Prison Privatisation Report International
No. 71/72, Dec 05-April 06
Published by the Public Services International
Research Unit (
For all
inquiries about PPRI's contents or to contribute
material, please email Stephen Nathan, PPRI
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This publication is
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IN THIS ISSUE
CANADA ISRAEL COSTA
RICA PERU FRANCE GERMANY BULGARIA
UNITED KINGDOM JAPAN AUSTRALIA SOUTH AFRICA
CANADA
“The Government of Ontario will transfer the operation of the Central North
Correctional Centre in Penetanguishene to the public sector”, the provincial
government’s community safety and correctional services minister Monte Kwinter
announced on 27 April 2006 (see PPRI
#70, 64, 61, 58, 49, 44, 38,. 37).
“After five years, there has been no appreciable benefit from the private
operation of the Central North Correctional Centre,” said Kwinter in a news
release. “We carefully studied its overall performance compared with the
publicly operated Central East Correctional Centre (CECC) in Kawartha Lakes,
and concluded the CECC performed better in key areas such as security, health
care and reducing re- offending rates. As a result, the government will allow
the contract with the private operator to expire.”
Utah-based Managaement & Training Corporation’s (MTC) Canadian
subsidiary, Management and Training Corporation Canada (MTCC), was chosen to
operate the Central North Correctional Centre in May 2001 as part of a
five-year pilot project. During that period, the Central East Correctional Centre
- which is identical in design - opened as a publicly operated facility. The
pilot project was to determine if there was any advantage to private operations
of correctional services in
“We acknowledge that MTCC was in material compliance with the contract,”
said Kwinter, “but the evidence clearly indicates that the public facility
produced better results in key performance areas.”
The contract with MTCC ends on 10 November 2006.
An Ontario Government spokesperson told PPRI
that an internal review to compare MTCC-run Central North Correctional Centre
with publicly-run Central East Correctional Centre was carried out and the
methodology reviewed by Anthony Doob of
the University of Toronto. The government also commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) to evaluate MTCC’s contract performance and to make recommendations for
policy options.
According to Canadian Press the
company has responded to the government’s announcement by claiming that it has
saved taxpayers C$23 million and could save a further C$11 if allowed to
continue for five more years. Scott Marquand, president of MTC Canada, said
that there is no “evidence to support a change that will cost
According to data from the ministry of community safety and correctional
services seen by PPRI, the publicly
run prison rated better on security, classification, programming effectiveness,
continuum of services, recdivism rates,
healthcare and community impact. A comparison of programming quality was
deemed undeterminable.
PricewaterhouseCoopers
PPRI has also obtained a copy of the
executive summary of PwC’s report and a verbatim extract is set out below. The
full report, which incorporates information provided by ministry staff as well
as PwC’s own research and analysis, has not been published due to commercial
confidentiality.
The majority of PwC’s policy decision considerations favoured private
management and/or extending the period of comparison. One telling point in the
summary is a reference to the role played by the local community in
Penetanguishene which has consistently opposed CNCC being privately run. PwC
states: “With respect to community impact, findings indicate that the impact of
CECC appears to be somewhat more positive on the community than that of CNCC.
This difference in impacts is minimised if one does not consider the data from
the ani-privatisation advocacy groups in among the groups that rated both
facilities.”
PwC Summary of Findings
Overall, the data and analysis
in this report indicate that MTCC is operating in material compliance with its
contractual obligations under its Services Agreement with the Ministry, and
that its performance is, on the whole, satisfactory in the context of the
Ministry’s overall system. A comparison of the performance of CNCC versus CECC
(excluding cost) indicates that CECC is rated higher than CNCC.
Extending the Ministry’s
contractual relationship with MTCC for an additional five-year term appears to
be economically advantageous. However, there have been specific performance
concerns that will need to be addressed in negotiations with MTCC, should the
Ministry choose to continue its contractual relationship with MTCC.
MTCC Performance: CECC
Comparison
The Ministry analyses
conclude that on balance, CECC’s performance was
rated higher than that of CNCC, as managed and operated by MTCC according to
the Services Agreement for the identified comparison periods. The Ministry analyses address the comparative performance
(other than cost, which is dealt with separately in this report) of
CNCC, as managed and operated by MTCC, versus CECC. This conclusion is based on
the comparative information available from the Ministry on comparative
non-economic performance, those addressing security, programming, health and community impact for the specific comparison
periods identified within the report.
1. With respect to security, CECC scored higher
than CNCC on static security, video monitoring, staffing levels, supervision
levels, and search compliance. CNCC scored higher than CECC on preventative
maintenance (of security-related equipment) and training compliance. Overall,
CECC scored higher than CNCC on security.
2. With respect to programming:
● On
classification, and on use of this classification for client/risk
need practices, CECC rated higher than CNCC with the exception of the
educational area in which CNCC’s use of the Canadian
Academic Achievement test was noted;
● On
variety and volume of programming, CNCC rated higher than CECC,
particularly in the educational area;
● On
programming quality and effectiveness, CECC’s
closer alignment with the “what works” literature resulted in a higher rating
than CNCC. Organizational culture was another factor in which CECC rated
higher, although “both institutions struggle to effect cultural change to one
that supports rehabilitation of offenders”;
● On the continuum of
services to offenders, CECC’s well-established
inter-agency links, discharge planning and staffing levels were factors
contributing to its higher rating versus CNCC; and
● On
recidivism, analyses were performed using data from the Offender
Tracking Information System as of September 2005. For this analysis, “due to
the short follow-up period, recidivism is defined as any re-entry into the
provincial system, including offenders who re-entered the system due to parole
violations or remand warrants”. The analysis compared inmates at CNCC for the
period of April 2002 to July 2003, and inmates at CECC for the period of March
2004 to June 2005. These analyses concluded that the recidivism rate of inmates
released from CNCC was higher than those released from CECC by a statistically
significant amount, allowing for differences in offender populations.
3. With respect to health, CECC rated higher
than CNCC overall in areas of infections, time to respond to requests, time to
receive treatment or medication (by a small margin), issues of concern and
health-related ombudsman complaints by inmates. CNCC rated higher on health
care assessments. Overall, CECC rated significantly higher than CNCC on health.
The Ministry authors note that “substantially more audits were performed at
CNCC than CECC; this may have resulted in a greater number of critical
incidents at CNCC than at CECC.” A direct comparison between CNCC and CECC on
health care is complicated. Although both institutions provide health care,
CNCC operates a 24-hour infirmary, while at CECC, the facilities required to
deliver comparable services are not available due to construction issues. The
Ministry authors note that “this may have some impact on the inmates that may
be transferred to this facility.”
4. With respect to community impact, “findings
indicate that the impact of CECC appears to be somewhat more positive on the
community than that of CNCC. This difference in impacts is minimized if one
does not consider the data from the anti-privatization advocacy groups” in
among the groups that rated both facilities.
MTCC Performance: Services
Agreement Expectations
The research and analysis
conducted by PwC addressing matters of performance
versus contractual expectations (other than cost) indicate that MTCC has been
in material compliance with its contractual obligations. It is also fulfilling the expectations of
stakeholders interviewed by PwC for this analysis
related to these obligations and the Ministry’s intent in entering into the
contractual relationship with MTCC.
1. With respect to performance, data and
interview results indicate that MTCC is operating in material compliance with
its contractual obligations. There have been, over the course of the Initial
Term, issues that have arisen related to these contractual obligations,
notably in areas of health care and food services. In these cases, quantitative
data and interview findings indicate that MTCC’s
performance trend has been favourable and that MTCC is currently operating in
material compliance with its contractual obligations.
2. With respect to stakeholder satisfaction,
interview results indicate that stakeholders–Ministry and community–are
satisfied with MTCC’s performance against
expectations. Internally to the Ministry, interviewees indicated that CNCC
under MTCC management is operating as expected within the Ministry’s
corrections management structure. Relations with Adult Community Corrections
have been strained at times, although interviewees indicate that this is a
Ministry-wide challenge not unique to CNCC. Community stakeholders indicated
that issues which arose from the opening of CNCC – the impact of CNCC on the
local waste treatment system, and clear delineation of responsibility (between
MTCC and the Ministry) for communication and action–have been resolved and that
MTCC is operating according to expectations.
3. With respect to the impact on the
4. With respect to the impact on the community,
the positive economic benefit of CNCC has proved, according to interviewees, to
be greater than anticipated in part because of MTCC’s
policy of buying locally where possible. According to interviewees MTCC has
also earned a reputation of being a good corporate citizen through its program
of charitable giving. The opening of CNCC has placed a strain on the Huronia and
Cost and Affordability
The data and analysis in
this report indicate that the Ministry has enjoyed a cost advantage at CNCC
versus CECC over the life of the current contract with MTCC. Further, based on MTCC’s
initial pricing proposal for a contract extension, continuing the MTCC contract
is economically advantageous.
