there was insufficient drug treatment work, though
this was likely to be at the heart of the resettlement needs of most women in the
prison.”
“Overall,
this is a positive report on a prison that has undergone a steep learning curve
in a short time. We were impressed with the enthusiasm of managers and staff,
and their readiness to learn from experience, and to take on board our proposals.
The crucial task for managers will be to ensure that the relatively
inexperienced staff team are sufficiently supported, so as to minimise the
staff turnover that can easily destabilise a fairly new prison. We have also
pointed to other areas that need to be built on, if the prison is to sustain
and improve on its early progress.”
Report on an announced
inspection of HMP Bronzefield, 13-17 June 2005, by HM
Chief Inspector of Prisons, September 2005, published
■ Ashford Prison Services Ltd had a turnover of £74.7 million for the
financial year ended 31 march 2005. The company made a pre-tax loss of £0.7
million. ‘Related Party Transactions’ [payments] listed in the company’s
accounts during the year were:
Interserve Project Services Ltd - construction services - £1,010,396
Interserve PFI Holdings Ltd - subordinated debt - £2,036,145
Interserve PFI Holdings Ltd - subordinate debt interest - £146,602
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - subordinated debt - £2,611
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - subordinated debt interest - £2,036,145
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - bank loan - £8,132,105
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - bank loan interest - £2,141,934
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - advisory services - £41,924
UK Detention Services Ltd - advisory services - £16,815,508
Sodexho Investment Services Ltd - subordinated debt - £2,036,145
Sodexho Investment Services Ltd - subordinated debt interest - £146,602
Bank loans of £58,733,726
owing at
More money go round
Peterborough Prison Management Ltd’s
principal business is the design,
construction, management and financing of a new prison for men and women in
UK Detention Services Ltd - advisory services - £9,677,284
Interserve Project Services Ltd - construction services -£20,663,295
Interserve Investments
Plc - advisory services - £5,423
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - bank loan - £29,879,199
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - advisory services - £144,487
The company’s bank loans
repayable between one and over five years were £82,307,882.
No plans for cost
comparisons
The
government has “no current plans to commission further research” into the
comparative costs of public and private prisons in
Electronic Monitoring
provides value but…
The
electronic monitoring of adult offenders in
The
use of electronic monitoring has grown from 9,000 cases in 1999-2000 to 53,000
in 20054-05 and, in that financial year, the home office spent £102.3 million
on the electronic monitoring of curfews. Private contractors provide and install
the monitoring equipment and are responsible for monitoring what the NAO refers
to as ‘the curfewees’. New contracts commenced in
April 2005 and are operated by G4S and Serco. The NAO also stated that: “…given the vital
part which contractors play in maintaining public confidence in curfews as an
effective control or punishment, the home office should be more rigorous in the
regular audits which it conducts with the contractor.”
The Electronic Monitoring
of Adult Offenders, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 800
Session 2005-2006, 1 February 2006, National Audit Office, www.nao.org
EM cross-examination
Following
the publication of the National Audit Office’s report on electronic monitoring
in England and Wales, the government’s committee of public accounts discussed
the findings, taking oral evidence from David Taylor-Smith of service providers
G4S Justice Services, Mr Tom Riall of Serco as well as Sir David Normington
from the home office and Aileen Murphie from the
National Audit Office on 15 March 2006. Overall there were 109 questions. Set
out below are extracts from the uncorrected transcript of the hearing.
Q31 Helen Goodman MP
(Labour): Are you going to do more
research on the difference in the impacts on people's behaviour of being under
curfew as opposed to being locked up?
Sir David Normington: I think we probably will, and this is a
recommendation in the report. The anecdotal evidence is that it helps but there
is not much evidence that the Curfew Order itself has a particular impact on reoffending. It is going to be training, jobs, housing and
so on, maybe family support, which will be much more influential in getting
people back into society and stop them reoffending.
It is most unlikely that the curfew by itself will be a significant issue in reoffending. We have not got that evidence so I think we
could do with some more.
Q32 Helen Goodman: One of the things I am not quite clear about from this
is to what extent you are able to make independent checks on the effectiveness of
the way it is operating in practice other than the information that is provided
to you by the contractors because obviously they have a conflict of interest in
presenting this information to you.
Sir David Normington: One of the recommendations in the report is that we
should do some better auditing, some whole case auditing, rather than just
looking at the statistics and we have agreed to do that and have started it in
fact so that we take some actual cases and follow them through rather than
looking at bits of the process and monthly reports and statistics. I think
there is a need to do that and that is what the NAO said we should do and we
have started doing that.