1. With respect to historical cost efficiency,
CNCC and the CECC are the two most efficient adult correctional institutions
when using per diem costs to evaluate the cost efficiency of correctional
institutions in
2. With respect to future affordability,
projected costs for CNCC are lower than for CECC at all utilization levels
considered for contract renewal based on the initial proposal from MTCC.
For the prospective Renewal
Term period, MTCC’s initial proposal indicates
savings of approximately $8.4 to $10.3 million ($9.6 to $11.4 million including
Cookchill savings) versus comparable costs at CECC.
Decision Considerations
The Ministry’s preferred course
of action with respect to the Services Agreement will depend in large part on
the definitive economic terms available in negotiation with MTCC and the cost
indications of terminating a relationship with MTCC.
1. One additional decision factor that the Ministry
may consider is that a decision to transition of the operation and management
of CNCC to the Ministry would be difficult to revisit (that is, to re-introduce
private corrections management) at a later date due to, for example, labour
relations reasons. A decision to continue external management of CNCC is easily
reversed, as the Ministry is afforded a decision point (at a minimum) at every
contract expiry; and
2. Another decision factor that the Ministry may wish
to consider is that, due to delays in commencing operations at CECC, the
comparative study of CNCC and CECC is based on one year of real time experience
for financials and a variety of different calendar periods for each facility in
other areas. Completion of this analysis has been delayed. The Ministry may
wish to make its decision on the long-term management of CNCC based on a
greater experience base and real time comparison with the public sector over
that time.
Scenario 1: Economic
Advantage for Continuation of MTCC Relationship
Initial pricing from MTCC
indicates an economic advantage of continuing the Services Agreement with MTCC, although the advantage may not be as great as is was
for the Initial Term. Overall, performance of CNCC under MTCC management was
satisfactory in the context of the Services Agreement. Based on this, the
Ministry’s preferred course of action may be to negotiate with MTCC with a view
to achieve modified contractual performance obligations that reflect the
Ministry’s concerns regarding the performance issues highlighted in this
report, as well as the best possible economic terms. Other issues for
consideration include:
1.
The Ministry’s evolving priorities for the overall management of the
2.
The Ministry may need to exercise its option to extend for all or part of one
year in order to provide the time necessary to achieve its negotiating
objectives (or to determine that they cannot be achieved);
3.
Alternatively, the Ministry may determine, for policy reasons outside the scope
of this report, that managing CNCC should be internal to the Ministry, notwithstanding
an economic advantage to continue the contract with MTCC;
4.
Finally, the Ministry may choose to re-tender if it determines, in the course
of negotiations with MTCC, that improved terms may be available in the market
and that these improved terms would offset the investment (financial and in
operational disruption) involved in re-tendering.
Scenario 2: Economic
Advantage for Internal Provision
If, in the course of the
negotiations described above, the definitive pricing from MTCC indicates an
economic advantage for internal provision by the Ministry (using CECC as the benchmark), or that the Ministry’s
performance objectives cannot be met, then the Ministry’s preferred cause of
action may be to:
1. Prepare for expiry of the MTCC
contract and commencement of the internal provision;
2. Re-tender the CNCC contract to
achieve better terms from another provider; or
3. Retain MTCC as a service
provider as part of the overall Ministry portfolio at this time for policy
reasons.
Scenario
3: No Apparent Economic Advantage for MTCC or Internal Provision
If the Ministry determines
that there is neither a clear advantage to either internal provision nor to a
continued contractual relationship with MTCC, then the Ministry’s preferred
course of action will be determined by policy considerations. Examples of such policy considerations include:
The desire to extend the
comparative analysis of CNCC versus CECC as described above;
1. The desire to have an external “benchmark” as part
of the Ministry corrections portfolio to achieve competitive tension and a
window on practices in other jurisdictions. This action would indicate to
continue having the private sector be involved; or
2. A policy decision that
Central
North Correctional Centre Review and Comparison With
Central East Correctional Centre, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Federal crackdown
: more private prisons?
Anthony Doob of the
The
government of Israel has been allowed an extension on its deadline for
responding to a supreme court order requesting a definition of the
constitutional limits of the powers to be contracted out to the private sector
(see PPRI #70, 69-67, 64, etc). The
government’s response had been due by the end of January but the court granted
an extension. The final court hearing is now scheduled for June 2006.
In
a recent decision signifying the importance of the case, the court issued a
ruling that seven judges rather than three should hear the arguments.
Even
though the government has now signed a contract with a consortium to finance,
design, build and run a prison the petitioners are challenging the government’s
constitutional authority to privatise prison operations. They claim that
granting a prison operator clear governing authority, including the use of
force, restricting freedom and restricting the privacy of both prisoners and
visitors contravenes
The
government, on the other hand, argues that the privatisation of a prison is a
statutory privatisation that does not harm fundamental constitutional rights.
Constitutional issues in
the
Two
eminent
He
concludes: “…based on my expertise, experience and analysis of relevant court
decisions, is that the operation and management of prisons is one of he
exclusive and essential function s of the modern state: therefore, the act of
privatising prisons, if properly brought before a competent court, would be
declared unconstitutional. Another clear conclusion is the experience with
private incarceration has proved to be futile, dangerous and gravely harmful to
human rights, especially to inmates’ rights and dignity. If a state delegates
one of its essential functions (operating and managing of prisons)it might find itself in an irreversible process, ultimately
abdicating itself of its sovereignty.”
In
a paper Private prisons - Colony beyond
the scope of democracy and outside the realm of Law and Justice - prisoners as
raw material, Professor Michael Waltzer of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton,
argues that “the problem of prison privatisation is that it illegitimately
exposes the prisoners from the protection of the law … all the internal rule
and regulations of their imprisonment, the system of discipline and reward, the
hundreds of small decisions that shape their daily lives, are open now to a
single unanswerable question: is this punishment or economic calculation, the
law or the market?”
Furthermore
he argues that: “In this case the state gives up on what it cannot give up
legitimately, which is its prerogative to punish, or use coercive force against
violators of the law. Since incarceration is part of the process of criminal
justice and stems directly from decisions of the court, private prisons may put
in question the legitimacy of the court decisions as well.”
“Imprisonment
is a state action, and so is every decision made, whoever makes it, about the
course and character of imprisonment. All such decisions are subject to
constitutional norms, and the courts will do what they can to enforce those
norms. The enforcement will probably be more roundabout, and will take longer
and be harder to monitor, in private than in public prisons. Although the
constitutional monitoring of administrative decisions in the field of
imprisonment leave room for desired improvement, it still offers the hope of
legal protection.”
This,
he says, “is probably the chief economic advantage of prison privatisation-that
it shuts down this hope, that it offers a (temporary) escape from the
enforcement of constitutional norms…. we should not be contracting out, as if
these were not our prisoners; we
should be bringing new ideas into the orbit of public service.”
MTC’s battle for compensation
Management
& Training Corporation (MTC) are due to receive $4 million compensation
from the government of Costa Rica after the ministry of justice cancelled a
contract to finance, design, build and run a prison at Pococi
(see PPRI #68, 62, 52, 51, 49-46
& 42).
The
company had been seeking $20 million in compensation. However, the agreement
has not yet been ratified and it is not clear whether the outcome of elections
on
While
these negotiations have been going on the ministry of justice has built 2,600
places at a cost of $10 million. MTC’s project would
have cost $73 million for a 1,200 bed prison.
Two private prisons on the
way
Two privately financed,
designed, built and operated prisons are to be commissioned in
In 2002 US firm Carter Goble
Associates was commissioned to advise on how to expand capacity and they
suggested that to increase capacity it was necessary to restructure existing
facilities and build new prisons.
Comision multisectorial encargada
de proponer medidas para viabilizar la construcción de establecimientos penitenciarios mediante inversion
privada así como el ordenamiento jurídico necesario para su implementación
D.S.No 014-2005-JUS Informe
Final Lima, 10 December 2006, available from PPRI.
Contract awarded
Eiffage, the Paris-based
construction and concessions multinational, has been awarded a 20 year contract
to finance, design, build and maintain four prisons with a combined capacity of
2,800 beds. The contract is worth some €350 million (see PPRI #69, 67, 52, 44, 25 & 11). The facilities will be built at
The
unsuccessful bidders included Bouygues, Spie Batignolles and two Vinci
subsidiaries, Sogea and GTM. The contract tendering
process for a second group of prisons is underway.
Semi-private prisons more
expensive
The
direct running costs of
Cour des Comptes, Rapport public
thématique, Garde et réinsertion, La gestion des prisons, January 2006, full coverage in the
next PPRI.
■ See also Dedans Dehors No. 53, Jan-Feb. 2006 and No.54, March-April 2006, Observatoire international des prisons Section française,
www.oip.org
■
A conference to promote public private partnerships in
Another semi-private prison
The
state of
Debate on private prisons?
A public debate on private
prisons is due to take place this year. In an interview with Bulgaria National
Radio (BNR) in March, deputy justice minister Dimitar
Bongalov announced that his ministry was open to the
idea.
“Institutional meanness” at Serco’s
“
The
chief inspector carried out an announced inspection in November 2005 of this
local prison for males. The capacity is 1,120 although at the time of the
inspection the prison held 1,105.
The
chief inspector’s other findings included:
●
“…respect was again seriously undermined by the physical conditions in which
many prisoners lived, which in some cases were squalid. Many prisoners lacked
pillows, adequate mattresses, toilet seats, working televisions, notice-boards
and places to store belongings. Some cells, especially on the younger
prisoners’ wing, were dirty and festooned with graffiti. These were examples of
institutional meanness which was also reflected in the practice of making
prisoners pay to change the PIN phone numbers they needed to contact relatives,
and in the fact that no unemployment pay was provided to those prisoners for
whom no work was available.”
●
“Suicide prevention continued to be well managed, with innovative work, though
prisoner ‘buddies’ needed more support. However, this good work was undermined,
in the important early days of custody, by inadequate procedures and
environment. The alleged first night centre was a wing of poorly maintained,
often dirty cells where no support was available for newly-received prisoners,
and where some prisoners were at risk from others. Combined with inadequate and
unsafe detoxification procedures, these deficits presented significant risks to
prisoners’ safety. Bullying was also insufficiently addressed, even though
links to self-harm were evident.”
●
“Lengthy periods of time out of cell, with little activity and low staff
levels, raised concerns about safety. Equally importantly, the young men had
little chance of participating in anything that might reduce their chances of reoffending.”
●
“Race relations were well managed, but younger black and minority ethnic
prisoners said they were significantly disadvantaged in their treatment … there
was no clear management of young prisoners, who comprised a third of the
population, and they described their experience much more negatively than did
adult prisoners.””
●
“Our main concern was not only that managers had failed to tackle the problems
we pointed out at the last inspection, but also that the prison had
deteriorated in some important respects. It is noticeable that the deficits we
found are all in areas not specifically mandated by the contract under which
the prison is run. There remains a concern that, focusing on meeting their
contractual obligations prison managers had allowed important areas to slip
below what was safe and decent; and indeed may have sought savings in precisely
those areas.”
Despite
this the chief inspector also stated that: “
Following
the report’s publication, the Guardian,
Report on an announced
inspection of HMP & YOI
■
The Doncaster prison management contract provides Serco
with £19 million per year in income, according to a company presentation at the
Merrill Lynch Seminar on Defence & Home Affairs in November 2005 (www.serco.com).
UKDS-run Forest Bank : early promise not maintained
“In 2002 we described the
new, privately managed Forest Bank as a very good local prison. However, this
unannounced short follow-up inspection found that this early promise had not
been sustained. In particular, there had been a significant deterioration in
safety - so that urgent management attention and remedial action was required
to rebuild staff confidence and properly regain control of the prison.”
UK Detention Services Ltd opened Forest Bank in
● “There had been
over 2,500 adjudications in the first half of 2005 and in the most recent month
positive mandatory drug test results had reached 40%. Prisoner assaults on
other prisoners were consistently running at 25 a month. There was a continuing
series of assaults against staff, including one unsavoury incident when a
bucket of excrement was thrown into an office and over two staff who were in
there, while we were at the prison. This was by no means the first such
“potting” incident in the prison’s recent history. The establishment was attempting to respond
to these issues but there was a lack of coherence and balance in their
approach.”
● “We were
concerned that a culture of tolerance of, and acquiescence with,
inappropriate
behaviour was becoming established at Forest Bank and this put both
prisoners
and staff at risk. Local managers were not surprised by what we had found
and
were keen to see matters improve. High levels of staff turnover did not help to
create
an atmosphere of certainty and consistency in dealing with some challenging
behaviour
and a local culture steeped in serious drug abuse.”
● “A survey carried
out by the quality improvement group (QIG) asked respondents to comment on what
they thought of the induction programme; 38.5% of respondents thought it was
“useless”.
● “There had been
an undoubted increase in the number of work and training
opportunities
in the establishment and many work places provided accredited learning
opportunities.
Local employers who might be able to offer prisoners employment on release had
been approached and the establishment was prepared to facilitate this through
the use of resettlement release on temporary licence. If every activity place
had been used, every prisoner at Forest Bank could have at least part-time work
or education and, for many, there would be full-time work. However, we found
that over half the prisoners in residential units were locked in their cells
for lengthy periods. It was not clear why senior managers were not fully
exploiting the potential in this area.”
● “The reception
area was busy with an average of 110-130 new receptions and 150 discharges to
court each week, in addition to various other movements. The area was largely
staffed by senior custody officers and basic grade staff who had either never
worked in reception or had been working elsewhere for a considerable period of
time and who were unfamiliar with reception policies and procedures. A change
of shift pattern in the month before our inspection had resulted in a dedicated
team of eight reception staff increasing to a team of 25 to cover both visits
and reception areas. Reception was bare and institutional in design. Prisoners’
first experience of Forest Bank was being greeted by staff, standing behind a
high desk, and being told to stand behind the yellow line. Overall, however,
reception staff treated prisoners respectfully and interactions were friendly.”
The chief inspector recommended 59
improvements, some of which were repeated from the previous inspection, and
highlighted one example of good practice.
Report on an unannounced
short follow-up inspection of HMP Forest Bank, 22-24 August 2005 by HM Chief
Inspector of prisons, December 2005,
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/
First report on women’s
prison
HMP
Bronzefield, in Ashford, Middlesex, is the
In
June 2005 the prison was inspected by the chief inspector of prisons. In her
report the chief inspector made 152 main recommendations for improvements,
noted 25 points for improved housekeeping and highlighted three examples of
good practice.
The chief
inspector stated that: “some of the newly recruited staff had not been prepared
for this level of need; and nor had some of the initial systems, in particular
detoxification and healthcare. It was to the credit of managers that they had
to some extent stabilised the staff group, and that lessons had been learnt
from the early false starts in detoxification and healthcare, which were
beginning to be remedied by the time of the inspection. The high dependency
unit was caring well for some very ill women. We remained, however, concerned
by the paucity of primary mental healthcare for the majority of women, and the
length of time taken to transfer acutely mentally ill women to appropriate NHS
facilities.”
“Suicide
and self-harm management was good; but anti-bullying strategies needed
improvement.
Nevertheless, prisoners were less likely to say that they had been victimised
by other prisoners than the benchmark for women’s prisons.”
The chief
inspector said that both the physical environment and the relationships between
staff and prisoners at Bronzefield were good. “Staff were approachable and knowledgeable about individual
prisoners. However, their inexperience sometimes meant that they were unable to
sort out prisoners’ detailed queries; and the applications and complaints
system was not effective.”
“The
prison had made a good start in tackling race relations, but had not yet got to
grips with the needs of the 40% of its population who were foreign nationals,
some of whom had language needs that were not being met.”
She also
noted that “the provision of activity was better than in most prisons we have
inspected. Not only were prisoners out of their cells for lengthy periods, they
were also able to participate in activities that were linked into resettlement
needs, and workshops that delivered employment skills. Unlike many local
prisons, Bronzefield did not rely primarily on
domestic cleaning jobs in order to provide out of cell activity for its
prisoners. This approach is greatly to be commended.”
However,
the prison “lacked a needs analysis of its population, or the ability to track
and ensure progress on the resettlement plans that were developed for each
prisoner. Most importantly, there was insufficient drug treatment work, though
this was likely to be at the heart of the resettlement needs of most women in the
prison.”
“Overall,
this is a positive report on a prison that has undergone a steep learning curve
in a short time. We were impressed with the enthusiasm of managers and staff,
and their readiness to learn from experience, and to take on board our proposals.
The crucial task for managers will be to ensure that the relatively
inexperienced staff team are sufficiently supported, so as to minimise the
staff turnover that can easily destabilise a fairly new prison. We have also
pointed to other areas that need to be built on, if the prison is to sustain
and improve on its early progress.”
Report on an announced
inspection of HMP Bronzefield, 13-17 June 2005, by HM
Chief Inspector of Prisons, September 2005, published
■ Ashford Prison Services Ltd had a turnover of £74.7 million for the
financial year ended 31 march 2005. The company made a pre-tax loss of £0.7
million. ‘Related Party Transactions’ [payments] listed in the company’s
accounts during the year were:
Interserve Project Services Ltd - construction services - £1,010,396
Interserve PFI Holdings Ltd - subordinated debt - £2,036,145
Interserve PFI Holdings Ltd - subordinate debt interest - £146,602
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - subordinated debt - £2,611
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - subordinated debt interest - £2,036,145
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - bank loan - £8,132,105
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - bank loan interest - £2,141,934
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - advisory services - £41,924
UK Detention Services Ltd - advisory services - £16,815,508
Sodexho Investment Services Ltd - subordinated debt - £2,036,145
Sodexho Investment Services Ltd - subordinated debt interest - £146,602
Bank loans of £58,733,726
owing at
More money go round
Peterborough Prison Management Ltd’s
principal business is the design,
construction, management and financing of a new prison for men and women in
UK Detention Services Ltd - advisory services - £9,677,284
Interserve Project Services Ltd - construction services -£20,663,295
Interserve Investments
Plc - advisory services - £5,423
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - bank loan - £29,879,199
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc - advisory services - £144,487
The company’s bank loans
repayable between one and over five years were £82,307,882.