Q35 Greg Clark MP
(Conservative): We have talked about
the need under your contract to check that the equipment is working every so
often. Are there financial penalties that you incur if the equipment is found
not to be working?
Mr Riall (Serco): There are performance measures within the contract
which state that we have to have the service up and running 24 hours a day and
if there are any gaps in that performance then financial deductions are placed
against us and potentially, ultimately, more serious consequences should those
failures continue.
Q36 Greg Clark: Mr Taylor-Smith, over the last year have there been
penalties imposed against you for any of these reasons?
Mr Taylor-Smith: Yes, there have. We have incurred just about £100,000 worth of
penalties, most of which occurred around the start-up of the new contracts in
April last year. That has settled down now in the second half of the year to
about £16,000.
Q37 Greg Clark: What is the principal cause of those payments?
Mr Taylor-Smith (G4S): If I look at the moment we have 19 service levels of
which we are currently failing on one, and that is to call offenders within 15
minutes if they are absent for five minutes or more. That requires a technology
fix which we are currently putting in, so that is a good example of improving
the monitoring platform, and that will be in by April and we will be meeting
all the service levels.
Q38 Greg Clark: What is your experience, Mr Riall?
Mr Riall: Not dissimilar to that.
Q39 Greg Clark: What have you paid out in fines?
Mr Riall: In 2005 we paid out a total of £41,000 in penalties.
Q40 Greg Clark: What was the reason?
Mr Riall: Again, there were one or two performance measures
where we narrowly missed the required thresholds.
Q41 Greg Clark: Do you know which ones?
Mr Riall: For example, the requirement to report 100% of all
breaches of Adult Curfew Orders on time. There have been occasions when we have
slipped below the 100% requirement which has resulted in a financial deduction.
Q45 Greg Clark: Turning to some of the breaches and the particular
point of reporting breaches on time, Mr Taylor-Smith. You seem to regard your
performance as being satisfactory on this. Can you explain why?
Mr Taylor-Smith: For the period that the report covers I would not consider our
performance to be satisfactory. Our performance since the commencement of the
new contracts where there are much more appropriate service level measures in
place - the Home Office is measuring us more appropriately on the things which
are most important - in this particular area is satisfactory.
Q46 Greg Clark: So they have changed the measurements.
Mr Taylor-Smith: That is right.
Q47 Greg Clark: Is it still the case that you are required to report
breaches within 24 hours?
Mr Taylor-Smith: That is correct.
Q48 Greg Clark: Does that continue to be measured under the contract,
the number of failures to report within the 24 hours?
Mr Taylor-Smith: That is correct.
Q49 Greg Clark: So that continues to be something that you are
measured on. According to the report at page three, paragraph 11, 22% of
breaches took between one day and three days to report and 13% took over three
days. It seems worrying that during the period this report was being drawn up
that level of failure took place. Can you explain what was wrong with the
system that you were operating?
Mr Riall: Can I just pick up on that point? Under the first
generation of contract there was a much greater emphasis placed on the need to
verify whether a breach had or had not occurred rather than the immediate
reporting of a suspected breach.
Q50 Greg Clark: I was talking about what is reported here. Perhaps you
can turn to page three, paragraph 11, which says that the majority of breaches
were reported to the Home Office within 24 hours but 22% took between 24 hours
and three days. That is a fact, is it not?
Mr Riall: It is a fact. The point that I was making was
particularly during the time that the NAO report was being put together there
was much greater emphasis placed by us as contractors on establishing whether a
breach had or had not occurred rather than reporting. Those lessons have been
learned and you will see that the standards of reporting are significantly
better.
Q51 Mr Richard Bacon MP
(Conservative): Can I just interrupt
for a minute. You are saying there has been a significant change in the
performance since the publication of this report.
Mr Riall: Correct, in terms of ----
Q52 Mr Bacon: The report was only published on
Mr Riall: It is an ongoing thing. The period that is being
referred to in the report, as I understand it, was predominantly the first six
months of 2005. A new contract was entered into on
Q53 Mr Bacon: Did you or the Home Office supply the NAO with the
performance information out of this new contract?
Mr Riall: The information supplied to the NAO was partly out of
the old contract and the first two months of the new contract.
Q54 Mr Bacon: Only the first two months of the new contract?
Mr Riall: Correct.
Q55 Mr Bacon: Would the NAO like to comment on this?
Ms Murphie: When contracts are changing it is obviously quite
difficult to make an assessment and the new contracts are quite different from
the old ones. I think if the performance is improving to that extent then that
is gratifying and that is what we would all like to see.