No plans for cost
comparisons
The
government has “no current plans to commission further research” into the
comparative costs of public and private prisons in
Electronic Monitoring
provides value but…
The
electronic monitoring of adult offenders in
The
use of electronic monitoring has grown from 9,000 cases in 1999-2000 to 53,000
in 20054-05 and, in that financial year, the home office spent £102.3 million
on the electronic monitoring of curfews. Private contractors provide and install
the monitoring equipment and are responsible for monitoring what the NAO refers
to as ‘the curfewees’. New contracts commenced in
April 2005 and are operated by G4S and Serco. The NAO also stated that: “…given the vital
part which contractors play in maintaining public confidence in curfews as an
effective control or punishment, the home office should be more rigorous in the
regular audits which it conducts with the contractor.”
The Electronic Monitoring
of Adult Offenders, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 800
Session 2005-2006, 1 February 2006, National Audit Office, www.nao.org
EM cross-examination
Following
the publication of the National Audit Office’s report on electronic monitoring
in England and Wales, the government’s committee of public accounts discussed
the findings, taking oral evidence from David Taylor-Smith of service providers
G4S Justice Services, Mr Tom Riall of Serco as well as Sir David Normington
from the home office and Aileen Murphie from the
National Audit Office on 15 March 2006. Overall there were 109 questions. Set
out below are extracts from the uncorrected transcript of the hearing.
Q31 Helen Goodman MP
(Labour): Are you going to do more
research on the difference in the impacts on people's behaviour of being under
curfew as opposed to being locked up?
Sir David Normington: I think we probably will, and this is a
recommendation in the report. The anecdotal evidence is that it helps but there
is not much evidence that the Curfew Order itself has a particular impact on reoffending. It is going to be training, jobs, housing and
so on, maybe family support, which will be much more influential in getting
people back into society and stop them reoffending.
It is most unlikely that the curfew by itself will be a significant issue in reoffending. We have not got that evidence so I think we
could do with some more.
Q32 Helen Goodman: One of the things I am not quite clear about from this
is to what extent you are able to make independent checks on the effectiveness of
the way it is operating in practice other than the information that is provided
to you by the contractors because obviously they have a conflict of interest in
presenting this information to you.
Sir David Normington: One of the recommendations in the report is that we
should do some better auditing, some whole case auditing, rather than just
looking at the statistics and we have agreed to do that and have started it in
fact so that we take some actual cases and follow them through rather than
looking at bits of the process and monthly reports and statistics. I think
there is a need to do that and that is what the NAO said we should do and we
have started doing that.
Q35 Greg Clark MP
(Conservative): We have talked about
the need under your contract to check that the equipment is working every so
often. Are there financial penalties that you incur if the equipment is found
not to be working?
Mr Riall (Serco): There are performance measures within the contract
which state that we have to have the service up and running 24 hours a day and
if there are any gaps in that performance then financial deductions are placed
against us and potentially, ultimately, more serious consequences should those
failures continue.
Q36 Greg Clark: Mr Taylor-Smith, over the last year have there been
penalties imposed against you for any of these reasons?
Mr Taylor-Smith: Yes, there have. We have incurred just about £100,000 worth of
penalties, most of which occurred around the start-up of the new contracts in
April last year. That has settled down now in the second half of the year to
about £16,000.
Q37 Greg Clark: What is the principal cause of those payments?
Mr Taylor-Smith (G4S): If I look at the moment we have 19 service levels of
which we are currently failing on one, and that is to call offenders within 15
minutes if they are absent for five minutes or more. That requires a technology
fix which we are currently putting in, so that is a good example of improving
the monitoring platform, and that will be in by April and we will be meeting
all the service levels.
Q38 Greg Clark: What is your experience, Mr Riall?
Mr Riall: Not dissimilar to that.
Q39 Greg Clark: What have you paid out in fines?
Mr Riall: In 2005 we paid out a total of £41,000 in penalties.
Q40 Greg Clark: What was the reason?
Mr Riall: Again, there were one or two performance measures
where we narrowly missed the required thresholds.
Q41 Greg Clark: Do you know which ones?
Mr Riall: For example, the requirement to report 100% of all
breaches of Adult Curfew Orders on time. There have been occasions when we have
slipped below the 100% requirement which has resulted in a financial deduction.
Q45 Greg Clark: Turning to some of the breaches and the particular
point of reporting breaches on time, Mr Taylor-Smith. You seem to regard your
performance as being satisfactory on this. Can you explain why?
Mr Taylor-Smith: For the period that the report covers I would not consider our
performance to be satisfactory. Our performance since the commencement of the
new contracts where there are much more appropriate service level measures in
place - the Home Office is measuring us more appropriately on the things which
are most important - in this particular area is satisfactory.
Q46 Greg Clark: So they have changed the measurements.
Mr Taylor-Smith: That is right.
Q47 Greg Clark: Is it still the case that you are required to report
breaches within 24 hours?
Mr Taylor-Smith: That is correct.
Q48 Greg Clark: Does that continue to be measured under the contract,
the number of failures to report within the 24 hours?
Mr Taylor-Smith: That is correct.
Q49 Greg Clark: So that continues to be something that you are
measured on. According to the report at page three, paragraph 11, 22% of
breaches took between one day and three days to report and 13% took over three
days. It seems worrying that during the period this report was being drawn up
that level of failure took place. Can you explain what was wrong with the
system that you were operating?
Mr Riall: Can I just pick up on that point? Under the first
generation of contract there was a much greater emphasis placed on the need to
verify whether a breach had or had not occurred rather than the immediate
reporting of a suspected breach.
Q50 Greg Clark: I was talking about what is reported here. Perhaps you
can turn to page three, paragraph 11, which says that the majority of breaches
were reported to the Home Office within 24 hours but 22% took between 24 hours
and three days. That is a fact, is it not?
Mr Riall: It is a fact. The point that I was making was
particularly during the time that the NAO report was being put together there
was much greater emphasis placed by us as contractors on establishing whether a
breach had or had not occurred rather than reporting. Those lessons have been
learned and you will see that the standards of reporting are significantly
better.
Q51 Mr Richard Bacon MP
(Conservative): Can I just interrupt
for a minute. You are saying there has been a significant change in the
performance since the publication of this report.
Mr Riall: Correct, in terms of ----
Q52 Mr Bacon: The report was only published on
Mr Riall: It is an ongoing thing. The period that is being
referred to in the report, as I understand it, was predominantly the first six
months of 2005. A new contract was entered into on
Q53 Mr Bacon: Did you or the Home Office supply the NAO with the
performance information out of this new contract?
Mr Riall: The information supplied to the NAO was partly out of
the old contract and the first two months of the new contract.
Q54 Mr Bacon: Only the first two months of the new contract?
Mr Riall: Correct.
Q55 Mr Bacon: Would the NAO like to comment on this?
Ms Murphie: When contracts are changing it is obviously quite
difficult to make an assessment and the new contracts are quite different from
the old ones. I think if the performance is improving to that extent then that
is gratifying and that is what we would all like to see.
Mr Bacon: Perhaps
if the NAO were to revisit this subject in a few years' time we would be able
to see whether the performance had been maintained.
Q56 Greg Clark: I am not sure it has much to do with the contract,
either breaches are being reported on time or they are not, why should that be
influenced by the contract? You already contracted before to report breaches
within 24 hours and yet 22% took between 24 hours and three days and 13% took
more than three days. Why should the contract have made a difference to that, that was already part of your requirement?
Mr Taylor-Smith: May I take that up? It is worth putting it into context. This was a
new service and was the largest service of its kind in the world and when it
commenced the focus initially was very much about equipment and technology and
explanations.
Q57 Greg Clark: Sorry, can I stop you there. That was not the case. We
are talking about a sample that the National Audit Office took last year, I
assume, so we are not talking about the beginning of your previous contract, we
are talking about a relatively short period of time ago in which a very large
number of breaches were not reported on time.
Sir David Normington: I think you will find, and I stand to be corrected by
the NAO, they took a sample of cases adding up to 35, for instance, in the
breaches of the curfew over three years from 2002 until the end of the
contract, some cases in each year, and they looked at those. They are reporting
on that sample of 35 cases. The numbers vary in each case but they took a
sample over a period of a number of years.
Q58 Greg Clark: Can I ask the NAO to clarify this. Was the sample a
recent sample or was it looking back to right at the beginning?
Ms Murphie: We took a sample of cases of Adult Curfew Orders and
Home Detention Curfew Orders but over the three years that the system had been
underway.
Q59 Greg Clark: When you reviewed these examples did you notice an
improvement during those three years?
Ms Murphie: I think that would be difficult to say actually.
Q63 Greg Clark: So you were not being fined enough before, this is
what you are saying. If you had been fined more then you would have reported
things quicker.
Mr Riall: I would argue that the financial deduction is not the
only incentive upon our performance.
Q64 Greg Clark: What was in the old contract that clearly did not
work?
Mr Riall: We were not subject to performance deductions under
the old contract for failures to report breaches on time.
Q65 Greg Clark: This is useful for our monitoring of these contracts
in the future. What you have just said to me is that the penalties that you
faced under the old contract were not sufficiently high to incentivise
you to do what you were required under the contract to do.
Mr Riall: There were not financial deductions for that
particular measure under the old contract.
Q66 Greg Clark: So it is only with the bringing in of financial
penalties that you have improved your practice?
Mr Riall: No, the point I was trying to make was that it is not
just financial deductions that incentivise our performance
because we are clearly concerned about the reputation of our organisations,
about the re-bidding of new contracts.
Q67 Greg Clark: The proof of the pudding is in the eating, is it not?
The reputational effect was there under both
contracts and yet you had lots of breaches. They bring in extra financial
penalties and suddenly your reporting performance improves. That is an
interesting observation as to the relative impact of reputational
consequences versus financial consequences.
Mr Riall: Assisted also by things like better technology, which
I have mentioned as well.
Q74 Kitty Ussher MP (Labour): What
kind of assessment do you do of whether a company is a fit and proper company
to run such an important public service?
Sir David Normington: We will do the usual checks. It is the normal
process. There will be a specification, of course, and we will be judging the
tenders against that specification. We will be looking at past performance
because in this case we know these companies quite well, not just in this area
but in some others. We will be doing the usual due diligence checks. It is a
quite normal process but, of course, this is a very high risk operation and
these companies are in that business.
Q75 Kitty Ussher: Indeed. I
did a quick press search myself particularly on what I think of as Group 4 Securicor, although I understand you have changed your name
slightly. As part of your due diligence did it concern you that they were being
investigated and had a number of problems in this area across the world? I
found performance disputes in
Sir David Normington: I did not personally look at all of that. I do not
know whether all of that was looked at. Certainly we do the proper checks. We
were satisfied that the company could provide us with the service we needed. I
cannot respond on all of those individual cases. We will have done a proper
look but whether we looked at all of those things I am afraid I do not know.
Q76 Kitty Ussher: Group 4 Securicor has been highly expansionary in recent months and
years. It has expanded rapidly internationally by acquisition. Did the
Department have any concerns that it was overstretched as it sought to acquire
this large contract in the
Sir David Normington: We awarded them the contract and they are performing
very well and that is the proof of it really. There are big profitable
companies in this business and Group 4 Securicor is
one of them. I think we were satisfied that they could provide this service
well, and they do.
Q77 Kitty Ussher: Mr
Taylor-Smith, I must give you an opportunity to respond to the points that I
have raised. How would you answer the questions that I have just put to Sir
David?
Mr Taylor-Smith: If I take the first one about how was the procurement run, in my
experience of working in this area over the last four and a half years this was
unquestionably the most intelligently run procurement I have been involved
with. It definitely resulted in a 40% saving to the taxpayer but it also
resulted in us at the right stage getting involved with putting in place the
relevant measures for measuring up and also ensuring that the contract met its
aims and objectives. That is an answer to the first one. In terms of our
activities around the world, just to give it some perspective, we have got
380,000 employees in 108 countries.
Q78 Kitty Ussher: Wow.
Mr Taylor-Smith: I am sure that in any one day we may be celebrating great successes
with industrial relations - for instance, about a month ago we signed as the
first company in the
House of Commons Minutes
of Evidence Taken before The Committee of Public Accounts, 15 March 2006, Uncorrected
Transcript of Oral Evidence to be published as HC 997-I,
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmpubacc/uc997-/uc9
Oakhill Secure Training Centre
report
“The
centre was struggling to care for trainees with limited staffing numbers. The
majority of staff providing direct care were new to the job and had received
basic childcare and custody training. The safety and security of the trainees
was being managed, but there was improvement needed at all levels in order to
bring the centre up to the standards required and against which it was being
inspected,” stated a recent report by the Commission for Social Care
Inspection.
Oakhill Secure Training Centre at
According
to the inspectors, “prior to this inspection the management team had been
restructured in an effort to strengthen it following a difficult and
challenging period at the centre extending from December 2004 to February
2005.”
The
inspectors also found:
●
“a management team that had recently been restructured and that was still
finding its feet”;
●
“a management team that showed the capacity and desire to improve the centre
and to take forward positive ideas for the care of the trainees”;
●
“a centre that was understaffed and frequently not meeting the minimum staffing
levels set by the Youth Justice Board for 80 children”;
●
“good relations between the majority of trainees and staff”;
● “a tangible feeling of hope for the future amongst the staff
group.”
Inspectors
also noted that “staff and trainees at the centre were struggling to understand
and resolve day-to-day matters involving care. There were inconsistent messages
from staff to trainees about issues such as the provision of food, skin care
products, and the operation of the rewards and sanctions procedures. The lack
of clearly understood policies and procedures with regard to these issues
created unfair pressure on the workforce, and confusion amongst the trainees.”
“Staff
were, on the whole, new to this type of role; most had
not worked in such a centre before. Staff turnover was slowing down from a high
level when the centre opened. Those staff interviewed by inspectors showed
great resolve and determination to ensure trainees received the best possible
care. Trainees spoken to respected those caring for them and were enjoying
adequate day-to-day care within the constraints described above. Staff were positive about the recent management appointments and
changes to the senior management structure.”
The
centre was “aiming to provide a multi disciplinary service to trainees. Some
excellent individual work with trainees was observed, which was valued and
welcomed by the trainees. However the different disciplines working at the centre
had yet to respect each other’s roles and learn to share information for the
benefit of trainees. “
The
provision of health care provided by the Milton Keynes Primary Care Trust (PCT)
was said to be “excellent” while education services were “improving” and were
assessed as “adequate”.
Inspectors
“had some concerns over the way child protection was managed” and they found
“three possible child protection incidents that had not been referred to the
local authority.” A local authority social worker had recently been seconded to
the centre and inspectors commended this “as a positive step forward”.
They
concluded that “major improvements” were needed to the staffing establishment
and communications within the centre “in order that it could better meet the
aspirations of its managers and the standards against which CSCI measures the
performance of Secure Training Centres” and that ”staff
training needs to be ongoing.”
Inspectors
were “concerned about the range and number of areas for development found during
this inspection.” They were, however, “heartened by the potential of the new
management team who had an understanding of the issues that needed to be
addressed. The management team was determined to drive forward improvements for
the benefit of the trainees, the staff and the centre as a whole.”
Commission for Social Care
Inspection, Inspection of Oakhill Secure Training
Centre, May 2005, published
■
The
report’s publication prompted questions of the government in the House of Lords
by Baroness Stern. She asked what measures had been taken in response to the
report. The minister of state replied that: “the centre’s operator drew up an
action plan to achieve improvements… progress against the plan is reviewed
regularly. At the [youth justice} board’s request the commission’s inspectors
made a further, unannounced, visit to Oakhill at the
end of November, during which they assessed the progress against the action
plan as well as the overall effectiveness of the centre. Following the visit,
the commission wrote to the board confirming that Oakhill
is a safe and secure environment for the children placed there. The operator is
reviewing the action plan…in order to achieve further improvements…”(Lords Hansard,
■ STC (Milton Keynes) Ltd is the joint venture company formed to
finance, design, build and manage Oakhill Secure
Training Centre. The most recent accounts filed, for the 65 weeks ended 31
December 2004, show that 100 per cent of the stock in the company are held by STC (Milton Keynes) Holdings Ltd which,
in turn, is 49 per cent owned by Securicor Justice Services Ltd, 26
per cent by New N.T. Ltd and 25 per
cent by MJ Gleeson Group plc.
■ Securicor Justice Services Ltd,
filed its accounts for the 15 month period ended
Privatisation of probation
service delayed
Government plans to invite
the private and voluntary sectors to run probation services in
“This follow-up report indicates that serious
attention has been paid to the matters raised in the full inspection report of
2005, and that most have been dealt with satisfactorily,” stated
HM Inspectorate of
Prisons, HMP
■ Kilmarnock Prison Services Ltd’s accounts
for the year ended
The companies involved
The companies involved in the
finance, design, construction and operation of non-custodial services at the
Mine Social Rehabilitation Centre include: Secom Co Ltd, Shimizu Corporation,
Nippon Steel, Takenaka Corporation, AXIS SATOW Inc, Shogakukan Production Co. Ltd, Nihon Unisys Ltd, Hitachi
Ltd, Azusa Sekkei Co. Ltd, Aim Services Co. Ltd and
Nichii Gakkan Company. The prison is due to open in
April 2007. Although prison guards will be state employees the final division
of labour between public and private staff has not been finalised (see PPRI #57).
Bidding for contracts for a
second private prison, the Shimane-Asahi Social Rehabilitation Centre in Asahimachi, Hamada City, was due to start on 21 April 2006.
However, the process has been delayed as two of the bidders,
Obayashi Corporation and Shmizu Corporation have been
temporarily disqualified after alleged bid-rigging on a military contract.
However, both will be allowed to bid for the prison contracts in the summer.
The scheduled opening date of the prison is October 2008.
The government’s public
accounts and estimates committee has called for the department to “provide
meaningful comparisons of costs and benefits between public and private prisons
in future annual reports. These comparisons should include:
● expenditure
totals in the financial year for all prisons under their major cost categories;
● average
cost of housing a prisoner for the year in each prison;
● explanations
for major variations in expenditure on an individual prison basis;
●assessed aggregate
performance against service delivery outcomes by each prison and the resulting
impact on the amount of performance linked fee in the case of private prisons;
and
● commentary
on matters relevant to any comparisons that can be drawn between costs of public and private prisons.
In its report the committee
also states that “the triennial reviews of the prison service agreements
[between the government and private prison operators GSL and GEO Group] should
not impede the publishing of costs data, given that the specific details of
individual elements comprising each cost category would not need to be
disclosed.” Its view was that; “the overriding factors influencing decisions on
the breadth of published cost material to be included in the department’s
annual report and the magnitude of public funds directed each year to the
operations of public and private prisons, and the consequential right of
Parliament and the community to have access to sufficient information to judge
how well costs are managed within prisons.”
The committee had been asking
for the release of the original prison services agreements for Port Phillip
Prison and Fulham Correctional Centre since its 2002-03 budget outcomes
inquiry. The committee did not receive this material until November 2005. In May 2005 the minister for corrections had
written to the committee stating that a second triennial review of the prison
service agreements had commenced and that commercial confidentiality prevented
the disclosure of prison cost data during this process. The committee intends
to follow up the costs of running prisons in its 2006-07 budget estimates
inquiry.
Parliament of Victoria, Public Accounts and Estimates
Committee, Report on the 2004-05 Budget Outcomes, April 2006, No.194 Session
2003-06, www.parliament.vic.gov.au/paec/inquiries/budgetoutcomes
2004-05/default.htm
GSL: Port Phillip Prison
GSL
Australia has been fined almost $A200,000 by
Corrections Victoria for an incident in which a vulnerable prisoner was
humiliated and hurt by prison officers at Port Phillip Prison in June 2005 (see
PPRI #69, 68, 63, 61, 59, 57, 56,
51-49, etc).
According
to an internal GSL report seen by The
Sunday Age the prisoner allegedly rejected efforts to make him cover up the
incident. As a result of the incident the company fired four prison officers.
Meanwhile,
a 29 year old remand prisoner, Darren Parkes was
stabbed to death at Port Phillip on
The
company is also facing a lawsuit from four former prisons at Port Phillip who
allege that they were abused and mistreated in an incident when they were
removed from their cells. Seven prison officers, the company and the State of
The
company’s contract for Port Phillip is currently under a scheduled review by
Corrections Victoria.
1999 death at Fulham “a
travesty”
The
murder of prisoner Paul Shaw at the (then) Australasian Correctional
Management-run Fulham Correctional Centre in November 1999 has led a
“The
fact that Paul Shaw was stabbed with a shiv
[home-made knife] constructed in the Unit from the metal stays of a broom,
coupled with the fact that there was a home brew in the unit in respect of
which a number of inmates, possibly even one of the assailants, were affected
by alcohol merely confirms the contention that searches and/or
monitoring/supervision in the period leading up to Mr Shaw’s death was clearly
deficient. The question then is whether that represents one of the causal
factors or links in the chain of causation, or is it merely a background
circumstance to the death of Paul Shaw,” stated coroner Philip Byrne.
In
a paragraph headed ‘crux of the finding against ACM’ the coroner stated: “The
failure of staff to appreciate impending trouble due to an inadequate level of
supervision, surveillance and monitoring of the unit, especially in the light
of information that was abroad concerning home brew; an inadequate audit of
implements such as the broom from which the shiv used
to stab Paul Shaw was manufactured, together with the inadequacy of the search
regime in the weeks leading to Mr Shaw’s death, clearly represent causal
factors in the chain of causation that culminated in the death of Mr Shaw.
Incarceration obviously represents a loss of liberty - it is a travesty when it
results in a prisoner losing his life.”
The
coroner also noted that: “some of the
critical requirements in the Operating Manual especially the Search Manual were
clearly not fulfilled: this impacted inexorably on prisoner management and
security. Responsibility for these inadequacies must be borne up the chain of
command of management hierarchy, from corrections officers to supervisor, to
unit managers to the top - where the buck ultimately stops.”
While
noting that since 1999 “significant advances” had been made, the coroner
recommended that
State Coroner
Two
new correctional facilities designed and built by Bilfinger
Berger subsidiary Victorian Correctional Infrastructure Partnership have been
officially opened. Marngoneet Correctional Centre
near Lara, west of
Junee’s attractive package
GEO
Group Australia Pty Ltd has been recruiting an operations manager for its 750
bed Junee Correctional Centre in New South Wales (see
PPRI # 70-67, 64, 61, 57, 55, etc).
According to a recent advert in The Australian
the company is offering “an attractive salary package negotiable in excess of A$100K.” For that salary “… the primary objectives … will be
to ensure the operational functioning of the June Correctional Centre on a day
to day basis…” GEO recently won a three year extension of its contract to
manage the facility until March 2009.
■
The 2004/05 annual review of Junee’s performance
found that the GEO Group “met their contractual obligations.” The department of
corrective services “will continue to work collaboratively with GEO to maintain
this standard.” In previous contract
years a review was undertaken by the offender services and programs branch
heads. However, this review was not undertaken for 2004/05. The report also
noted that for the year 2003/04, the company had $A5,625
withheld from its performance linked fee for failing to meet targets on
prisoner classification. This penalty had not been calculated at the time of
writing the 2003/04 report (see PPRI
#69). At the time of writing this latest performance report the departmental
review panel had not made its assessment and recommendations concerning GEO’s performance for the purposes of payment of the
performance linked fee for 2004/05.
New
South Wales Department of Corrective Services, Annual Report 2004/05, Junee Correctional Centre 2004/05 Performance Assessment
Report.
Value for money in
In April 2005 the
government’s public accounts committee resolved to conduct an inquiry into the
value for money from New South Wales correctional centres, compare the costs of
publicly run prisons with the state’s one privately operated facility (GEO
Group-run Junee Correctional Centre, see PPRI # 70-67, 64, 61, 57, 55, etc) and to review whether improvements
to the department of corrective services’ (DCS) calculation of costs would
facilitate better cost comparisons. Published in September 2005, the report’s
findings included:
● The publicly run
correctional centres operating under the recently implemented ‘Way Forward’
model have reduced overtime, sick leave and other employee related expenses.
During the 2004-05 financial year new correctional centres opened in Kempsey and Windsor. These centres are operating under a
new consent award as part of the department of corrective services’ ‘Way Forward’
workplace reform package. This new management model was developed to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of delivering corrective services and this
agreement with the Public Service Association led to the prisons being publicly
rather than privately run.
● Despite
the difficulty in making comparisons between the performance of particular
correctional centres, the privately operated centre was a useful comparison for
the department during the development of its ‘Way Forward’ strategy.
● The
auditor general’s reports to parliament from 2002-2004 compared the cost of
correctional centres operated by the department of correctional services
against the privately operated centre at Junee. The
inmate costs quoted in 2004 were from a DCS costing model that is no longer
used for external purposes, as it is not comparable to other jurisdictions.
● The
government should maintain at least one private prison in the state for the
purposes of benchmarking the performance of publicly operated centres and to encourage
the development of innovative management techniques.
● The
government should consider strategies to improve the cost effectiveness of
health services provided by Justice Health.
The report also noted that:
● The
cost of monitoring Junee and managing the contract is
approximately A$150,000 per year.
● The
actual operating costs for Junee are not available as
GEO is a private company that is in competition with other operators in
● The
pay rates at Junee have remained static since 2003.
● The
department of corrective services were not of the opinion that the private
sector was required for change to occur.
● Besides
comparing costs of correctional centre other qualitative factors should also be
compared to provide a complete picture. However, comparing the quality of
service can be even more difficult than comparing the cost.
● The
committee considered that information on the performance of the corrections
sector should be improved. Of particular importance is developing performance
measures for preparing inmates for their return to society through
rehabilitation programmes and training.
● On
recidivism the committee also noted that there are no figures available from
the
NSW Parliament
Legislative Assembly, Public Accounts Committee Value for Money from NSW
Correctional Centres, Report No. 13/53 (No.156) - September 2005.
■ The transcripts of public
hearings held in June 2005 and the written submissions to the inquiry are
available at www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/publicaccounts
Serco wins in
Serco Australia has been chosen as the preferred bidder for
a five year contact to manage the 700 bed medium security Acacia Prison in
Western Australia (see below and PPRI
#70, 66, 64, 62, 59, 57, 55, 52, 48, 37, 36, etc). If contract negotiations are
successful the company will take over from AIMS Corporation on
Acacia Prison “still not the
standard bearer”
“Acacia is still not the
standard bearer or pacesetter for the remainder of the prison system that it
was intended to be. There is much to be achieved if it is, one day, to fulfil
that role,” said
The prison, run by Sodexho subsidiary AIMS Corporation, was inspected in July
and August 2005. It was previously inspected in 2003 and the inspector found
that “there had been some improvements since then. However in the context where
the first five year contract would expire in May 2006, these improvements were
not sufficient for the inspector to be satisfied with the prospect that the
management contract might simply be ‘rolled over’ to the existing contractors,
AIMS. There seemed to be every reason to explore the field of potential
operators - in other words to test the market. This was the view that the
Government itself adopted.”
The inspector also noted that:
“the prison is nowhere near as fragile as at the time of the first inspection.
On the other hand there are some significant areas of poor performance.”
He also stated that
“under-employment is a reality in most prisons in
The inspection “found
considerable disquiet on the part of prisoners in relation to the allocation of
work” and that “the situation seemed especially poor for Aboriginal prisoners.”
“Overshadowing most aspects
of the 2005 inspection … was the issue of human resources-especially staffing
levels, training, qualifications and support from management.” A pre-inspection
survey of staff saw many staff “list low rate of pay and no incentives, lack of
ongoing training, and poor support from management as some of the worst things about
working at Acacia and supported the apparent reasons for the instability of the
workforce.”
The inspector made 32
recommendations for improvements.
Report of an Announced Inspection of Acacia Prison,
Report No. 32, March 2006, Office of the Inspector of Custodial
Services, www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au
Department of Justice report
on AIMS contract
“In considering its options
the department had an independent market analysis carried out that identified a
broad base of interest in the private sector for providing the prison service.
This, together with AIMS chequered performance, led to the decision to
re-tender the contract when it expires in May 2006, enabling the government to
retest the market and improve the current form and cost of the contract,”
stated the director general of Western Australia’s department of justice.
In 2005 the government
commissioned an External Assessment Report which “found that there were clear
signs that the prison was slipping back into a traditional prison model and its
innovative ideals were being eroded. There was also evidence of behaviour that
was not consistent with the stated aims of a private prison.” Other findings
included:
● senior management were not leading the facility as an
innovative and inclusive organisation, and not demonstrating leadership in the
prison;
● custodial staff were spending more time in the control room
rather than being visible in the prison;
●
constant changes at senior management level had created a lack of consistency
and some senior positions were subject to prolonged periods of acting;
● a
severe loss of custodial staff over the year meant 50% of staff had less than
12 months experience in prisons and morale was extremely low; and
● some local practices by a new general manager appeared to be
aimed at increasing profitability by cutting expenditure, often in key areas
such as staffing.
The annual report also noted
that: “This year AIMS Corporation failed to provide the necessary prisoner
employment hours as required … and was penalised financially. Of greater
concern the department issued Acacia prison with a default notice in May 2005
after the withdrawal in April 2005 of the prison’s accreditation as a
registered training provider, following its failure to renew its malpractice
insurance cover. However, by September the department was satisfied with the
actions taken by AIMS to have its registered training provider status
reinstated, but remained concerned at the lapse in management processes.”
The department also re-examined
the measures used to determine performance-linked fees and decided that: “more
stringent performance measures, with a stronger focus on input and innovation
will be included in any new contract.”
“…While AIMS has responded to
the review with an effective strategy, it has not, over the last four years,
lived up to the promise of its tender documents and has not delivered the
quality of service required by the department.”
From June 2004 to May 2005
AIMS could have received a total of A$24,811,574 for
the operation of Acacia Prison., including a base contract fee of A$23,570,990
and a performance-linked fee of A$1,240,583. However, because AIMS failed to
fully meet the requirements for several performance linked fees the company
only received a total of $A24,668,818.
AIMS’ five year contract
began in May 2001 with the option of extending the contract on one or more
occasions for terms of three to five years. The maximum total operational
period for the contract was 20 years. In July 2005 the department of justice
advised AIMS that it would not be renewing the contract on
Government of Western Australia, Department of
Justice, Annual Report 2004/2005, Acacia Prison Services Agreement, 30
September 2005, www.justice.wa.gov.au
Court security and custodial
services inspected
“The usual mode of assessing
whether privatisation of criminal justice services has been successful is to
look at the performance of the contractor in providing those services - in this
case AIMS. That is obviously the core question. However, the attitude and
skills of the purchaser - the department of justice and ultimately the State of
As well as the contractor’s
performance the inspector’s report investigated the contract and dealt with
issues such as the government’s cost-based financial model, under-resourcing, under-investment in infrastructure, poor
communication, parliamentary scrutiny, accountability,
and contract variations.
One finding was that: “in
general terms there was a high level of approval of the service being provided
by AIMS, especially in comparison with that of previous providers (the police
and the Department). This view was commonly expressed by persons being held in
custody, persons attending the centre and ancillary staff such as
lawyers…” However, other findings
included:
● “Staffing levels and
training remain a major issue and … putting the welfare of persons in custody,
court staff and AIMS staff at risk.”
● “The initial training
for AIMS court security and custodial services staff seems adequate, but there
is a deficiency in ongoing training.”
● “…as the contract
enters its first renewal period, the department must adhere to its legislative
responsibility to table all amendments to the contract to ensure full public
scrutiny and accountability can occur as intended by parliament.”
The inspector
made17 recommendations for improvements. Since the inspection was carried out both the government and the
company have had the opportunity to respond to the inspector’s recommendations
and these are included as an appendix.
Report of an Announced Inspection of Metropolitan
Court Security and Custodial Services, Report No.31, February 2006, Office of
the Inspector of Custodial Services, www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au
■ See also Department of Justice, Annual Report
Contract for the Provision of Court Security and Custodial Services, 30
September 2005, www.justice.wa.gov.au
NSW Police buildings
contract
United Group Ltd an
Australia-based multinational has won a five year contract to provide property management
services at all New South Wales’ (NSW) 1,200 police buildings including police
stations, court houses, special purpose facilities, commercial and residential
properties (see PPRI #70). Operations
will commence on
GSL’s immigration contract
re-tendered
GSL’s contract to operate immigration detention centres on
behalf of the department of immigration and multicultural and indigenous
affairs (DIMIA) will not be automatically extended (see PPRI #70, 66, 63, 57-55, 52, 51, 46-44, etc). The company’s
existing $A300 million contract expires in 2007. GSL is expected to participate
in the new tendering process.
Flaws in DIMIA’s
2002 tendering process
The federal government’s
re-tendering process for what was, at the time, Australasian Correctional
Management’s (ACM) contract to run immigration detention centres has been
severely criticised by the auditor general (see PPRI #70, 66, 63, 57-55, 52, 51, 46-44, etc). In a recent report
the auditor general found that the department of immigration and multicultural
and indigenous affairs’ records were “not fit for purpose” and compromised its
ability “to demonstrate accountability and transparency.”
Documents had been altered by
the department to disguise the fact that the identity of the successful bidder,
GSL, had been disclosed before it was appropriate. Also, at A$287
million GSL’s bid was the cheapest when originally
submitted in October 2002 compared with ACM’s A$334
million and MTC’s A$365 million. But when GSL revised
its calculations and increased its bid by A$32.5
million the department did not consider the other bidders. The auditor general
found that ACM’s bid should have been preferable as
it offered higher standards at a similar price.
ACM also received A$5.7 million as a contract completion payment which, the
auditor general concluded, was “not within the intent or the sprit of the
contract for the provision of detention services.”
Management of the Tender process for the Detention
Services Contract, The Auditor-General, Audit Report
No.32, 2005-06, Australian National Audit Office, March 2006, www.anao.gov.au
Labor pledges end to private
immigration detention
Industrial action over wages
and conditions
Some 300 prison officers at
the maximum security Kutama-Sinthumule Correctional
Centre at Makhado, Limpopo,
have taken industrial action in pursuit of improved wages and benefits (see PPRI #69, 68, 64, 63, 61, 58, 56, etc).
According to the staff, the
company running the prison, South African Custodial Management (GEO Group), has
failed to meet the terms of the contract between SACM and the government. The
company, however, has a legal opinion suggesting that it is not at fault. While
the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), the union that represents
the majority of staff, condemned the strike a spokesperson told PPRI that, according to the contract,
employees should not be worse off than their public sector counterparts. POPCRU
alleges that the company is refusing to pay accommodation allowances and that salaries
have been set too low from the start of the contract in 2002.
During the industrial action
prisoners rioted and set fires causing damage to an accommodation unit. At
least one prisoner was killed. The police, national defence force and the department
of corrections brought the situation under control.
Privatisation to solve
overcrowding?
Private prisons would help
solve the problem of congestion and pose a challenge to publicly run prisons,
according to
However, the justice minister
has subsequently announced that 25,000 of the 40,000 prisoners languishing in
227 prisons across the country will be released. Priority for release will be
given to the sick, the elderly, and those who have been awaiting trial for
longer than the sentences they might face.
Notes on privatisation
“The new prisons that are
being built or planned appear generally to be public rather than private sector
institutions…” although …”Korea and Japan are exceptions to the general trend,
” noted the summary of the 25th Asian and Pacific Conference of
Correctional Administrators (APCCA), September 2005.
A discussion of privatisation
found that the strongest form, where companies design, construct, finance
and/or manage prisons “remains a highly controversial topic.” Other “less
dramatic and less controversial forms” include the use of private security
companies to carry out prisoner escorts and contracting for the provision of
medical services …” The rapporteur noted that “the
basic message to emerge is that it is possible to privatise some services and
to save money but also to maintain (or improve) standards of service delivery.
The key to achieving better value for money in this area is ‘getting the
contract right’ in the first place and in effective monitoring of compliance by
the private contractor.”
Meanwhile, “many
jurisdictions remain opposed to prison privatisation. The Correctional Service
of Canada, for example, believes that the public sector ensures an unqualified
and undiluted commitment to the public interest in corrections.” In
In terms of privatising services
“many jurisdictions (even those which see no role for the private sector in
actually running prisons) have energetically pursued contracts for certain
services with the private sector. Well managed initiatives of this sort have
brought significant savings.”
The
conference was attended by delegates from 23 jurisdictions in the Asian and
Pacific region. The private sector had observer status through Troy Ittensohn, general manager, Management & Training
Corporation (MTC) in
APCCA conference documents
are available at www.apcca.org
Private Prisons in
America, A Critical Race Perspective, Michael A. Hallett,
This book describes how,
under the auspices of a governmentally sanctioned ‘war on drugs,’ incarceration
rates in the
The Rise and Stall of
Prison Privatisation: An Integration of Policy Analysis Perspectives, Richard
F. Culp, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Policy Review,
Vol. 16, No. 4, December 2005, Sage Publications, www.sagepublications.com
“This
article examines prison privatisation policy in the
Progress
or Profit? Positive
Alternatives to Privatisation and Incarceration In Shelby County, Tennessee, by
D. Kaplan and B. Libal, Coalition Against Private Prisons and Grassroots
Leadership, December 2005. www.grassrootsleadership.org
“This
report summarises the experiences of prison and jail privatisation in
communities similar to
The
In
this article the author states: “Today the
Lessons from prison
privatisation for probation, Alison Liebling, in Rehshaping Probation and Prisons, The new offender
management framework, M.Hough, R.Allen
and U.Padel (Eds) Policy
Press,
“There
will continue to be problems in conceptualising and developing appropriate
targets in the awarding of contracts (as well as interpreting the scores). We
should be watching carefully to track whether the presence of commercial
interests in prison and probation work has a distorting effect on national and
regional policy. As other countries rapidly turn to the
This
contribution is one of a collection of articles based on a July 2005 symposium
in
Prison Privatisation, in
Penal Systems, A Comparative Approach, Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, Sage
Publications, 2006, www.sagepublications.com
This
book includes the chapter Prison
Privatisation, in which the authors examine “the nature and extent
of private sector involvement in the provision of penal facilities and
services” within four groups of countries described as: neo-liberal;
conservative corporatists; Oriental liberalist corporatist; and Nordic social
democracies. “It is almost certainly not coincidental that the recent revival
of private sector involvement in the provision of prison facilities and
services should have originated in, and made most progress to date within, the
neo-liberal group pf countries.”
Speaking of Performance Improvement, Charles Elliott, Prison Service Journal,
Issue 163, January 2006, www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk or email
psjournal@hotmail.com
“In
prison management, we hear much of ‘driving change forward’; of robust, change
centred management; of meeting the targets of the change agenda; even of
‘pushing change through’. The mental images that such phrases conjure up are of
a group of eager middle or senior managers confronting a reluctant and/or
lethargic work force that will respond only in proportion to pressure applied.
The final recourse in that pressure is the threat to increase the involvement
of the private sector, with the implication that jobs would be lost and/or pay
reduced; contestability has teeth.” The author argues that this “single image
was always misleading.”
The Limitations of
Electronic Monitoring, Mike Nellis, Prison Service
Journal, No. 164, March 2006, www.prisonservice.gov.uk or
email:psjournal@hotmail.com
“The
electronic monitoring (EM) of offenders remains a key ingredient of government
crime control policy and while it has been repeatedly oversold by politicians
as a ‘get tough’ measure, there is no doubt that electronically monitored
curfews can add in a useful element of surveillant
control to more traditional forms of community supervision, at least with some
offenders. There is no reason to think that in itself EM can have a
rehabilitative impact, though it may help to sustain an offender’s involvement
in programmes which do. Moreover, particularly with young offenders, there is
also no reason to think that EM will much of a
controlling impact either, unless the offenders are simultaneously given
incentives and assistance to desist from crime…”
Independently verified
reductionism: prison privatisation in
“The
Scottish Parliament recently considered proposals, which, if implemented, would
lead to a considerable expansion of prison privatisation. Both the Scottish
Prison Service and the Scottish Executive used what they claimed to be an
independently verified cost saving of £700 million as the major justification
for these proposals. The way this figure was constructed and used provides an
example of the increasing tendency on the part of government to quantify what
cannot be quantified, to ‘make the invisible visible’. This article uses
several methods to interrogate this figure of £700 million, particularly the
role played by ‘net present value’ in its construction. Its fuller significance
emerges from an understanding of the contexts of the Private Finance Initiative
and Public Private Partnership, the experience of prison privatisation and the
foreclosure of alternatives to privatisation. This article is based upon an
analysis of government documentation, interview evidence with key players and
testimony given by them to a cross-party committee charged with investigating
these proposals.”
Prison readings, A
Critical introduction to prisons and imprisonment, Edited by Yvonne Jewkes and Helen Johnston, Willan
This
book “provides a critical introduction to some of the main debates and dilemmas
associated with prisons an imprisonment, and acquaints students with some of
the most relevant literature on the subject.”
Included are: Prison
privatisation: panacea or Pandora’s box, by
Michael Cavadino and James Dignam
and Can prisons be legitimate? Penal politics, privatisation, and the timeliness of an old idea by Richard Sparks.
Report on the unannounced
inspections of three short-term non-residential immigration holding facilities:
Calais Seaport France; Coquelles Freight, France; and
Coquelles Tourist France, 2-3 August 2005, HM Chief
Inspector of Prisons, January 2006, published March 2006, www.inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmprisons/inspect_reports/
An
examination of the facilities established under international treaty on French
soil by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). “The fundamental
obligation of the Securicor (G4S) staff who run the
Managerialism in Australian Criminal Justice: RIP for KPIs? By Arie Freiberg,
“Over
the last 25 years managerialism, or new public
management, has produced sweeping reforms in the criminal justice system.
However, it has been relatively unremarked, probably
because it has been embedded in a broader modernising process of government.
This article examines the substantive effects that managerialism
has had on the criminal justice system.”
How Packer bought the County Court: Public private
partnerships are costing taxpayers huge amounts, by Kenneth Davidson, The Age,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/kenneth-davidson/how-packer-bought-the-county-court/2006/04/12/1144521396951.html
In this article the author
argues that: “Apologists for public private partnerships… always fail to point
out that most of the real benefits of private sector efficiencies occur at the
construction stage and can be captured through competitive tendering without
losing the overwhelming advantage of being able to borrow at a lower cost than
private investors.” He also explains the comparative costs of projects
including two court complexes. “The County Court cost A$130
million to build. Down the street is the Federal Court that cost $A108 million.
The financing cost of the County Court is 8 per cent, compared with the
government bond rate of 5.5 per cent for the Federal Court. Over the life of
the County Court PPP, Victorian taxpayers will have paid out $A520 million - an
average of $A26 million a year. Over the same period, the interest on the bonds
necessary to finance the Federal Court will have cost Commonwealth taxpayers
$A300 million - an average of $A15 million a year. And at the end of the period
what have we got? In the case of Victorian taxpayers,
nothing. The building is owned by Challenger Financial Services Group,
which is owned by
Investigation into the
handling, storage and transfer of prisoner property in Victorian prisons,
Report of Ombudsman
“Grievances
about prisoner property contribute to poor prisoner morale and management
problems for staff. There are also cost implications for the prison system in
investigating prisoner complaints, interviewing staff members involved and
replacing damaged and lost property. The aim of my investigation was to provide
recommendations that would lead to improving the management of prisoner
property in all Victorian prisons.” The
two private prisons, Fulham Correctional Centre (Geo) and port Phillip Prison (GSL) hold
about half of the state’s prisoners and “considerably more property than the
other prisons.” GSL Custodial Services also currently transports all prisoners
and property between prisons, police cells an courts. The report details the
complaints, investigation, conclusions and recommendations for improvement.
ENDS
Prison Privatisation Report International
Internet: www.psiru.org/justice
Email:
stephennathan@dsl.pipex.com